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Abstract 
 
 This thesis critically examines the Central Intelligence Agency‘s 
hand in the decision-making process through a detailed and careful analysis 
of its daily, weekly and ad hoc intelligence reports.  The research is 
significant because, in the early years of the Cold War, particularly during 
the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, Washington was unsure whether 
Soviet provocations were local or global.  Based on the premise that the 
CIA had a mixture of successes and failures, this study will demonstrate 
that, with relative consistency, intelligence analysts provided relatively 
perceptive assessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions.  In part, 
because of CIA assessments, US policymakers were better able to conclude 
that the Kremlin was unable and unwilling to risk a direct military 
confrontation with the United States during these two crises.   
 Furthermore, much of the literature on the Central Intelligence 
Agency‘s early years scarcely addresses, beyond general terms, what 
analysts were telling policymakers during these two Cold War crises.  Too 
often, it has been argued that the CIA‘s voice remained removed, 
uninvolved and had little to no influence in the decision-making process.  
For this reason, this thesis—through a detailed, critical analysis of the 
Agency‘s intelligence reports—will offer a fresh perspective and help to fill 
an important gap in this critical aspect of history. 
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Chapter I 
  
 
Nam et ipsa scienta potentas.
1
 
 
Introduction 
 The intelligence failures of September 11, 2001 and the Iraq 
invasion of 2003 have again stirred the public‘s interest in the secret world 
of the Central Intelligence Agency.  For America, the threats from 
terrorism, weapons proliferation, rogue nations, and extremists represent a 
new affront to national security.  These challenges facing intelligence in the 
twenty-first century are a dramatic departure from yesterday‘s legions of 
communist armies and assured mutual destruction.  At the same time 
though, these new threats highlight the relevance of the not-so-distant 
history of the Cold War by reminding us of the inseparable, if variable 
relationship between intelligence and foreign policy.  In principle, 
intelligence begins with the policymakers setting requirements or needs and 
then moves to the collection of raw data in response to those needs.  
Analysts then analyze the significance of the collected data and prepare a 
report—often the most challenging task.  How great an impact their 
analysis makes upon the policymakers‘ assumptions is a matter for 
empirical historical research.   
 The purpose here is to examine the role and impact of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the early phases of the Cold War, but always 
                                                 
1
 ‗Knowledge itself is power.‘—Sir Francis Bacon  
7 
 
mindful that any examination of its record is biased by contemporary 
standards and expectations.  After setting out the purpose of the study, this 
introductory chapter will outline the research questions I will explore, the 
primary focus being on the destabilizing crises of the Berlin blockade 
(1948-1949) and the Korean War (1950-1953).  It will then offer a 
summary of the sources used during my research and their limitations, 
before setting the study‘s basic structure and methodology.  Finally, the 
chapter will present a brief historical overview of some of the major Cold 
War events that gave shape to the fascinating world of America‘s first 
peacetime intelligence agency. 
 
 
Purpose and Research Questions 
 Numerous well-researched and perceptively written books have 
been published on Western intelligence in the past fifty years.  This 
proliferation of literature offers a deep pool of knowledge on the CIA‘s 
relatively brief history.  It also makes it possible for this study to leave the 
more sensational topics of covert action and espionage aside, as well as the 
CIA‘s early organizational and bureaucratic history to other scholars.2  
Since previous studies have not gone far enough in examining the scope of 
the CIA‘s reports during the formative years of the Cold War, this project is 
timely.  In line with a small number of researchers pursuing a similar 
                                                 
2
 For one of the most recent, thought-provoking studies on the CIA‘s early Cold War 
clandestine  efforts, see Sarah-Jane Corke, US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy:  
Truman, secret warfare and the CIA, 1945-1953, Halifax:  Routledge, 2008. 
8 
 
approach, I will provide a detailed and critical analysis of the declassified 
intelligence reports that reached policymakers during the Berlin crisis 
(1948-1949) and the early stages of the crisis in Korea (1950-1951).  
Throughout the study, I will examine the CIA‘s hand in the decision-
making process through a detailed analysis of the daily, weekly and ad hoc 
intelligence reports, as well as numerous foreign policy documents.
3
  The 
thesis will do something new by suggesting that the CIA was an active 
participant in the process, even serving, at times, as a guiding hand for 
policymakers.   
 The central thrust of my argument is on this idea of a guiding hand 
during times of crisis, particularly on the question of whether the Soviet 
Union had the ability or intent to provoke a major armed conflict.  In doing 
so, the thesis will move beyond value judgments about whether this 
influence was good or bad.  (The impression often given is that the early 
CIA was flawed, uninvolved and had little to no influence in the decision-
making process).
4
  Likewise, when turning to the second issue to be 
examined, that of the quality of the CIA‘s assessments, the premise will be 
that the CIA had a mixture of successes and failures.
5
  The study will 
examine the extent to which the Agency succeeded in providing accurate 
                                                 
3
 Copies of these intelligence estimates were frequently disseminated to departments 
outside the Office of the President, including:   National Security Council, National 
Security Resources Board, Department of State, Office of Secretary of Defense, 
Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, State-
Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy 
Commission, and Research and Development Board.  
4
 See the selective literature review in the following chapter. 
5
 Harry Howe Ransom reminds us that intelligence analysts have to move between the 
factual and speculative properties of intelligence production to deal with ‗unknowable 
questions.   In Central Intelligence and National Security, Cambridge, Mass:  Harvard 
University Press, 1958, p. 41.  
9 
 
and perceptive assessments, and where it fell short in doing so, it will show 
why these shortcomings occurred and their impact on the policy process. 
The study asks the following questions:  First, how well did analysts 
read Soviet intentions and how effectively did it read each crisis?  Much of 
the time, this means deciphering what actions the CIA believed that the US 
could pursue without provoking direct Soviet military retaliation.  Second, 
how accurate were its warnings and assessments?  Although much more 
difficult to answer directly, this study is also interested in how much 
influence the CIA had on the formation of policy decisions during times of 
crisis.  This is the most difficult challenge—to move beyond drawing 
inferences and show precise connections between the CIA and decision-
making.  For this reason, the author has been careful not to overstate what 
can and cannot be claimed.  To what extent the intelligence reports 
influenced policymakers is almost impossible to measure.  Looking for an 
answer to this question is like finding a tea set in a hardware store.  
Nevertheless, an examination of these questions is necessary, and indeed 
overdue, because of the level of detail it unearths about the relationship 
between intelligence and foreign policy-making. 
 
  
Sources and Limitations 
 Restricted access to intelligence documents, coupled with the 
mystery of the declassification process of classified materials, makes it 
difficult to understand the analysts‘ thought processes and how they went 
10 
 
about compiling and analyzing information.  To complicate matters further, 
there exists a real paucity of interdepartmental memoranda and 
communiqués in the intelligence archives.  These documents either no 
longer exist or remain classified.  What remains classified today is 
impossible to ascertain, making it exceedingly difficult to establish the 
exact extent to which the CIA influenced policy assumptions.
6
  As a result, 
historians miss an opportunity to adequately examine the opinions 
expressed and revised before the final official publication intended for 
dissemination, leaving us, instead, to connect the dots in the historical 
record. 
 It has been pointed out that, as historians, we should remain 
suspicious of the declassification process of intelligence documents in the 
archives; and that because of the inherent problems with omission, we do 
not yet know the full story of the Cold War, and ‗indeed we may never 
know.‘7  But, of course, this distortion does not mean that we should waver 
in our determination to understand this fascinating facet of history.  
Intelligence documents continue to be declassified through the Historical 
Review Program of the Central Intelligence Agency.  In fact, the CIA 
continues to release millions of pages of historical documents to the 
National Archives and Records Administration; and has, for over a decade, 
reduced its backlog of pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and 
                                                 
6
 The intelligence reports made available for researchers are selected by the CIA‘s 
Historical Review Program.  (The guidelines for this program have still not been made 
clear to the public). 
7
 Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand:  Britain, America and Cold War Secret 
Intelligence, London:  John Murray Ltd., 2001, pp.7-8. 
11 
 
Privacy Act requests.
8
  Careful examination of these documents (although 
pre-selected) can still shine a brighter light onto what the CIA was telling 
policymakers during the early Cold War. 
When first considering the direction of my research, I visited the 
national archives in Moscow, hoping to carry out more of a comparative 
research approach of US and Soviet intelligence during the Cold War.  
During this visit, I met with the head of the Russian archives in Moscow, 
Tatiana Pavlova, who informed me that my access to intelligence materials 
was ‗hopeless.‘  True to her word, when I requested the intelligence дело 
(files) listed on the описи (inventory or catalogue files) the archivists 
informed me that intelligence documents were restricted to researchers. 
After returning from Russia, I quickly concluded that any 
comparative history of US-Soviet intelligence would be unbalanced, at 
best.  The summary of sources reflects an adjustment from this early 
direction of my research.  The study drew from a large number of primary 
sources that, for our purpose, have not been mined as deeply by other 
scholars, including:  a) the declassified Central Intelligence Agency 
documents at the CIA‘s Electronic Reading Room and at the National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Maryland.
9
  
This includes documents accessed from the CIA CREST database at 
                                                 
8
 CIA Press Release, ―CIA Makes Significant Progress on FOIA and Privacy Act Cases,‖ 
November 6, 2007.  https://cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements. 
9
 For access to the CIA‘s Electronic Reading Room, see http://www.foia.cia.gov.  For the 
most up to date verification on FOIA materials listed, contact:  CIA, FOIA Public Liaison, 
Washington, DC, 20505 or, more directly, by contacting:  CIA, Attention:  Kathryn I. 
Dyer, Information & Privacy Coordinator, Room 1107, Washington, DC 20505. 
12 
 
NARA;
10 
b) the US State Department publications, to include the FRUS 
(Foreign Relations of the United States) series; c) the memoirs of US 
policy leaders and intelligence officers, and d) a wide range of the existing 
literature (primarily American and British) relating to intelligence and US 
foreign policy. 
In addition to source limitations, it is also necessary to reflect on the 
many nuances of the decision-making process, bearing in mind that the 
cause and effect relationship between the intelligence producer and the 
policy consumer is often elusive and rarely conclusive.
11
  The policy 
process remains a complex amalgam of bureaucratic inertia, special 
interests, economic considerations, leadership personalities, alliances, 
institutional credibility, political moods, public and media pressures and 
personal loyalties.
12
  President Harry S. Truman‘s decisions were based 
heavily on counsel from his circle of advisors, particularly from his 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, whom represented one of the most 
important voices of the early Cold War.
13
  As the 33
rd
 President of the 
                                                 
10
 The CREST computer database system of declassified documents is released or reprinted 
by the CIA‘s Center for the Study of Intelligence and obtained from the CIA Records 
Search Technology at the National Archives and Records Administration.  The documents 
issued by the CIA can be categorized roughly into three groups.  1) internal memoranda, 2) 
intelligence from the field on specific topics, and 3) finished intelligence.  This final 
group, disseminated to the policy consumer, encompasses the bulk of the primary source 
material used for this study. 
11
 Although dated, Brewster C Denny‘s Seeing American Foreign Policy Whole (Chicago:  
University of Illinois Press, 1985) provides a superb analysis of these nuances. 
12
 For further discussion on this point, see Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War, London:  
Routledge, 1995, p. 70.  Arthur Darling‘s book also remains a useful resource on the 
bureaucratic wrangling during the Truman administration.  See, The Central Intelligence 
Agency:  An Instrument of Government, to 1950, University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 
1990. 
13
 Other important personalities included:  Charles Bohlen, Secretary of Defense, James 
Forrestal, (Forrestal was an unapologetic supporter of covert action, including the Ukraine, 
China, and the Italian elections of 1948).  Robert A. Lovett (Lovett was Marshall‘s 
undersecretary of State beginning in 1947 and later, as Truman‘s Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, was instrumental in the creation of the CIA), Averall S. Harriman (US 
ambassador to Moscow from 1943-1946, later serving as special advisor to Truman, 
13 
 
United States, Truman also relied on the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) under 
George Kennan and Paul Nitze, as well as members of the National 
Security Council.  As a member of the NSC, the CIA‘s Director weighed in 
on any major foreign policy issue, either formally through the NSC or 
through a report passed on to NSC members.  Given the many facets of the 
policy process, then, it would be unwise to suggest that the archival 
evidence provides unproblematic empirical proof that policy was simply 
some reflection of intelligence, whether sound or flawed.
14
  In actuality, the 
CIA represented just one of the many voices that shaped policy, and, at 
times, could be given less weight than other, more readily digested policy 
inputs.  This complexity makes our understanding all the more difficult, but 
it is also what makes detailed research so important. 
 Finally, I would like to acknowledge my biases, as I am aware of 
them.  My youth was spent growing up in America during the final decades 
of the Cold War.  Throughout my teenage years, I was aware of the 
televised political rows between President Ronald Reagan and Premier 
Mikhail Gorbachev.  I observed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
political fallout during my service in the United States Navy.  As a PhD 
                                                                                                                           
McCloy, and Nitze (Nitze played a key role in drafting the planning guidance document 
NSC68 in 1950, giving the containment policy a more military dimension).  For a more 
detailed discussion of these influence on policy see, Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of 
Power:  National Security, The Truman Administration and the Cold War, Stanford:  
Stanford University Press, 1992.  The President continues to draw from a number of 
information brokers that help to shape American foreign policy, including:  the National 
Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense intelligence 
organizations, the State Department‘s Bureau for Intelligence and Research, and the 
Departments of Treasury and Energy. 
14
 Dean Rusk writes about this difficulty in, As I Saw It, Daniel S. Papp, ed., New York:  
W.W. Norton, 1990, pp. 52-53.  ‗With the constant flow of information, it is difficult to 
determine the wheat from the chaff.  Analysts and policy makers alike tend to interpret 
information to support their own viewpoints, giving rise to differences.‘  Rusk‘s 
observation touches upon the built-in oppositional component to the CIA‘s early 
assessments.  
14 
 
research student studying in the United Kingdom, I hope to have achieved 
some distance from this not-so-distant political landscape that has shaped 
so many Americans who grew up during the Cold War. 
 
 
Methodology 
 The thesis is based on a case-study approach, examining two early 
Cold War crises—the Berlin blockade and the Korean War.  In particular, it 
will concentrate on the period during each crisis in which the threat of 
escalation was elevated, up to the time when the crisis passed its high 
watermark.  Avi Shlaim defines this period as ‗the first trigger event until 
the return of the perceptions of threat, time, and probability of war to non-
crisis level.‘15  There are a number of striking parallels between the two 
case-studies.  First, both Berlin and Korea were political tripwires that 
threatened to escalate into a broader global war.  Second, both crises 
provided analogous intelligence challenges.  Third, both were direct 
challenges to American policies of containment.
16
  Finally, each crisis saw 
the failure of peaceful cooperation and resulted, instead, in entrenched 
political and military partition.  The first crisis had a profound effect upon 
the second.  In fact, the study will show that for CIA analysts and 
                                                 
15
 Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949:  A Study in Crisis 
Decision-Making, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983, p. 162.  
The author presents one of the most authoritative studies on the subject but only briefly 
touches on the CIA‘s appraisal of the crisis.  
16
 John Lewis Gaddis‘ Strategies of Containment:  A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 
American National Security Policy (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1982) remains one 
of the best studies on Containment. 
15 
 
policymakers the face-off in Germany served as a model in Korea.  The 
geopolitical divisions followed a remarkably similar pattern of provisional 
partition caused by the failure of the US and the Soviet Union to agree on 
the terms of unification and the establishment of governments in both 
fragments of the divided countries. 
 However, there were also important differences between the two 
crises. Berlin was a likely Soviet target and a primary interest for America.  
Korea, on the other hand, seemed an improbable hot spot, yet emerged as a 
central battleground.  And though it was a lower priority for policymakers, 
a line was breached in Korea that was unacceptable. Additionally, the crisis 
in Berlin never required a military draft, and casualties never had to be 
factored into the conflict.  In contrast, Korea, an old-fashioned kind of war, 
though fought along twentieth-century lines, was far more violent.
17
   
 It is also important to emphasize that these particular case studies 
enable us to observe Cold War dynamics and the interplay between 
intelligence and policy-making under the continuity of leadership of Joseph 
Stalin and Harry Truman.  The elimination of any change in the supreme 
political leadership of the two superpowers enhances the value of the two 
case studies.  It makes it possible to isolate, with some precision, the degree 
to which the CIA‘s role remained constant in the two situations, and the 
ways in which it differed. This, in turn, increases the scope for more 
general conclusions based on the comparative case-study method. 
                                                 
17
 Although the use of bombers, tanks, naval power and fighter aircraft were implemented 
during combat, the fighting was more often carried out with machine guns, field artillery, 
rifles, bayonets and hand grenades.   
16 
 
Structure 
 The study is presented in seven chapters.  After a brief introduction, 
the second chapter will offer a selective review of the intelligence 
literature.  This historiography will focus on the key historians, the former 
policy and intelligence officials and the journalists who have struggled with 
the difficult questions surrounding the CIA‘s history.  The main body of 
work consists of the original case studies—the Berlin blockade and the 
Korean War.  Chapters three and four will center on the CIA‘s influence on 
the policy-making process in the Berlin crisis, while chapters five and six 
will focus on Korea.  The thesis will demonstrate that, with respect to 
Soviet intentions, the CIA was most effective and accurate at answering the 
question:  Will the Cold War turn hot?  Many policymakers at the time 
believed that it was about to do so.  Cold War historian, John Lewis 
Gaddis, reminds us that, in retrospect, we can see that though Stalin ran 
risks in initiating the Berlin blockade and in sanctioning the North Korean 
invasion, he behaved cautiously.
18
  This study will show that the CIA, 
perhaps better than anyone in Washington, understood this at the time.  
Finally, chapter seven will present my conclusions arising from the two 
case studies. 
                                                 
18
 John Lewis Gaddis, ‗The Intelligence Revolution‘s Impact on Postwar Diplomacy.‘  
See, The Intelligence Revolution, A Historical Perspective, from the Proceedings of the 
Thirteenth Military History Symposium, 12-14 October 1988, Washington DC:  Office of 
Air Force History, 1991, p. 262. 
17 
 
 
Historical Overview 
 It is difficult to overstate how dire the international situation 
appeared to US policymakers immediately following the Second World 
War.  America was eager to demobilize its military forces after the war and 
to disengage from international conflicts, even at a time when its overseas 
interests had been markedly broadened.  In addition, policy priorities were 
directed elsewhere in the world.  The United States‘ demobilized war 
machine and diminished presence overseas left it ill prepared to confront 
the spread of Soviet influence across Europe, the Far and Near East and the 
Mediterranean.  This reality colored the political mood with ‗fear of 
another depression, fear of the emergence of a new dictator, and fear of a 
third world war.‘19  Moreover, a series of events in 1946 all but guaranteed 
a chilling of relations between the US and Soviet Russia, leaving 
Washington with an air of anxiety and uncertainty.
20
  And as relations 
soured, economic problems abounded and the spread of communism 
threatened governments overseas.
21
  The escalation of confrontational 
                                                 
19
 Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis:  The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-
1948, New York:  W.W. Norton & Company, 1977, p. 144. 
20
 On February 9:  Stalin delivers a speech in which he states that war between the Soviet 
Union and the United States and England was inevitable.  Feb. 22:  Kennan‘s first 
delivered his view of containment in his ‗long telegram‘ from Moscow.  Feb. 28:  US 
Secretary of State James Byrnes unveils new, tougher policy towards the Soviet Union.  
March 5:  Winston Churchill delivers his ‗Iron Curtain speech‘ in Fulton, Missouri.  
March:  the Soviet Union‘s refuses to depart Iran.  The U.S. fears this foreshadows Soviet 
tactics of exerting political and economic pressure as a means of coercing concessions 
from vulnerable nations.  August 7:  The Soviet Union demands joint control of the 
Turkish straits.  US policy leaders fear a Soviet invasion of Turkey and a subsequent 
seizure of the Black Sea Straits.  In response, Washington calls for Turkish opposition with 
the assistance of US military and economic aid.  September 24:  The Clifford Report urges 
Truman to oppose Soviet expansion. 
21
 At the same time, the Soviet Union was strengthening its postwar intelligence that had 
been damaged by demobilization, defections and the Venona decrypts.
21
     
18 
 
rhetoric and provocative actions from both sides had primed mindsets in the 
US, potentially on track for extreme behavior, to react strongly to Soviet 
actions.   
Gaddis notes that although President Harry S. Truman and his key 
advisors were determined to secure the United States against whatever 
dangers it might confront, ‗they lacked a clear sense of what those might be 
or where they might arise.‘22  In this situation, intelligence would begin to 
become an increasingly valuable tool for an administration that struggled to 
understand its new adversary.  Douglas F. Garthoff notes: 
 
In a world increasingly seen as threatening 
and at times even dangerous because of 
Moscow‘s ambitions and actions, Agency 
analysts sought to understand and explain 
Soviet behavior to a US policymaking 
community anxious to make the right moves 
to ensure US national security.
23
   
 
By 1947 the US-Soviet relationship had emerged as the single most 
important factor dominating national security priorities.  On the one hand, 
the United States‘ emphasis on economic assistance elicited anger and 
frustration from the Kremlin.  On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
challenged and frustrated US postwar reconstruction efforts.  Moreover, 
Joseph Stalin was hard to read:  policymakers often held conflicting points 
of view about likely acceptable levels of Soviet cooperation.  This left 
                                                 
22
 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know:  Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press, 1997, pp. 5-6. 
23
 Douglas F. Garthoff, ‗Analyzing Soviet Politics and Foreign Policy,‘ Watching the 
Bear:  Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, Washington DC:  Center for the 
Study of Intelligence, 1996.  Garthoff worked for the CIA from 1972 to 1999, starting out 
in the Office of National Estimates as an analyst of Soviet affairs. 
19 
 
policymakers—the president, his senior advisors, important political 
appointees such as the secretaries of state and defense, and the National 
Security Council—unsure just how much the Soviet Union was prepared to 
risk.  Policy leaders from both sides knew little of the other‘s intentions and 
scrambled to utilize intelligence to better understand its adversary.  
Initially, Truman‘s ignorance on intelligence matters left the White 
House in the dark about the nation‘s national security priorities.  At the 
time of his predecessor‘s death in April 1945, Truman was arguably one of 
the least qualified and informed people in Washington to deal with 
intelligence.  This initial lack of experience appears to have led to a general 
supposition that he was not ‗attuned to intelligence‘s expanded role as an 
instrument of policy and power.‘24  In fairly short order, though, his 
administration was looking to intelligence as a means of projecting power 
and securing influence to counter threats by the least antagonistic means.   
 Before the establishment of the CIA, US intelligence was primarily 
the responsibility of the military services and the State Department; and 
these organizations operated to provide only the specific tactical and 
operational information that their sponsors required.  The Central 
Intelligence Group (CIG), established by President Truman in January 
1946, was the first postwar attempt to provide strategic warnings and 
conduct clandestine operations in an attempt to address growing concerns 
about Soviet intransigence.  However, the prevailing wisdom in 
                                                 
24
 Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence:  The Secret Side of American History, 
Toronto:  Lexington Books, 1990, p. 175. 
20 
 
Washington by 1947 was that the CIG was providing little in the way of 
hard intelligence and had broken no new ground.
25
   
 Anxious then to avoid another surprise like the attack on Pearl 
Harbor,
26
 President Truman dissolved the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) 
and, through the National Security Act of 1947, created the Central 
Intelligence Agency on 18 September.
27
  The CIA was tasked with 
addressing this gap and providing the top US leadership with the 
comprehensive intelligence that could be considered independent of the 
views of the military services and the State Department.
28
  Specifically, the 
CIA was expected to have the following: 
 
 An ability to collect intelligence on the 
Soviet target to enable analysts to fulfill 
their requirements 
 An operational ability to help blunt Soviet 
expansion 
 An ability to weaken the Soviet Union 
and its allies and surrogates 
 A counterintelligence capability to deal 
with Soviet espionage and possible 
subversion
29
 
                                                 
25
 Stansfield Turner, Burn Before Reading:  Presidents, CIA Directors and Secret 
Intelligence, New York:  Hyperion, 2005, p. 49.  The CIG was the successor of the World 
War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
26
 The views on Pearl Harbor vary widely.  On the question of surprise, Thomas Schelling 
notes, ―…it is not true that we were caught napping at Pearl Harbor.  Rarely has a 
government been more expectant.  We just expected wrong.‖  See, ―Foreword to Roberta 
Wohlstetter,‖ in Pearl Harbor:  Warning and Decision, Stanford:  Stanford University 
Press, 1962, p. vii. 
27
 President Truman established the CIG in January 1946 to provide strategic warnings and 
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It also seems likely that Truman‘s most trusted advisor, Secretary 
Acheson, was eager for a centralized intelligence agency to play a 
dominant role in the coordination of national intelligence estimates and 
even welcomed ‗the closest possible relationship at all levels with the 
CIA.‘30  Truman‘s right-hand man understood that the existing National 
Intelligence Authority needed to be strengthened and centralized;
31
 
although he would later reflect that he had the ‗gravest forebodings about 
this organization and warned the President that as set up neither he, the 
National Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to know 
what it was doing or to control it.‘32 
About the time the Central Intelligence Agency was established, a 
number of high profile indictments seemed to justify the growing fear and 
apprehension in Washington.  In a growing frenzy, the investigative 
organization, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC),
33
 fed 
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off newspaper headlines that exploded with sensational reports about Soviet 
espionage in America.
34
  Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, intent 
on capitalizing on the political momentum of HUAC, sent a letter to the 
President in February 1950, in which the Senator advised Truman that he 
had the names of 57 communists who were in the State Department and 
challenged the President to expose the traitors.
35
  Although his accusations 
were unfounded, McCarthy seemed to voice the current distrust from a 
segment of Americans about not just the supposed Soviet influence in 
government but about the men who ran American foreign policy.‘36 
In addition to domestic trouble, the first major challenge to create 
anxiety about the possibility of military confrontation came in 1948 as 
policy leaders focused much of their attention on the destabilizing events in 
Berlin.  The situation in Germany remained tense and uncertain during the 
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first face-to-face confrontation between the US and the USSR.  The 
emerging crisis in Berlin signified the first irrevocable fracture between 
East and West that threatened to spiral out of control and escalate into a 
major armed conflict.  The crisis also represented ‗the most concrete 
manifestation‘ of the early Cold War and a defining phase in the formative 
years of the Central Intelligence Agency.
37
   
During this time Washington was busy participating in the North 
Atlantic collective security alliance and implementing a policy of 
containment in a range of theaters including, Greece, Italy, Eastern Europe, 
the Middle East and the Far East.  Policymakers were becoming 
increasingly aware of the need for accurate assessments that could clarify 
for an already anxious administration whether or not the Soviet Union 
desired or was prepared for a military confrontation with the West.  Such 
assessments could better contextualize security threats and show whether or 
not the Kremlin‘s actions necessarily reflected a wider strategy for a direct 
military confrontation.   
The crisis in Berlin had left US policymakers more suspicious, 
disillusioned and anxious about Soviet intentions.  Though the airlift to 
Berlin was a success, Washington became increasingly alarmed about the 
developing situation in the Far East.  With little political or military risk, 
Soviet involvement in Asia was gathering momentum, leaving Washington 
unsure whether the communist actions were regional or more global.  
Whereas communism was losing ground in Western Europe by early 1949, 
it was rapidly gaining power throughout Asia as the Kremlin was stepping 
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up pressure in the region.  Historian Kathryn Weathersby points out that the 
‗specter of World War III never loomed larger or more corporeal than it did 
in 1950.‘38 
In response to the domestic challenges (mentioned earlier) and foreign 
policy challenges (like Berlin, Korea and the Soviet Union‘s explosion of 
an atomic device), Paul Nitze, the principal author of National Security 
Council Resolution 68 (NSC68), drafted a policy blueprint in spring 1950 
that addressed the Soviet problem by bridging the gap between American 
needs and efforts.  Referred by Charles Bohlen as ‗the most significant anti-
communist statement of 1950,‘39 NSC68‘s militarization of America‘s 
foreign policy concerns not only led the White House to view communism 
in increasingly threatening terms, but also gave Washington a clearer 
mandate for a peacetime intelligence agency.
40
   
 This new direction is also significant because it specifically 
provided for an ‗improvement and intensification‘ of intelligence activities 
and the ‗intensification of affirmative and timely measures by covert means 
in the fields of economic, political, and psychological warfare with a view 
to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite 
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countries;‘41 and called for the intensification of US efforts in research and 
development and an improvement in ‗the handling of intelligence matters 
when there was a crisis situation.‘42  By the time hostilities in Korea had 
ended, the CIA‘s footing as an important voice for policy decision-making 
seemed all but secured.
43
  However, its record and reputation up to that 
point, both in terms of providing accurate and perceptive intelligence and 
its impact on policy formation, has continued to be debated by historians. 
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Chapter II 
 
Demystifying the Rogue Elephant:
44
   
Changing Interpretations of CIA History 
 
The policymaker-intelligence relationship has 
not received as much attention as the other 
parts of the process.
45—Mark M. Lowenthal  
 
 While the general public might reference The Complete Idiot’s 
Guide to the CIA for an understanding of America‘s notorious spy agency, 
those requiring a more scholarly examination of the subject will need to 
look beyond this kind of popular treatment of the secret world of 
intelligence.
46
  The CIA‘s history may be much discussed, yet it is still 
clouded with controversy, misperceptions and complexities that lead to 
contradictions.  At times, the literature can seem like a kaleidoscope of 
shifting perceptions that threaten to obscure the truth and obfuscate history.  
Moreover, the methodologies used are often narrowly based—restricted to 
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histories written about covert action, signals intelligence, espionage, 
counterintelligence, intelligence personalities and domestic security, rather 
than engaging in the larger picture of intelligence‘s role in policy decision-
making. 
 Above all, we must keep in mind that the intelligence literature is, 
in many ways, a subset of the wider history of the Cold War.  As American 
foreign policy was shaped for forty-three years by the East-West struggle, 
intelligence was always a large part of what made the Cold War hot or cold.  
One must be careful not to give way to confusion between the 
historiography of the CIA and the general historiography of the Cold War, 
although we can broadly categorize intelligence history according to the 
general historiography picture.  In particular, the CIA has ‗defenders and 
critics‘ from participants and historians that tend to fit in with the Cold 
War.  However, intelligence history has some special features of its own.   
 Broadly speaking, we can identify schools of intelligence 
historiography which overlap with the history of the Cold War.  This 
intelligence literature can be divided into three major categories based on 
Cold War history:  orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist, although 
certain imbalances and gaps in the historical mosaic are present in each of 
these schools of thought.  It is also possible that the CIA requires a different 
categorization of history.  As we gain distance from the Cold War, these 
categories—orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist—might feel worn 
out.  Alternatively, we may want to begin to think of the intelligence 
literature by more fresh categorizations:  a) biographies, b) institutionalists, 
c) contextualists, and d) those authors that jump the species barrier. 
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 Particularly striking about the literature is the limited attention 
devoted to the Agency‘s analytical role in the Berlin crisis.  It is helpful to 
start with a guiding hypothesis to test how each of the three Schools treats 
the questions explored in this study.  We might expect to learn that, as a 
general rule, the orthodox authors have been close to the CIA and, although 
often silent on issues of the CIA‘s influence during the two crises, have 
tended to overstate its role.  While often quick to point to the Agency‘s 
missteps and blunders, the revisionists have not been particularly exercised 
on pinpointing the CIA‘s specific influence.  We might also expect to learn 
that post-revisionists have begun to problematize and analyze the issue, but 
that they have not devoted much detailed attention to the very early period 
where these two crises are concerned; nor have they arrived at a firm 
estimate, one way or the other.  To an extent, these general trends can serve 
as a guide in constructing a framework of the literature. 
 This chapter is not designed to outline the staggering number of 
volumes of intelligence history that have been written since the CIA‘s 
creation.
47
  Hence, the authors treated do not represent any definitive list, 
but rather a careful selection from the relevant literature of the CIA‘s 
history, including publications by historians, retired government officials 
and journalists.  Whether writing as participants or observers, intelligence 
historians have shed a great deal of light on important questions, to include:  
How and why did the CIA evolve as a bureaucratic institution?  How did 
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intelligence fit into the high-stakes arena of foreign policy?  What was its 
relationship with presidents and their advisors?  What were the functions 
and duties of intelligence analysts and covert actions?  Can and did 
intelligence improve?  From studying these questions, one would hope to 
see more answers about the CIA‘s nature and the quality of its influence 
during its formative years.  Of course, a salutary reminder must be made 
that, while historians can tread too lightly across the intellectual minefield 
to decode a number of unanswered or underexplored questions, these 
authors simply do not have the space to explore every aspect of intelligence 
and foreign policy.   
 The purpose here, therefore, is to provide a concise treatment of 
some of the most relevant and influential literature on the CIA, paying 
particular attention to how the CIA‘s analysis of the two early Cold War 
crises (Berlin and Korea) has been treated.  This review will also show how 
the attitudes toward intelligence have evolved in the last 50 years, while 
addressing more detailed writings on intelligence, in relation to these two 
crises, in the central chapters themselves. 
 Interpretations of CIA history have been less than homogenous, 
tending to polarize around two contentious viewpoints—that of the 
defender and that of the critic.  The terms ‗defender‘ and ‗critic‘ are 
somewhat crude, and crude descriptions can lead to crude understandings.  
(For example, none of the critics provide a blanket of condemnation).  
However, it is helpful to highlight this distinction because it overlaps with 
the orthodox and revisionist authors—the partisan attitudes that have done 
so much to shape the intelligence literature of the last half-century.  
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Likewise, these labels can further our understanding of the orthodox, 
revisionist and post-revisionist schools, none of which has gone far enough 
in answering the questions that this study will examine.   The momentum 
of the Cold War was, without doubt, the most profound force shaping 
intelligence literature from the 1950s to the 1980s.  The major authors often 
found taking sides irresistible.  The 1960s to the 1980s witnessed some of 
the most controversial and contentious publications on the secret world of 
intelligence.  As American intelligence activities expanded throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, the CIA came under more intense public scrutiny, playing 
out most dramatically in the congressional oversight committees of the 
mid-70s.  Then, as one might expect, the pendulum of perception began to 
shift away from the extremes and toward the center by the 1990s.  The 
literature written during the post-Cold War era came to represent some of 
the most even-handed histories, often explaining the CIA‘s past in more 
complex, multi-dimensional terms. 
 In addition to recognizing the divisions between ‗defenders‘ and 
‗critics,‘ it is also helpful to remember that intelligence historians were 
profoundly influenced by the orthodox (traditionalist), revisionist and post-
revisionist historians—which is why it is useful to consider these three 
schools of Cold War historiography, in turn, when reviewing the CIA 
historiography.  The orthodox historians tended to place the lion‘s share of 
the responsibility for the Cold War on the shoulders of Soviet leaders and 
the supporting communist ideology.  These scholars often viewed the Cold 
War as a contest between good and evil.  And while many of the revisionist 
historians also saw the East-West struggle in moral terms, much of the 
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blame centered on America‘s capitalistic need to protect and expand its 
overseas markets, thereby limiting its diplomatic options with the USSR.  
In contrast, post-revisionist scholars cautioned against a single-source 
blame and explanation for the causes of the East-West conflict.  The post-
revisionists quickly gained ground with their ability to understand the 
complex interactions and ideologies of the Cold War. 
 Charles D. Ameringer notes that someday, ‗the historian and the 
intelligence professional together may write the perfect book.‘48  Until that 
time comes, though, there is still a great deal to be learned from the 
―imperfect‖ historical record.  This leads to one final distinction that should 
be made.  The authors of intelligence history write from two different 
vantage points—that of the observer (scholars and journalists) and that of 
the participant (retired policy and intelligence officials).   
 To various degrees, historians have been denied access to many 
primary sources, making it exceedingly difficult to offer definitive 
conclusions.
49
  Within the last two decades, however, documents relating to 
the CIA‘s history have been declassified in massive numbers.  While 
sensitive information about covert operations or CIA operatives remains 
restricted for national security reasons, a wealth of previously classified 
intelligence documents have been declassified at the National Archives and 
Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.  In addition, numerous 
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CIA and Department of State documents have been made accessible online.  
The fact remains, though, that the government continues to balance 
disclosure with secrecy in order to protect sources and methods of 
collection and analysis.  Therefore, historians wanting to know more than 
the available evidence will bear will continue to face real limitations far 
into the future.  Harry Howe Ransom notes that the outside scholar can 
only know what the government chooses to disclose.  Given this inherent 
secrecy, ‗public knowledge is peculiarly subject to manipulation by the 
intelligence establishment.‘50 
 Former intelligence officers have helped to fill in the gaps.  It 
should be remembered, however, that, frequently passionate about their 
subject, these participants often have an axe to grind or an agenda to pursue 
and excessively stress perceived injustices and shortcomings.  By using 
their publications as a mouthpiece for reform proposals, airing grievances, 
or showering accolades on themselves or colleagues, they risk taking 
objectivity hostage.  Moreover, these participant-turned-historians can be at 
odds over balancing secrets with the declassification process.   
 Yet when approached with caution, these authors‘ unique insight 
into the internal atmosphere and day-to-day workings of the CIA can 
significantly enhance our understanding of Cold War intelligence.  These 
participants-turned-authors provide an insight into the nuances and 
subtleties of the intelligence-policy process that might not otherwise be 
accessible.  Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 
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1973, suggests that participants of history offer a valuable perspective and 
can portray ‗the workaday operations and internal atmosphere of the 
Agency.‘51  Similarly, D. Cameron Watt states, ‗It is in the nature of the 
dialogue between historians and officials that those who move between the 
two communities, whether as historians serving as officials or as former 
officials turned historians, have a crucial role to play.‘52  Still, many 
historians maintain that participants make poor historians of events.  In 
contrast to the academic observers who are familiar enough with the issues 
to have the insight but distant enough to be objective, participant-historians 
have been considered ‗too involved to achieve the detachment necessary to 
write objectively.‘53  
 The list of former intelligence and policy officials to contribute 
include:  Allen Dulles‘ The Craft of Intelligence, Victor Marchetti and John 
D. Marks‘ The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, and Ray S. Cline‘s The 
CIA Reality vs. Myth.
54
  More recent works include Russell Jack Smith‘s 
                                                 
51
 Foreword by Helms, in The Unknown CIA, p. x. 
52
 D. Cameron Watt, ‗The Historiography of Intelligence in International Review,‘ 
Intelligence in the Cold War:  Organisation, Role, International Cooperation, Ed., Lars 
Christian Jenssen and Olav Riste, Oslo:  Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 2001, p. 
190.  Harry Howe Ransom provides another illuminating, albeit brief review of the 
intelligence literature since 1974 in which he divides the literature into four categories:  
memoirs defending the intelligence system, whistle-blowing exposés, scholarly analyses, 
and reports from executive and congressional studies.  See ‗Being Intelligent about Secret 
Intelligence Agencies,‘ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1. (Mar., 
1980), pp. 141-148. 
53
 James Noren and Noel E. Firth, Soviet Defense Spending:  A History of CIA Estimates, 
1950-1990, Bryan, Texas:  Texas A&M University Press, 1998, p. xiii. 
54
 Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, New York:  Harper & Row, 1965.  Dulles‘ view 
of intelligence is one of the most widely recognized orthodox defenses of the CIA.  Victor 
Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, New York:  Dell, 
1974.  Although viewed as an insider, Marchetti‘s publication represents a revisionist 
exposé of the CIA during Vietnam War, including heavy-handed attacks on CIA's 
clandestine services.  Ray S. Cline, Washington:  Acropolis Books, 1976.  This original 
version of Cline's work has been revised and reissued twice under different titles:  The CIA 
Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan. 
Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1981.  The next revision, The CIA: Reality vs. Myth, 
(Washington, DC: Acropolis Books) was published the following year. 
34 
 
The Unknown CIA:  My Three Decades with the Agency
55
 and Michael 
Herman‘s Intelligence Power in Peace and War.  Because these authors are 
constrained by secrecy (most have to sign CIA Secrecy Agreement Form 
368 before submitting their material to the CIA‘s Publications Review 
Board for prepublication security review), their work can fall short of 
objectivity.  In fact, Allen Dulles writes:  ‗On the whole, Americans are 
inclined to talk too much about matters which should be classified.  I feel 
that we hand out too many of our secrets.‘56 
 
 
The Orthodox Authors 
 We must first recognize that, unlike the general Cold War 
historiography that we associate with the late 1950s and 1960s, the CIA 
historiography follows a less chronological pattern.  A few key reasons 
account for this distinction.  First, the intelligence literature from the 
orthodox school is typically more defined by its relationship to the subject 
than any established chronology.  Second, the secretive nature and 
declassification process of intelligence history means that our 
understanding of the CIA is more tentative than the broader history of the 
Cold War, making schools of thought in intelligence less rigid. 
 Often associated with official histories, many writers from the 
orthodox school have tended to place great emphasis on the structure and 
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organization of intelligence, often producing what is essentially an 
institutional history.
57
  These authors also deal at length with the 
personalities and bureaucratic politics within the intelligence community, 
particularly DCI leadership styles and personalities.
58
  Moreover, these 
works usually shrink away from anything controversial.  This is not to say 
that history must always contain controversy to be influential or valuable.  
However, one can imagine few subjects more rife with complexity and the 
potential for controversy than the Central Intelligence Agency‘s history.59 
 Among the orthodox historians, Sherman Kent‘s 1949 book, 
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, remains a classic text on 
US intelligence and policy making.
60
  Kent, a former intelligence officer 
(serving on the Board of Estimates from 1952), is widely recognized as the 
single most influential contributor to the analytic doctrine and tradecraft 
practiced in the CIA‘s Directorate of Intelligence.  Throughout his career, 
Kent argued that, to remain highly objective, the intelligence estimative 
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process must remain detached from policy.
61
  His argument that the truth 
had to be approached through a systematic method, much like the method 
of the physical sciences, served as a blueprint for the future of intelligence.  
His influence is perhaps most apparent in Bruce Berkowitz and Allan 
Goodman‘s update of Kent‘s classic text, Strategic Intelligence for 
American National Security.
62
 
 Another feted CIA veteran, Scott D. Breckinridge, also published a 
relatively non-contentious study, The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence 
System.
63
  The study argues that the CIA has had the right ear of the 
President in matters of decision-making but notes, however, that this was 
more through the authority of the NSC and not the CIA directly and has 
vacillated, depending on presidential attitudes.  In many ways, this book 
was a response to the legal challenges against the CIA during the 1970s.  
Breckinridge, no doubt shaped by his defense of the Agency before the 
1975-1976 congressional investigating committees, used his study as a 
platform to set the record straight, to demystify the Agency‘s structure and 
organizational history, and to defuse the legal wrangling and abuse of 
power questions surrounding US intelligence activities. 
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 Thus, Breckinridge‘s history does more to examine the background, 
history and organization of US intelligence in an attempt to place the CIA‘s 
role within the context of the whole of US intelligence organizations than it 
does to scrutinize the spy agency.  In emphasizing the hierarchy and 
structure of US intelligence, Breckinridge focuses on the organizational 
details of intelligence, clandestine operations, scientific and technical 
collection, and counterintelligence.  The study also deliberates on the DCI‘s 
early role within this national security structure, arguing that the immediate 
political fallout of the National Security Act of 1947 would have fallen on 
any new intelligence agency that ran up against the vested interests of the 
other established intelligence organizations.  The questions that generated 
the initial reservations about the CIA‘s powers were therefore, he argues, 
‗inevitable.‘64 
 Breckinridge does touch upon the challenges facing the CIA during 
the Truman presidency, albeit in little more than a dozen pages.  The nature 
of the national security structure, he suggests, is one of uncertainty.  This 
being the case, though, the arrangements and procedures of intelligence are 
designed to ‗present the President with the best-considered programs 
possible.‘65  Breckinridge remains ambiguous, however, and skirts around 
passing any critical judgment, writing that intelligence summaries can 
provide a reliable forecast and ‗even in times of uncertainty, it still can 
highlight the issues.‘66 
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 In the postwar environment, Breckinridge manages only a handful 
of general conclusions about the CIA‘s early efforts and efficacy during the 
Truman presidency.  During the time of the crisis in Berlin, the 
considerable concern over internal stability in Germany, he notes, led to 
intelligence operations ‗designed to learn about internal political 
developments, especially those involving related Soviet subversion.‘  The 
effect was to put the CIA in touch with a broad range of social strata (most 
notably refugees from Eastern Europe and the USSR) in Western Europe, 
‗thereby producing valuable contacts with access to a great variety of 
knowledge about events of the moment.‘  He notes that the CIA‘s initially 
‗limited capabilities gathered substance and momentum.‘67  As in his 
reflections on Berlin, Breckinridge uses little ink on the issues facing the 
policy-intelligence relationship in Korea other than to briefly note that the 
intelligence services had failed to predict the outbreak of war in 1950.
68
   
 At the same time, Breckinridge highlights the outside political 
forces that have affected the direction of the US intelligence community.  
Although he cites American and international law as necessities of 
legislative oversight, the author, nevertheless, suggests that legal inquiries 
into the past will do nothing to change the need for a robust intelligence 
community.  ‗Whatever the future adjustments, and whatever 
reorganizations and realignments there may be,‘ insists Breckinridge, ‗the 
basic missions and functions will continue essentially as they have been, 
until there is a change in the nature of the world in which we live.‘69  
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However, one must be careful not to assume this volume is simply nose-
thumbing the Agency‘s critics.  More likely, Breckinridge is merely 
suggesting that although dramatic public scrutiny and legislation designed 
by its critics will continue to test the CIA‘s authority, in the end, these 
challenges do not alter the basic missions and functions of intelligence.  
 In the company of Sherman Kent and Scott D. Breckinridge is one 
of the most influential authors of the CIA, Arthur B. Darling.  Unlike the 
aforementioned historians though, Darling was an academic recruited by 
the CIA as its Chief Historian, with no prior intelligence experience.  In 
The Central Intelligence Agency:  An Instrument of Government, to 1950, 
the author was allowed a great deal of latitude in developing his own ideas 
about the CIA‘s early history and was granted unprecedented access to the 
official files and records of the CIA and to interviews with participants.
70
  
Written in 1952-1953 (but only declassified in November 1989), not long 
after the events described in his book occurred, this publication represents 
the first volume published internally by the CIA‘s Historical Review 
Program and still stands as a major contribution on the CIA‘s origins and 
its growth as an instrument of policymaking. 
 Darling‘s almost exclusive focus on the CIA as an instrument of 
government is quite narrow as it discusses whether or not the Agency 
should exist as a cooperative interdepartmental activity or should become 
an independent agency.  A review in The American Historical Review notes 
that the result is ‗not disinterested analysis but a historical survey endorsing 
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the necessity for an independent, centralized agency.‘71  Indeed, Darling 
succeeds best at chronicling the bureaucratic conflicts that defined the 
Agency‘s early years and shaped the future direction of intelligence.  His 
interpretations of events have drawn controversy and criticism, though, 
most notably from Ludwell Lee Montague.  But why the fuss over 
Darling‘s history?  He did, after all, have unprecedented access to classified 
files, as well as advancing recommendations for a more efficacious CIA—
as an instrument of government separate from, but contributing to, the 
policymaking process.  Most likely, the controversy arose because his book 
was less a study of Cold War events than an examination of the politics 
within the national security bureaucracy and in the debate surrounding the 
future of intelligence Darling stepped on the toes of those he wrote about.  
According to the CIA‘s own history staff, ‗Darling blames the State 
Department, the FBI, and what he terms the Military Establishment—
especially the heads of the military intelligence services—for much of the 
hardship which the early CIA endured.  It was against this backdrop of 
personal and departmental politicking that Darling set his narrative.‘72  
Interestingly, Allen Dulles, the then Director of Central Intelligence, also 
disagreed with Darling‘s findings on the basis of its favorable assessment 
of the Agency‘s record prior to the ‗Dulles period.‘  As DCI, Dulles 
restricted access to Darling‘s publication by classifying its contents.73   
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 Written from the CIA‘s perspective, Darling‘s study provides us 
with one of the first examinations of the origins, structure and function of 
the Central Intelligence Agency during the Truman administration.  On 
specific Cold War crises where the CIA helped to shape the Truman 
administration‘s policy priorities, though, Darling breaks no new ground.  
Referencing the Berlin blockade on April 1, Darling states, ‗There was no 
doubt that the affairs of the world were in crisis.‘  Yet, the events of the 
crisis and the CIA‘s precise role are never discussed.  (Not so surprisingly 
then, neither is the crisis in Korea that transformed Darling‘s ‗instrument of 
government‘).  Moreover, the book never makes the connection between 
the organizational history of the Agency and exactly what it was telling 
policy makers. 
  A more recent volume produced by the CIA‘s Historical Review 
Program comes from Ludwell Lee Montague, a long-time intelligence 
official.
74
  Montague‘s text, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of 
Central Intelligence, October 1950- February 1953, is similar to Darling‘s 
study, in that it reflects orthodox CIA doctrine.
75
  According to Montague, 
Smith was the first successful DCI, even arguing that the CIA‘s history can 
be divided into two distinct periods:  pre-Smith and post-Smith.
76
  Not 
unlike Darling, Montague‘s administrative study of the Smith years sheds 
considerable light on the difficulty the Agency had in developing as a 
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national, centralized intelligence agency.  The American Historical Review 
notes:  ‗Montague‘s hermetically sealed account of administrative changes 
within the agency and bureaucratic turf battles with national security rivals 
will induce claustrophobia in anyone interested in what the agency was 
doing outside Washington.‘77 
 However, Montague does less to deliver any indictment of other 
government agencies, concentrating more on arguing how the Central 
Intelligence Agency could be most effective in framing foreign policy.
78
  In 
the end, though, his position of the CIA arises from his primary thesis that 
Smith, in the line of intelligence directors, was a success while most other 
DCIs were, to various degrees, failures.  Montague‘s contribution to the 
CIA‘s historical series is significant not only because his study 
demonstrates how Smith‘s leadership influenced the Agency‘s future, but 
also because he offers convincing arguments for elevating Smith‘s 
standing.  Certainly by 1950, President Truman had developed a desire for 
foreign policy decisions to be based on better intelligence.  However, 
Montague‘s study of the CIA‘s influence during the Truman presidency 
takes on a decidedly dry and bureaucratic tone.  He examines 
organizational decisions that centered on the dismantling of the CIA‘s 
Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) and the creation of the newly 
established Office of National Estimates (ONE) and the Board of Estimates 
(BOE) under Smith‘s leadership.  But he does so at the expense of 
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revealing much about what intelligence was telling decision-makers during 
the crises that occurred during Smith‘s tenure as DCI. 
 Given the restricted scope of his study (from October 1950-
February 1953), Montague is justifiably silent on the CIA‘s influence 
during the Cold War‘s first major crisis—the Berlin blockade.  He picks the 
Korean War up at the point when the central character, General Walter 
Bedell Smith, took the helm at the CIA, showing how intelligence activities 
were intensified as a direct response to the fear that the communist attack in 
South Korea ‗might be the opening gambit of World War III.‘79  Montague 
traces the steps taken by the CIA leadership who sought to overcome the 
difficulties that had burdened the Agency and worked towards better 
intelligence.  Korea presented the recently appointed DCI with an 
opportunity to push through rapid reforms and requests for increased 
personnel and facilities.  So rather than focus on what influence Smith‘s 
Agency had on policy, Montague‘s study keeps close to the reforms that 
were brought on during the Korean War. 
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The Revisionist Authors 
 
Unfortunately, the American government 
keeps people like me very busy.—William 
Blum
80
 
  
 The orthodox or ‗traditional‘ historians of Cold War history who 
came to symbolize the consensus history of the 1940s and 1950s were 
eventually overshadowed by new voices in the 1960s and 1970s.  Still 
reeling from the embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs and the anti-
establishment sentiment from the Vietnam War, the CIA received a black 
eye in 1974 when the New York Times disclosed that the CIA had been in 
violation of its congressional charter for engaging in domestic spying.  
(That same year, President Richard Nixon was implicated in the Watergate 
break-in scandal).  These events, coupled with mounting domestic 
opposition to the Vietnam War and public scrutiny stemming primarily 
from congressional hearings on intelligence blunders and abuses, appears to 
have set the tone for a number of revisionist authors. 
 Compared to the orthodox school, the revisionist literature is often 
associated with anti-establishment attitudes.  Yet they continued to write 
significant histories that have often brimmed with controversy.
 81
  The 
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revisionists argue that the Cold War provided justification for and triggered 
the implementation of illegitimate measures.  ‗Their view,‘ William Corson 
argues, ‗was that the mere existence of the Cold War created a de facto, all-
embracing, no-time-limit ―war powers act‖ which gave [policymakers] 
absolute license to ignore, violate or otherwise abridge anyone‘s civil, 
personal, and human rights.‘82  In addition, these historians were, as one 
might expect, quite critical of the Central Intelligence Agency.  
Revisionists‘ often simplistic view about warnings failures, public trust 
abuses and unchecked powers often accompany proposals for what they 
consider bureaucratic ailments plaguing the intelligence community, and 
they frequently offer analysis of where the future of the CIA needs to go.
83
  
Much of their criticism aimed at the CIA‘s early warnings is often narrow 
and framed in terms of political points-scoring.  This is not to suggest, 
however, that one cannot find some balance within this extremely varied 
group of historians.   
 Journalist William Blum, one of the most controversial historians, 
has, perhaps more than any other, worked to expose the misdeeds of the 
American establishment, particularly its Central Intelligence Agency.  
Above all, Blum‘s diatribes strike against what he considers the American 
government‘s imperialism and its henchmen of national security—the CIA 
and the US military.  The CIA:  A Forgotten History:  US Global 
Interventions Since World War 2 represents Blum‘s first major indictment 
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of American intervention.  Presented as a thematic, rather than 
chronological study, A Forgotten History spans the CIA‘s history from its 
missions in the Far East and Mediterranean during the 1940s and 1950s to 
South America and Cuba during the early 1980s.
84
  Referring to America‘s 
position after the Second World War, Blum shows his revisionist stripes in 
writing, ‗The opportunity to build the war-ravaged world anew, to lay the 
foundations for peace, prosperity, and justice, collapsed under the awful 
weight of anticommunism.‘85 
 So what does Blum have to say about the CIA‘s role in policy 
decision-making?  In A Forgotten History, Blum is not only silent about the 
1948-1949 Berlin crisis, but also about the entirety of Roscoe 
Hillenkoetter‘s tenure as Director of the CIA (May 1947-October 1950).  
On Korea, Blum has only slightly more to write.  Beyond suggesting the 
CIA‘s complicity in germ warfare and ‗numerous bombings and strafing by 
American planes‘ against Korean civilians, Blum argues that American 
interest in Korea centered on the communist element of the conflict.
86
  On 
the CIA‘s recommendations for a Western response to the crisis in Korea, 
Blum insists that the National Security Council (NSC) had only ‗the barest 
information available to it.‘  Blum suggests that, had the UN members not 
been so dependent upon US economic assistance, the United Nations would 
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have been in the best position to evaluate the necessity of repelling the 
North Korean attack.
87
 
 This original study was followed up by a no less controversial 
edition in 1995.  Essentially an update of his 1986 book, Killing Hope:  US 
Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II varies little from the 
1986 publication, other than to extend his study of US policy and 
intelligence bumbling into the mid-1990s.
88
  Using a series of brief case 
studies, Blum again attempts to demonstrate that the failures of American 
interventions of the Cold War are continuing.  However, we quickly see 
that Killing Hope has little to add in the way of the CIA‘s early history and 
is focused on his journalistic resolve to prove that America has done its best 
to thwart peace.  But although neither of Blum‘s publications ever fairly 
assesses the CIA‘s record, his works are, nevertheless, too significant to 
exclude from an outline of the intelligence literature. 
 Jeffreys-Jones, another leading revisionist historian influenced by 
the immediacy of the Cold War, offers a less speculative and less critical 
study of US intelligence and should be considered as more than a tentative 
history.  His most influential book, The CIA & American Democracy, spans 
the first forty years of the CIA‘s history and its struggle with a democratic 
society that has an inherent dislike and distrust of secrecy.
89
  Beginning 
with an analytical account of the Truman administration's tentative attitude 
toward the CIA, the book focuses on the evolution of the CIA from the 
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Truman administration through the Reagan administration.  In each 
administration, Jeffreys-Jones‘ central premise is that the CIA has been 
manipulated by the White House, the Congress, and even the public. These 
relationships, he argues, have damaged the CIA's standing and 
effectiveness in terms of intelligence collection, analysis and covert 
operations.   
 He provides balance to this, however, by suggesting that the CIA 
has enjoyed ‗mixed fortunes in democratic politics,‘ and ultimately 
concluding that the CIA, despite its troubles, has been sound most of the 
time.
90
  The book argues that by keeping American public opinion on its 
side the CIA‘s credibility as a policy tool is elevated, but acknowledges that 
the CIA has become something of a scapegoat, even doubted, at times, 
when proven correct.  That Jeffreys-Jones ends his work stressing reform 
and avoids the familiar call for alternatives is a reminder that this work is 
less partisan than much of the revisionist literature.   
 Reviews in American History reflects that Jeffreys-Jones covers 
virtually every aspect of the CIA‘s history in ‗a highly compressed 
fashion,‘ providing in most cases a less than satisfying account.91  Jeffreys-
Jones does, in fact, explore the intelligence debate of the early Cold War; 
although the work only skims the surface of the major Cold War crises, 
even passing over such critical crises as the Berlin blockade.  For example, 
he only comments how the Bogotá riots had left the CIA politically 
vulnerable during an actual crisis, like Berlin. In reality, though, there had 
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been no predictive failure by intelligence analysts with respect to Bogotá.
92
  
He suggests that this incident was significant because it prompted the CIA 
to issue ‗an indiscriminate profusion of warnings in an attempt to insure 
against political criticism‘ (a charge leveled against the CIA by some 
policymakers regarding its warnings of the communist offensive in Korea).   
Nor does The CIA & American Democracy shed much new light on 
our understanding of the Agency‘s role in foreign policy-making during the 
Korean War, even though the author stresses that Korea ‗opened a new 
phase in the CIA‘s history,‘ in part because the Korean War was another 
example of how Washington used the CIA as a political scapegoat.  This 
was primarily because Truman and his advisors were too ‗preoccupied‘ 
with other problems like Formosa and too impatient to read intelligence 
reports carefully:  they were ‗deaf‘ to important signals from the CIA.  
According to Jeffreys-Jones, ‗Truman could see that if he did not find a 
way of indicating his disappointment with the CIA, the nation might blame 
the president instead.  He therefore dismissed Hillenkoetter.‘93  These 
observations have some value, but only offer a partial explanation for the 
intelligence-policy problems. 
The book also argues that the North Korean invasion had ‗caught 
American forces unawares, but not because of a paucity of warnings by the 
CIA.‘  Jeffreys-Jones reminds us of MacArthur‘s obstructionist policies and 
refusal to allow the CIA to conduct its own operations and research in the 
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Peninsula.  However, he points out that ‗The evocation of the Kremlin 
bogeyman…shows that the CIA was underestimating autonomous 
tendencies in Korea at the same time that it was still covering itself against 
guessed-at contingencies by crying wolf.‘94 
But Jeffreys-Jones never really outlines exactly what intelligence 
was telling policymakers during the crisis.  Instead, the book explores what 
the long-term consequences of the Korean War were for the CIA.  For 
Jeffreys-Jones, even the bloody stalemate and eventual ceasefire did not 
change America‘s standing as a Cold War superpower; it did, however, 
leave Washington with a political bloody nose.  ‗It left the idea that there 
was something rotten in the government….‘95  Yet in the case of the CIA, 
the spy agency was rewarded for, at least what many in Washington 
considered to be, an intelligence failure.   
He also argues that the growing unpopularity of the war had 
reminded policymakers that war against communism was perhaps best 
waged not through conventional militarism, but rather through a 
combination of nuclear deterrence and clandestine operations.  Still 
smarting from the political repercussions of the Korean War then, the 
Truman administration became more receptive to fueling intelligence 
budgets and sidelining congressional oversight for covert operations.  
Korea, argues Jeffreys-Jones, was a long-term positive turn for the CIA 
because of the increase in budgetary expenditures and emphasis on covert 
activities. 
                                                 
94
 Ibid., p. 64. 
95
 Ibid., p. 64. 
51 
 
 Jeffreys-Jones‘ more recent major publication, Cloak and Dollar:  A 
History of American Secret Intelligence advances many of the same 
arguments made in his 1989 book.
 96
  As in The CIA & American 
Democracy, he questions the American intelligence system and its 
evolution toward such enormity and cost.  Cloak and Dollar completely 
neglects CIA history under the directorship of the Agency‘s first two 
intelligence directors—Roscoe Hillenkoetter and Walter Bedell Smith.  As 
a result, the chapters that bookend the CIA‘s formative years—Wild Bill 
Donovan and the OSS to Allen Dulles and the CIA—feel incongruous.  
Beyond this, though, the book successfully links the succession of 
espionage history from America‘s beginning to the contemporary threats of 
terrorism.  While this approach makes for an interesting narrative, it 
nevertheless seems to suggest that the current state of intelligence is shaped 
more by the legacy of intelligence than leadership personalities and 
national security threats.  Cloak and Dollar acknowledges some notable 
successes by American intelligence but seldom tips its hat to the CIA‘s past 
successes, instead focusing on the CIA‘s image as ‗a long-standing 
conspiracy of spies, a great confidence trick designed to boost the fortunes 
of the spy rather than protect the security of the American people.‘97 
 Flawed by Design:  The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, 
published after Jeffreys-Jones‘ The CIA & American Democracy, is a 
theoretical study focused on the bureaucratic and political realities that 
surrounded the emergence of the NSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and 
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the CIA.
98
  Historian Amy Zegart‘s unique interpretations of these 
hallmarks of American national security remain rather contentious.  Her 
book argues that the influence and effectiveness of the national security 
agencies were compromised by a lack of representation, susceptibility to 
executive power, and competition with other agencies, ultimately making 
reform much more difficult.  However, there are places where the author 
fails to connect the dots between her theoretical approach and history in 
some respects.  This is most evident in her generalizations about the events 
that occurred during the era when ‗the spooks reign supreme‘ from 1947-
1963.
99
  The American Historical Review correctly points to the most 
frustrating dimension of Zegart‘s framework:  The evolution of an agency 
is explained ‗principally by its initial design and to a lesser extent, by the 
ongoing interests of relevant political actors and events.‘100  In Zegart‘s 
view then, the birth of the CIA accounts for the history of its life and 
evolution—the spy agency created by the 1947 National Security Act was 
‗flawed by design.‘  This approach is inadequate, though, because it 
confines the CIA‘s history to an exceptionally limited definition.  Her 
emphasis on its origins as the explanatory model for the CIA‘s influence on 
policy decisions remains unconvincing.  Her theories, in turn, fail to 
translate into firm, evidence-based historical case studies. 
 Given the blanket of criticism the book throws over the American 
national security community, Flawed by Design reserves some of its 
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harshest judgment for the CIA‘s analytical function.  For Zegart, the CIA 
was created without the authority to coordinate intelligence from the rest of 
the community.  She makes the claim that the CIA was weak by design and 
strongly opposed by the military services as part of the national security 
structure from the beginning.  ‗Because of the way they are structured,‘ she 
argues, ‗American national security agencies ensure that both policy 
failures and successes will be costly.‘101  Zegart also attempts to track the 
developments of the Agency‘s covert wing and its analysis efforts, insisting 
that its estimates process and covert activities kept the CIA from being 
effective at coordinated analysis, for which she insists, had neither the 
power nor the talent. 
 Zegart‘s study is based on the assumption that the CIA was never 
supposed to amount to much anyway.  This premise becomes the 
springboard for Zegart‘s two primary assertions—first, that the CIA was 
given no authority to engage in covert activities of any sort; and second that 
the CIA, plagued with structural problems, was not designed to coordinate 
the disparate elements of the intelligence community.
102
  However, this 
premise, that just because the CIA‘s mandate was initially weak, the spy 
agency did not transform into a useful, albeit imperfect, instrument of 
foreign policy and adapt to early bureaucratic challenges, runs counter to 
the documentary evidence.   
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 Given Zegart‘s premise, it becomes clearer why Flawed By Design 
suggests a spy agency whose mandate ‗far exceeded its capacity to 
perform‘ and had an analytical branch that remained ‗insignificant.‘  She 
underscores her view of the CIA as a schizophrenic agency by echoing a 
New York Times article on July 20, 1948 that referred to the CIA as ‗one of 
the weakest links in our national security.‘103   In dealing with the CIA‘s 
shortcomings, Flawed By Design suggests that the executive branch has, 
since Truman, sought ways to ‗exercise damage control‘ and circumvent 
the established intelligence community in an effort to ‗offset the CIA‘s 
shortcomings.‘104  Yet, the staggering rate at which the CIA expanded its 
mandate and expenditures during its early years directly contradicts this 
assertion.
105
 
 Moreover, it is striking that a study which presents an extensive 
account of the CIA‘s evolution and transformation, completely ignores the 
Agency‘s first real challenge—the Berlin blockade, as well as any 
treatment of its first director, Roscoe Hillenkoetter.  Similarly, the crisis in 
Korea receives little consideration, beyond some general criticism of the 
CIA‘s role.  Zegart writes that ‗The situation was so bad that in October 
1950, three months after American troops landed in Korea, the agency still 
had no current coordinated analysis of the war.‘106  According to Zegart, 
Korea was not only an intelligence failure, but the police action might have 
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been avoided altogether had the CIA been better able to read the situation 
on the Peninsula. 
 The most recent contribution to the revisionist literature, Legacy of 
Ashes:  The History of the CIA, has generated even more controversy than 
Zegart‘s study.  In fact, Tim Weiner‘s journalistic, whistle-blower critique 
continues to elicit reactions from the CIA.
 107
  In a press release, the Central 
Intelligence Agency publicly criticized Weiner‘s rather sizeable 
publication, stating that his muckraking ‗paints far too dark a picture of the 
agency's past.   Backed by selective citations, sweeping assertions, and a 
fascination with the negative, Weiner overlooks, minimizes, or distorts 
agency achievements.‘ The CIA adds that Legacy of Ashes is ‗marked by 
errors great and small,‘ and that Weiner‘s ‗bias overwhelm[ed] his 
scholarship.‘ 108  We may never know the reason for the CIA‘s prickly 
reaction.  Whether or not the CIA simply took offence at Weiner‘s critical 
account of the CIA‘s recent catastrophes in Iraq, it is reasonable to assume 
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that the CIA views Weiner‘s study as an uncompromising marriage 
between savvy journalism and contentious historical interpretation.
 109
 
 Weiner uses his attention-grabbing narrative to highlight the CIA‘s 
intelligence failures, backing off only slightly by arguing that part of the 
problem with intelligence has been a catalogue of failed foreign policy 
operations and misguided orders from presidents.
110
   However, his harshest 
criticism is directed at the current state of the Agency, writing that the CIA 
was ‗gravely wounded‘ under George W. Bush.111  But what might first 
seem like contempt for the shroud of secrecy that Weiner attempts to unveil 
is, upon closer examination, more likely determination to expose the 
hypocrisies and injustices within the American bureaucracy. 
 Underneath his critical narrative, however, Legacy of Ashes 
provides a unique and compelling perspective on a number of early Cold 
War crises, albeit quite briefly on issues other than bungled covert 
operations.  In fact, the CIA‘s role and influence during the Truman 
administration is handled only superficially.  Weiner has little new to add 
on the Truman administration, except for claiming that the mismatch 
between the CIA‘s capabilities and the missions it was expected to carry 
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out was ‗staggering.‘112  This, he suggests, was because Hillenkoetter was a 
DCI with seriously weak standing when compared to the well-established 
State Department and the Defense Departments.
113
 
 Weiner actually argues that the biggest Cold War battleground was 
Berlin, but then leap-frogs past the crisis.  Skirting around the real issues of 
the crisis, Weiner instead focuses on the sensational revelation of 
America‘s use of secret funds (designed by George F. Kennan, James 
Forrestal and Allen Dulles).  These financial strings attached to the 
Marshall Plan (essentially a global money-laundering scheme, according to 
Weiner) gave the CIA‘s overseas operations in Europe the teeth needed to 
counter the network of communist front organizations.
114
 
 The CIA‘s influence leading up to and during the Korean War 
receives only slightly more consideration.
115
  Perhaps this is because Asia, 
as Legacy of Ashes points out, was always a sideshow for the CIA.
116
  But 
at the same time, Weiner stresses that the Korean War was the first great 
test for the ‗unholy mess‘ at the Agency.  Legacy of Ashes spends little 
space addressing the spy agency‘s role or degree of influence at the onset of 
the war, other than to briefly assert that the CIA had misread the entire 
crisis.  Weiner‘s only real emphasis on the eve of the Korean War is on the 
Soviet spy, William Wolf Weisband.  (Weisband had penetrated the CIA‘s 
signals intelligence).   Since silence had fallen ‗at the very hour that the 
North Korean leader Kim Il-sung was consulting with Stalin and Mao on 
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his intent to attack,‘ Weiner insists that the CIA was rudderless in a sea of 
speculation and uncertainty.
117
  This viewpoint, though, is unbalanced 
because it overemphasizes signals intelligence as the one true source of 
information, particularly when one considers that the National Security 
Agency had not yet been created.
118
  
 The study fast-forwards to the Agency‘s research and reporting on 
Communist China‘s intervention in Korea.  Weiner points out that the CIA 
knew ‗almost nothing‘ about what went on in China; and what they did 
know had been manufactured by the North Korean and Chinese security 
services.
119
  Weiner goes on to explain that the CIA was so in the dark 
because of the paucity of human intelligence and MacArthur‘s best efforts 
to exclude the CIA from the Far East.
120
 
 While Weiner‘s narrative can be compelling in places, the history 
is, nevertheless, limited by a persistent focus on only the most divisive, 
negative and startling events of the CIA‘s history.  Moreover, the book 
concentrates on the CIA‘s failures almost to the exclusion of anything else.  
Weiner seems to grant no concessionary narrative to the historical actors 
whose decisions and actions were very much influenced by the possibility 
of a third world war.  As a result, Legacy of Ashes neither deals with what 
CIA analysts were telling policymakers nor explores what impact its 
assessments might have had on policy decisions. 
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 Not all of the revisionist literature comes from the left, as we might 
expect.  Like the other revisionist authors so far reviewed, Walter 
Laqueur‘s A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence 
primarily concerns itself with the impact of the end product of analysis on 
policy, the causes of intelligence failures, and the prospects for 
improvement in intelligence gathering and analysis.
121
  Running against the 
grain of revisionist thought, though, Walter Laqueur acknowledges that the 
intelligence record, although dismal, is vital to national security.  
Interestingly, he calls for a variety of strategies to improve the efficacy and 
quality of information produced by the CIA through implementing even 
more rigorous standards and placing greater emphasis on human 
intelligence, particularly improving the quality of new recruits.   
 But like many revisionist authors, Laqueur struggles with the idea 
of secret services of intelligence within a free society.  On the one hand, he 
argues that intelligence ‗runs against the grain of American political 
culture.‘122  Yet on the other hand, he argues that intelligence, even when 
flawed, is an essential service and an important element in the decision-
making process.
123
  His view of intelligence as a craft, rather than a science 
rests on a belief that criticism of intelligence is partially based on 
exaggerated notions of what it can, and can not, accomplish, particularly 
during the late Stalinist period when predictions, of any kind, were 
difficult.   
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 Laqueur suggests that this was due, in part, to an overreliance on 
technology, leaving human intelligence weakened.
124
  A World of Secrets 
insists, however, that neither organizational reforms nor advances in 
technology have done much to help intelligence become any more effective 
at its job.  But although A World of Secrets works to identify problems in 
the production and use of intelligence for decision-making, it reasons that 
the confines of what a democratic culture will accept are limiting and thus 
diminishes meaningful reform and the CIA‘s ability to perform as an 
effective tool of policy.  What makes this book so unique, though, is its 
suggestion that intelligence has been in a crisis since the dawn of the Cold 
War and that this crisis can only be partially attributed to misperceptions 
and unrealistic hopes.  Laqueur pins the real underlying reasons for the 
crisis on the inherent difficulties of intelligence-gathering and analysis, 
admitting that even in ideal conditions, success cannot be guaranteed. 
 Still, Laqueur seems at odds with the reality of intelligence—that 
analysts must make predictions with varying degrees of certainty and 
precision given the imprecise and incomplete information they acquire.  As 
a result, the narrative is littered with frequent stories of warning and 
predictive failures, painting a picture that intelligence had, for so long, been 
functioning in a ‗morass of doubts and uncertainties.‘125  At least to 
Laqueur, it seems obvious that the American intelligence had little 
expertise in Soviet affairs. 
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 Laqueur spends a lot of space attempting to answer how much 
intelligence reports contributed to policy decisions.  Yet rather 
interestingly, his reflections on the CIA‘s influence during the stage-setting 
of the Cold War—the Berlin blockade and the Korean War—are quite 
general and brief.  Jeffrey T. Richelson suggests that the reason for a lack 
of depth in many of Laqueur‘s discussion is, in part, because of the number 
of topics he is trying to deal with.
126
  Nevertheless, A World of Secrets 
makes its position on intelligence efforts before 1950 quite clear:  
‗Immediately after World War II, intelligence played a very minor role in 
U.S. foreign policy.  Only with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 did 
central intelligence come into its own.‘  The Korean War, according to 
Laqueur, ‗provided a new catalyst to [US intelligence] thinking.  Suddenly 
the estimates changed.‘127  This change, Laqueur points out, was because 
Korea exposed inconsistent analyses of the growing tensions within the 
Sino-Soviet alliance.  Prior to this change, though, Laqueur countersinks 
the weight of the CIA‘s relationship with its decision-making clients:  
according to A World of Secrets, ‗intelligence was never as important in the 
conduct of policy as is commonly believed, nor is it ever likely to be.‘128 
 How, then, does Laqueur account for early Cold War policy 
formation?  He argues that top US officials decided on foreign policy (up to 
1950) ‗according to their own views of the world and on the basis of 
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reports received from American embassies around the world.‘   At the same 
time, though, the study points to the ‗fairly realistic estimates‘ of the CIA‘s 
early publication, Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the 
Security of the United States (published between September 26, 1947 and 
March 10, 1949), yet dismisses the quality and influence of intelligence 
analysis before 1950.
129
   
 The author points to two factors that he believes were keys in 
undermining the CIA‘s early efforts—intelligence forecasts‘ overreliance 
on open sources and diplomatic reports, and a ‗slightly manic-depressive‘ 
approach…whether the conclusions were good or bad.130  With this, 
Laqueur takes closer aim against the intelligence record by suggesting that 
CIA analysts failed to frame the Berlin crisis in more urgent terms.  
However, by framing the crisis as ‗alarming‘, CIA analysts might have led 
policymakers to view the situation in more exaggerated, negative terms.  A 
World of Secrets argues that, despite a politically astute prediction that 
most of the crises during 1950 would arise in Asia, the outbreak of the 
Korean War took intelligence by surprise.
131
  Yet he adds that policymakers 
in Washington were not keen to hear bad news about the policies they had 
implemented.  Laqueur also notes that at the onset of the Korean War, the 
West believed that a general war was a real possibility.  This hawkish 
political orientation, Laqueur argues, was influenced by a number of 
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Russophobe diplomats, but the CIA ‗played no significant role, except 
perhaps by providing occasional information on Soviet military capabilities 
that said the Russians did not intend to launch a general war.‘132   
 Laqueur concludes that, overall, the quality of intelligence before 
1950 was ‗as good as could be expected,‘ its comments were sensible, and 
its general evaluation was ‗more often right than wrong.‘  However, 
Laqueur appears uncomfortable with even this modest conclusion, adding, 
‗It is a moot point whether its record was superior to that of well-informed 
and experienced newspapermen or of seasoned students of international 
affairs.‘133  In the end, A World of Secrets points to a poor performance 
record by central intelligence.  So, while not an ardent critic of the CIA 
when compared with Blum, Laqueur‘s assessment of the intelligence 
record, nevertheless, often takes a critical tone. 
 Although orthodox and revisionist historians were all largely shaped 
by the time in which their work was written and were often caught up in the 
immediacy of the Cold War, the authors often reach very divergent 
conclusions, making trends difficult to establish.  In many ways, these 
histories represent the birth of the historiography of the CIA.  Jeffreys-
Jones ties in with this sentiment, arguing that the emergence of more 
critical appraisals of the CIA represents a ‗movement away from old, 
recriminatory questions towards newer, more thoughtful ones.‘134  To be 
sure, the historical lens typically becomes more focused with the passing of 
time; but their unique perceptions and assertions, whether from the left or 
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right, not only present an essential snapshot of the Cold War itself, but add 
a deeper dimension to our understanding of the CIA‘s history. 
 
 
The Post-Revisionist Authors 
 Over time, a more even-handed position began to question some of 
the revisionist and the orthodox interpretations of history.  This new 
response began to develop again after the trauma of the Vietnam War and 
congressional and media scrutiny, although post-revisionism was not really 
galvanized until after the Cold War.  Where, previously, so much emphasis 
had been placed on intelligence failures, the small group of post-revisionist 
historians have tended to place the Agency‘s wrong-doings, misadventures 
or mistakes within the context of Cold War history.  This is not to say that 
the post-revisionists are inhibited about stirring up past controversies while 
advancing new questions about the CIA‘s past.  Also in contrast with the 
many revisionist publications that appear to have one foot mired in 
contemporary intelligence-policy problems, the post-revisionists are more 
forceful in regarding intelligence as an integral component of Cold War 
history and tend to be more comfortable with examining the complexity of 
the Cold War‘s lessons. 
 Although more difficult to associate with any one particular theme, 
the post-revisionists go beyond the organizational and management history 
that characterized so much of the orthodox literature.  To be fair, these 
authors have the benefit of greater historical hindsight, writing nearer to the 
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time when the Cold War curtain was ripped open.  With unprecedented 
archival access they are better situated to demonstrate the historical context 
of the intelligence-policy process.  That said, even the recent volumes that 
offer a more balanced and dispassionate history are frequently broad in 
scope and rarely provide any in-depth study of particular Cold War crisis. 
 Intelligence historian Christopher Andrew‘s important exposition 
on US intelligence, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and 
the American Presidency, evaluates American intelligence‘s top level 
efforts—showing the extent to which ‗the fortunes of the intelligence 
community have been influenced by the personalities, as well as the 
policies, of the presidents they have served.‘135  Arguably, one of the most 
comprehensive post-revisionist accounts of American intelligence, Andrew 
provides a fresh perspective on the interrelationship between the President, 
the DCI, and the CIA, showing that the integral link between the Oval 
Office and intelligence has evolved into a closely interwoven partnership.  
In doing so, he cogently demonstrates that the influence intelligence has 
had on foreign policy has been subject to the President‘s ultimate authority 
over the intelligence process.  Along this same line, intelligence historian 
Len Scott notes that Andrew adeptly shows that ‗the judgment (and 
integrity) of the political leaders is as essential to the enterprise as the 
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organizations and the people who serve as gatherers and analysts.‘136  This 
top-down approach emphasizes the executive branch as the overarching 
influence that has directly shaped how intelligence is either used or abused.  
That being said, however, Andrew is never reluctant to attribute 
responsibility for the mistakes made by the policy officials in Washington. 
He cites successful relationships among the succession of presidential 
administrations (especially between President Ronald Reagan and DCI 
William Casey).
137
 In general, the CIA emerges in good standing from 
Andrew‘s contribution, showing that, with varying degrees of accuracy, 
intelligence has mattered in foreign policy decision-making.  
 Certainly for Andrew, this relationship transformation not only 
highlights the nuances and complexities of the policy-intelligence 
relationship, but also the extent to which ‗the fortunes of the intelligence 
community have been influenced by the personalities, as well as the 
policies, of the presidents they have served.‘138  By arguing that intelligence 
has been largely shaped by the President‘s temperament and experience, 
Andrew demonstrates that misjudgments and errors of the past rest squarely 
on the intelligence community and on the White House. 
 But what does this book say about the CIA‘s influence during the 
formative years of the Cold War?  In the relatively short space that his book 
devotes to the origins of the CIA, Andrew frames the problems of 
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presidential perceptions, personalities and leadership styles remarkably 
well.
139
  President Truman, insists Andrew, was less interested in 
intelligence than his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt and certainly had 
less understanding of it than his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower.  
However, Andrew reminds us that it was Truman who shaped the modern 
intelligence community—authorizing Anglo-American SIGINT 
collaboration in 1945, ordering the publication of the Daily Summary in 
1946, championing the National Security Act in 1947, authorizing the rapid 
expansion of covert action throughout his presidency, and founding the 
National Security Agency (NSA).
140
  So although Truman was on a steep 
learning curve, he quickly recognized the need for a peacetime intelligence 
agency in post-war national security.   
 Andrew‘s judgment of the CIA‘s early legacy is quite critical, 
claiming that, during the Truman administration, not a single agent was 
capable of providing a serious insight.
141
  He also suggests that, despite 
having enviable access to the Oval Office, the CIA‘s first director, 
Hillenkoetter, made little impression on President Truman.  At the same 
time, however, Andrew insists that the ‗inadequacies of direction‘ were as 
much Truman‘s as Hillenkoetter‘s fault.  This, Andrew chalks up to one 
key factor:  ‗Without the strong support of the president, [Hillenkoetter] 
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could not hope to fulfill the task of intelligence coordination required of the 
DCI.‘142     
 Andrew balances these assessments with positive appraisals in other 
places.  For instance, he notes the CIA‘s first relative success at 
‗psychological warfare‘ in the Italian elections.  However, Andrew‘s 
relative silence on intelligence between the Italian elections and the 
Eisenhower presidency seems to suggest that, at least during this relatively 
quiet period of covert action, the CIA‘s influence was shelved by 
policymakers.  This includes the larger European crisis of 1948—the Berlin 
blockade.  He does, however, weigh in on the CIA‘s record during the 
Korean War, although focusing primarily on the familiar questions of 
intelligence warnings.  For Andrew, the North Korean invasion was a big 
intelligence surprise, although he extends the CIA sideways credit for 
placing the Soviet threat within context for policymakers, writing that the 
CIA estimates asserted, without qualification, that the Soviet Union was 
engaged in an experimental war-by-proxy.  On the issue of the Communist 
China‘s invasion, For the President’s Eyes Only notes that CIA analysts 
were not alone in believing that the initiative would not be taken by the 
North Korean dictator.
143
 
 Beyond this familiar narrative, Andrew catalogues two important 
lessons learned from the Korean War.  First, the conflict confirmed the 
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need for further intelligence reforms.  Most notably, Korea prompted a 
massive SIGINT overhaul.  The invasion of North Korea and the 
subsequent Communist Chinese invasion, in particular, increased concern 
over the lack of SIGINT as a critically important source of information 
during times of crisis.  Second, the popular perception that the CIA had 
been caught with its pants down hastened Hillenkoetter‘s departure from 
the CIA.  Conversely, the crisis in Korea elevated Bedell Smith‘s influence 
with the president.  Andrew also seems to suggest, that, had the tide of the 
Korean War turned in favor of the UN forces before Hillenkoetter‘s 
departure, the DCI‘s record might have been less tarnished.144  However, 
this seems unlikely given the swell of negative opinion against the affable 
DCI, Hillenkoetter. 
 Richard J. Aldrich, a British scholar like Christopher Andrew, 
demonstrates how US secret services worked closely with the executive 
branch of government in formulating national security policy. According to 
his formidable volume The Hidden Hand:  Britain, America and Cold War 
Secret Intelligence, the Cold War was fought, above all, by the intelligence 
services.  His book provides more than an organizational history of 
intelligence, yet, as Richard Crockatt mentions, Aldrich has ‗an enviable 
grasp of the organizational complexities of the many often-overlapping 
agencies in America and the UK responsible for intelligence gathering and 
special operations.  He is also fully alive to the political contexts of secret 
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intelligence and is very good on the differences between the American and 
British ways of doing things.‘145 
 Aldrich‘s approach takes on another interesting dimension of 
Western intelligence, providing a unique history of Anglo-American 
intelligence co-operation from the Second World War up to the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco.
146
  Given from the perspective of the post-war British secret service, 
his treatment of the American spy agency is presented within the context of 
the curious coexistence of the complex and seemingly contradictory 
struggles between ‗three vistas of secret service—East versus West, West 
versus West, and each Western state bitterly divided against itself.‘147  The 
Hidden Hand rests on the idea of cooperation and conflict, even showing 
how intelligence served to increase tensions among the Western partners.
148
 
 Aldrich‘s study suggests that the American intelligence 
communities allowed continual extension of presidential power over 
foreign policy.  At the highest levels it was secret intelligence that 
underpinned and even legitimated many policies launched during periods of 
conflict.  For Aldrich, then, the idea that the Cold War could best be won 
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through special operations even helped to define the character of the 
conflict and gave rise to the British and American belief that intelligence 
was synonymous with empire management.  The Hidden Hand reveals how 
the CIA served as a kind of safety-valve, making Cold War leaders less 
dependent on the threat of nuclear destruction by allowing the West and its 
adversaries to fight out the conflict on less destructive terms.  Brewster C. 
Denny argues along this same line, noting that during the Cold War era, 
‗great powers have found regular intelligence activities by both sides to be 
important to stability…‘149 
 This study of the CIA‘s early years conveys a high degree of 
dispassionate, measured criticism.  Aldrich insists that the first two decades 
of the Cold War gave shape to later conflicts and relations between allies, 
although cooperation between Anglo-American intelligence was poor and 
the CIA‘s fortunes were only marginally improved by 1950.150  He points 
to the bureaucratic infighting that plagued the CIA that made it difficult to 
establish a foothold within the intelligence community.  Reflecting on 
historical cases, though, he largely passes over the CIA‘s assessments 
during the 1948-49 Berlin blockade and what influence the newly created 
American spy agency might have had during this crisis.
151
  This omission is 
worth noting for at least two reasons.  First, The Hidden Hand exhibits an 
unparalleled understanding of the Cold War crises that gave shape to the 
British and American intelligence services.  Second, by noting that many 
Western leaders sought to win the Cold War ‗by all means short of war‘ 
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and that by September 1948 they had resigned themselves to war, Aldrich‘s 
book seems to suggest, at least indirectly, that the CIA mattered during this 
early Cold War crisis.
152
 
 Aldrich‘s treatment of Korea goes into more detail.  He insists that 
Washington had initially been slower than London to engage with the Cold 
War, but by the 1950s, ‗it was making up for lost time.‘153  In fact, he 
argues that by the time of the Korean War, the British feared America‘s 
forward policy approach more than the Soviets.
154
  Korea was, indeed, a 
pivotal crisis for the British and American intelligence services, suggesting 
that intelligence had improved in the course of the Korean conflict.  In 
referencing the invasion of South Korea in June 1950, Aldrich even makes 
a point of stressing that a surprise attack does not always mean that an 
intelligence failure has occurred, arguing that the recriminations of the 
summer of 1950 obscured the real reasons for intelligence failure. 
 The Hidden Hand extends a finger of blame by calling attention to 
the CIA‘s inadequate assessments of communist actions outside the Soviet 
sphere.  In fact, the book argues, the main problem for the CIA was its 
narrow focus on the Soviet Union.
155
  Additionally, President Truman and 
Secretary of State Acheson were ‗strongly influenced‘ by the CIA‘s 
suggestions that there were no convincing indications of Chinese 
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Communist intervention.
 156
  Aldrich places the CIA‘s fallibility in the 
context of the military‘s own shortcomings, noting that General Douglas 
MacArthur was ‗weak on intelligence‘ and simply not up to the job, yet 
required the CIA to coordinate its intelligence operations with the army‘s 
intelligence and special operations entity.
157
   
 Written from a different vantage point than either Christopher 
Andrew or Richard Aldrich, Stansfield Turner‘s history of secret 
intelligence offers a unique perspective.  Turner, a long-term US 
government official with a distinguished service record as a US Navy 
Admiral, went on to serve as President Jimmy Carter‘s Director of Central 
Intelligence from 1977-1981.  Although directly involved at high levels of 
policy decision-making and subject to the CIA‘s Publication Review Board 
for security review, the book offers a relatively balanced history of the 
CIA. 
 In Burn Before Reading:  Presidents, CIA Directors and Secret 
Intelligence, Stansfield Turner devotes much of his historical narrative to 
the study of the directors who headed the CIA and assesses how well they 
provided unbiased intelligence and headed the intelligence community.  
From this approach, he argues that current intelligence should be, as during 
the Cold War, the first line of defense against security threats.
158
  And like 
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the Soviet threat, the new threat of terrorism has thrown the effectiveness of 
intelligence into question. 
 On many issues, Turner is candid about intelligence failures the 
CIA has made, yet he speaks with a more balanced voice than the more 
critical histories.  ‗Those who criticize our intelligence as a threat to our 
society‘s values and those who would condone any kind of intrusion into 
our personal privacy for the sake of the nation‘s security,‘ he writes, ‗are 
both wrong.‘159  In the same vein as Andrews‘ study, Turner‘s book focuses 
on past case studies (from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush) of the 
relationship between the executive branch and intelligence in an attempt to 
set the record straight on the CIA. 
 Turner‘s treatment of the early Cold War crises is brief.   In its 
chapter devoted to the Truman administration, Burn Before Reading offers 
little new regarding the Agency‘s history, outlining instead the legislative 
and bureaucratic struggles involved in the formation and execution of the 
National Security Act of 1947.
160
  According to Turner, the CIA was 
created amidst the Truman administration‘s early uncertainty about 
intelligence on the one hand and Hillenkoetter‘s political passivity on the 
other.  The end result for the early CIA, he argues, was centralized 
intelligence with responsibility but without authority.   
 Burn Before Reading briefly explores Hillenkoetter‘s role as DCI 
under President Truman.  Hillenkoetter, Turner mentions, enjoyed less 
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access to the president than his successor, Bedell Smith.  ‗Extremely loyal 
and dutiful, he seemed to think that the best way to serve the president was 
to get the information down on paper and then let the president get on with 
his busy schedule.‘161  He discusses how the popular perceptions of the 
CIA‘s early failures challenged Hillenkoetter‘s position as the CIA‘s 
director, ultimately leading to his replacement by Walter Bedell Smith.  
Turner also points to what he believes was the biggest failure during 
Hillenkoetter‘s early days:  the nuclear question.  On the whole, the CIA 
reported that it had no new intelligence on when the Soviet Union would 
acquire a nuclear weapon.  Most scientists, military men and politicians 
believed that atomic weapons were out of reach for the Soviet Union at 
least until 1953-1954, and the rapidity with which the Soviet Union caught 
up with the United States alarmed Washington and brought the CIA‘s 
analysis capabilities under the spotlight.  This flawed estimate was 
significant, argues Turner, because it underlined the lack of reliable 
information supporting current intelligence estimates. 
 However, beyond chronicling the CIA‘s estimates on the Soviet 
atomic project, the book does little more than broach the major issues of the 
intelligence-policy relationship during the early Cold War.  These included 
catering to the needs of the NSC staff and a lack of long-term analysis.
162
  
The developing crisis in Berlin is dealt with only long enough to briefly 
acknowledge that the CIA‘s long-term analysis of the situation served to 
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ease the tension that General Lucius D. Clay‘s telegram had raised in spring 
1948.
163
 
 His analysis of the Korean War is only slightly more in-depth than 
the Berlin blockade.  While Turner argues that Korea was an area of 
‗relatively long-range analysis,‘ there is a lack of any real discussion on 
why this was so.  He gives the CIA credit for the fact that reports were 
published that warned that pulling US troops out of Korea would invite an 
invasion, but concludes that the warnings were sidelined anyway.  This sort 
of ‗underpinning for policy,‘ Turner argues, was largely ignored.  Turner 
tempers his praises though, suggesting that, despite the CIA ‗getting it 
right,‘ the DCI should have pressed the president further by making a more 
straightforward statement about policy.
164
   
 Like so much of the intelligence literature, Burn Before Reading has 
one foot in CIA history and the other in contemporary intelligence issues.  
This is not surprising, given the author‘s intimate familiarity with and 
experience of the policy-intelligence relationship.  Despite this duality to 
his approach, Turner correctly acknowledges that the CIA‘s early years had 
a mixture of successes and failures.   
 These selected post-revisionist authors appear better positioned to 
isolate and account for historical tendencies than their predecessors.  
However, they still struggle with transcending the feud between orthodox 
and revisionist historians.  Still at the forefront of the historical debate of 
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the last half century, the post-revisionists have gone a long way to wade 
through the dark, murky waters of intelligence recrimination and reached a 
more balanced footing. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 All of the books reviewed raise serious questions about the history 
of the CIA‘s history.  This selective review of the literature has 
demonstrated that the interpretations advanced, however, have been widely 
divergent, sometimes to the point of contradiction.  Despite the evident 
value of this body of literature, work remains to be done on the role of 
intelligence in policymaking during key crises.  As we have seen, the 
spectrum of the intelligence debate extends from defensive, institutional 
positions to heavy-handed recriminations.  These oppositional viewpoints 
make it increasingly difficult to reconcile the links between these ‗three 
Schools‘ and how they weigh in on the questions I seek to answer about the 
CIA‘s early history.  The problem, however, is not so much that they 
disagree but that they have rarely asked the sort of questions that I am 
exploring and have they needed to look in more detail at particular case 
studies. 
 We‘ve seen that, when our original hypothesis is tested against 
specific examples, such generalizations become tricky.  And despite our 
best efforts to categorize and label these authors, they often don‘t fit neatly 
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into any summary generalizations.  In fact, it is my view that neither on the 
issue of the quality or the accuracy of the CIA‘s analysis of the two crises, 
nor on the question of how much influence it had at the time, do the three 
Schools offer completely tidy correlations or sufficient information.  
 So what can be learned about the manner in which the orthodox, 
revisionist and post-revisionist schools treat these two questions?  Where 
the quality and accuracy of the CIA‘s assessments is concerned, the 
tendency is for the Orthodox school to be charitable and to give the Agency 
the benefit of the doubt.  This camp, most often associated with accounts 
from inside the intelligence establishment, has typically focused on the 
defense of the CIA‘s record and on its organizational history.  As we have 
seen, their histories have provided little detail about the influence of the 
CIA‘s analysis during the Cold War‘s early crises.  Still, they represent a 
significant part to our understanding. 
 Known for their frequent stress on the inadequacies of the CIA, the 
revisionist departure from the traditionalist position has been largely silent 
on the CIA‘s influence during the early years of the Cold War.  Instead, 
we‘re left with a feeling that, in the more than sixty years since its creation, 
the CIA has failed to live up to its purpose.  Some might take pleasure from 
finding manifest failure and error by the CIA, especially if the source of the 
error could be tied to the wider portrayal of US motivation.  Others might 
be quite willing to attribute intelligence ―successes‖ to the CIA, even if 
regarding that as further evidence that it was the US rather than the USSR 
that had room for maneuver as the tensions mounted.  This image of a 
hopeless CIA is echoed by Donald Gregg:  ‗The record in Europe was bad.  
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The record in Asia was bad.  The agency had a terrible record in its early 
days—a great reputation but a terrible record.‘165  As our understanding has 
evolved, though, this view appears increasingly inadequate.  Still there are 
moments when revisionists offer a break from the clouds, suggesting that 
the School might well have been divided on the question of influence—
remember for instance, Laqueur‘s observations that perhaps the one 
significant part of the Agency‘s role had been its occasional information 
that ‗the Russians did not intend to launch a general war.‘    
 We have also seen that, because of their greater emotional 
detachment, temporal distance and access to sources, post-revisionists have 
generally been able to approach the questions with more objectivity and 
balance than either of the other two camps.  As such, the School has been 
gaining wide acceptance for their treatment of the complexities of the 
intelligence process and the broader context of Cold War history.  On the 
whole, this group of historians is also better positioned in staying above the 
fray of the fashionably charged issues of the Cold War, presenting a more 
balanced perspective on the intelligence-policy relationship.   
 It is important that we look upon these interpretations as building 
blocks that contribute to greater understanding because the historical record 
is continually being influenced by all three schools of thought.  Yet even 
when drawing from these schools, certain historical questions remain 
unanswered.  It is my contention that a number of difficult questions 
require further attention to arrive at a fuller understanding of the CIA‘s 
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early history.  This review of the intelligence literature has shown that, in 
the case of the CIA‘s influence on policymaking during two of the Cold 
War‘s most alarming crises—the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, 
historians have provided only a cursory treatment.  But what can account 
for the almost uniform brevity of treatment of these two major crises?  A 
number of factors might account for this:  1) restricted access to 
declassified documents, 2) common perceptions that the CIA was too new, 
and 3) many of the authors‘ attention have been monopolized by other 
controversies of the CIA. 
 This research will contribute to this ongoing debate by advancing an 
important direction in intelligence history.  The chapters that follow will 
travel their own course, free from any exposé of skullduggery.  I will 
examine two case studies in detail, demonstrating how the CIA made an 
important contribution to the understanding of American national security, 
both by providing additional warning of potential crises and by providing a 
guiding hand that helped to inform policy decisions.  I will examine the 
perceptiveness and accuracy of the Agency‘s assessments, primarily 
focusing on Soviet intentions and capabilities during times of crisis.  This 
approach will shine a brighter light on what influence the CIA‘s finished 
intelligence reports had on policy decisions.  In doing so, I will demonstrate 
that the less glamorous side of intelligence, analysis, was not always so 
black and white; and, as a policy determinant, was a more perceptive, if not 
always accurate, tool in shaping policy decisions than perhaps heretofore 
considered. 
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Chapter III 
 
Is the Sky Falling? 
The Emerging Crisis in Berlin 
 
 
Berlin is the testicles of the West.—Nikita 
Khrushchev
166
 
 
Preface 
 Berlin was a strategic gamble played by both sides that served as a 
prelude to future confrontation; and while neither the United States nor the 
Soviet Union desired a war, each side felt threatened by the actions of the 
other.  At the root of the crisis was the inability of either side to agree on 
how to administer the political process and the economic recovery of 
Germany.  World War II had been utterly destructive to the lives, property 
and economic system in Europe, particularly to the defeated people of 
Germany.  When the Nazi regime finally surrendered in the spring of 1945, 
almost every aspect of the German state was destroyed.  Before it turned 
the respective sectors of Berlin over to the Western powers, Commander of 
the United States Air Force Europe Command (USAFE), General Curtis E. 
LeMay noted that the Soviet army had ‗denuded the region of every shred 
of mechanical equipment which might be employed conceivably in any 
future dispensation.‘  Shocked by the apathy and inertia that the Soviets 
engendered among the German population, LeMay commented that the 
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Soviets ‗would have taken the very nails out of the woodwork if there had 
been time to pull ′em.‘167 
 The Western Powers were set on stabilizing the economy of their 
zones in relation to the European Recovery Program (ERP) and establish a 
separate German Government.  From the beginning of the post-war period, 
Herbert C. Mayer points out, the basic shaping force of US-Soviet relations 
in Germany was that the Western European countries had to recognize 
‗they could not rebuild a viable economic system for Europe without 
Germany; and Germany found out that it could never rebuild its place in the 
world without its European neighbors.‘168  The issues in Germany had 
become inseparable from the United States‘ overseas policy of economic 
revitalization.  As far as Washington was concerned, the survival of 
Germany depended on its economic recovery to bring Germany out of a 
state of fluid uncertainty and that success or failure in this directly impacted 
American national security.
169
  National security imperatives were, as one 
historian points out, the driving force behind the Truman administration‘s 
decisions.
170
  Moreover, Washington was still uncertain about which Soviet 
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actions might precipitate a broader conflict.
171
  If ever there was a clear 
sign that the Kremlin was pressing the Western partners into a defensive 
posture, the escalation in Berlin was it.  The Soviet Union reaction took the 
form of a blockade of the German city.
172
 
However, as one senior US army official observed, beyond a 
general consensus that an economically depressed Germany was a major 
impediment to a successful foreign policy in Europe, Washington‘s actions 
indicated a wait-and-see approach.  Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, the 
chief of the army‘s Plans and Operations Division stated: 
 
The United States has not defined clearly its 
national objectives, nor has it declared a 
clear-cut, well rounded foreign policy.  Such 
elements of foreign policy as are declared 
have emerged piecemeal and give the 
impression of an apparently unrelated series 
of improvisations to meet circumstances as 
they change or develop.
173
 
 
 Although the proposals for postwar Germany were first explored at 
the Tehran Conference in December 1943, it was not until the Potsdam 
Conference that the Allied leaders began to reshape the German map and 
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agree on the demilitarization of and reparations from the former Nazi 
state.
174
  
 It was here that the Allied Powers divided the German state into 
three occupied zones—the Soviet Zone, occupying the eastern third, the 
British Zone in the north and the American Zone in the south.
175
  These 
zones were intended to be a temporary arrangement, but shortly after 
Germany‘s boundaries had been carved up, optimism about a peaceful, 
diplomatic solution to the developing crisis became increasingly 
challenged.
176
 
Furthermore, the agreements at Potsdam had left Germany a political 
minefield.  Nikita Khrushchev pointed out that the problem of border 
access and controls had not been foreseen by the Potsdam agreement—an 
omission the Kremlin believed the West had turned to its own purposes.
177
  
Both sides believed it had the right as an occupying power in Berlin after 
the unconditional surrender of the Nazi government.  Germany was to be 
jointly administered by governors from the capital Berlin, but what 
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frustrated the success of this arrangement was that, as Truman states in his 
memoirs:  ‗The Russians, on their part, seemed determined to treat their 
zone of Germany virtually as if it were Soviet conquered territory.‘178  
What made matters worse was that Berlin was entirely surrounded by the 
Soviet sector.  Also loosely agreed upon at Potsdam was the decision to 
administer post-war Germany as a single economic unit.  What resulted, 
though, was the failure to agree on almost every issue.  As the situation in 
Berlin deteriorated, differences in economic strategies came to center more 
and more on the question of Western currency reform (a question dealt with 
by the CIA).
179
     
Frustrated by what the West saw as Soviet intransigence, the United 
States halted reparation deliveries from its zone to the Soviet Union.  The 
breakdown in cooperation was significant because it placed the United 
States in a dilemma.  General Lucius D. Clay outlined the difficult choices 
Washington faced: 
 
Anything we do to strengthen the Bizonal 
administration will create a hazard with 
respect to the U.S.S.R. in Berlin.  On the 
other hand, appeasement of the U.S.S.R. will 
continue the present unsatisfactory 
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administration of Bizonal Germany and make 
economic reconstruction difficult.
180
 
 
So faced with the risk of either antagonizing the Kremlin or appeasing 
the Soviet position, senior policymakers chose to proceed in the direction 
of creating an economically viable and independent West German State.  
Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, touched upon what was at stake:  ‗We 
in the United States have given considerable time and attention to these 
problems because upon their proper solution will depend not only the future 
well-being of Germany, but the future well-being of Europe.‘181  In fact, at 
no time since the end of the Second World War had war seemed so likely.  
Nikita Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that, at the time, the international 
situation throughout Europe was highly unstable.  ‗The slightest fluctuation 
in the pressure of the world political atmosphere,‘ Khrushchev wrote, 
‗naturally registered at that point where the forces of the two sides were 
squared off against each other.‘  For both sides then, Germany served as ‗a 
sort of barometer.‘182   
 Most policymakers in Washington shared similar priorities in 
Germany—to sustain America‘s position in Berlin and to avoid war with 
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the Soviet Union.  Reflecting on the uncertainty of whether Moscow was 
prepared to gamble everything for the control of Germany, Truman wrote: 
 
Our position in Berlin was precarious.  If we 
wished to remain there, we would have to 
make a show of strength.  But to remain there 
was always the risk that Russian reaction 
might lead to war.  We had to face the 
possibility that Russia might deliberately 
choose to make Berlin the pretext for war, but 
a more immediate danger was the risk that a 
trigger-happy Russian pilot or hotheaded 
Communist tank commander might create an 
incident that could ignite the powder keg.
183
 
  
 That Soviet leaders operated on the historical belief that a conflict 
between the Soviet Union and the Western countries was destined was 
perhaps the single issue that caused American policy officials the most 
anxiety and uncertainty.  In part because of this, President Truman‘s plans 
for Berlin were, to a considerable degree, ad hoc—often dealing with 
situations as they happened.
184
  Indeed, Truman only made the final 
decision to stay in Berlin on July 9, 1948 which, as we shall see, was well 
after the airlift was underway.
185
  Avi Shlaim writes in The Berlin Blockade 
that the initial reactive step by American decision-makers was ‗to seek 
information about the threatening move by the Russians which triggered off 
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the crisis.‘186  Given such uncertainty, particularly during the early stages of 
the crisis, such information was vital in the decision-making process for the 
Truman administration. 
 To Washington, the Kremlin was enveloping the European 
continent.
187
  But although unnerved by the rapidity and effectiveness of 
Soviet subversion and intransigence in Europe, Washington‘s responses to 
the flashpoints across Europe as the curtain was raised in the Cold War 
were often slow and unformed.
188
  The Communist Party had taken over the 
Hungarian government on May 31, 1947.  A week later, the leader of 
Bulgaria‘s anti-Communist Agrarian Party, Nikola Petkov, was arrested 
and subsequently executed, and the Agrarian Party itself was dissolved later 
in August.  The following month, the leader of Romania‘s anti-Communist 
National Peasant Party was arrested and sentenced to life in prison.  These 
ominous events sharpened relations between the two powers and served as 
a reminder to Washington what would most likely happen if the Western 
powers were to abandon their position in Germany.  Yet at a time when ‗the 
situation in Germany remained fluid,‘ policymakers were unsure at what 
point provocations in Berlin might become a political flashpoint and 
escalate into an armed conflict.
189
 
 Fully aware that the United States lacked the capabilities to 
implement any contingency plans, the urgency for military planners 
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intensified throughout 1947-48 in light of growing evidence pointing to a 
buildup of Soviet forces.
190
  John Oneal notes that from early 1948 on, 
‗American military leaders were greatly concerned that the foreign policies 
of the president implied a military capability that the United States did not 
actually have.‘191  However, David Holloway points out that Soviet military 
policy never betrayed any fear that war was ‗imminent.‘192  But if given the 
green light, Soviet-invading forces could drive swiftly and largely 
unopposed into Germany.  Truman‘s biographer, David McCullough, 
highlights the disparity of Western ground forces around Berlin:  ‗The 
Allies had all of 6,500 troops in Berlin—3000 American, 2,000 British, 
1,500 French—while the Russians had 18,000 backed by an estimated 
300,000 in the east zone of Germany.‘193   
 Alexander George argues, however, that the problem extended far 
beyond the gap in America‘s defense of Europe:  ‗The inability of U.S. 
leaders to sense correctly the Soviet approach to the calculation and 
acceptance of risks had been, in fact, a chronic problem from the beginning 
of the Cold War.‘194  Former CIA Deputy Director, Ray S. Cline adds that, 
beginning with the Berlin blockade and accelerating with the Korean War, 
Washington was inclined to expect a direct military assault by the Soviet 
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Union.
195
  One thing was for certain.  Stalin‘s moves, although purportedly 
defensive, smacked of offensive maneuvers designed to force the Western 
powers out of their respective zones.   
 During this time Washington required pragmatic, realistic 
assessments of Soviet intentions and capabilities in Western Europe.  
Intelligence during the CIA‘s formative years was often right, sometimes 
misleading and occasionally wrong.  The role of the CIA‘s analytical 
branch, by itself, is complex.  This study, therefore, acknowledges, where 
appropriate, the often complicated and nuanced process of policy decision-
making.
196
  The ways in which the Truman administration considered input 
from other governmental institutions and organizations varied; and while 
intelligence could be the best available source for difficult judgments about 
Soviet intentions and capabilities, policy direction could often depend 
ultimately on a particular mindset or attitude among senior policy officials.  
Reflecting on his presidency, Truman believed that the best results came 
from intensive study of different viewpoints and from arguments.  ‗I have 
spent many hours,‘ he wrote, ‗late at night and early in the morning, poring 
over papers giving all sides.  Many times I was fairly convinced in my own 
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mind which course of action would be the right one but I still wanted to 
cover every side of the situation before coming to a final decision.‘197 
 The point that deserves emphasis here is that at no time did the 
President rely solely on any one government official or organization for 
recommendations on policy action.  Truman and senior policymakers 
received advice and recommendations from a wide range of government 
agencies and personnel, particularly during times of crisis, including:  the 
State Department, George F. Kennan‘s Policy Planning Staff,198 the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff,
199
 the National Security Council,
200
 intelligence agencies 
and a number of other trusted high-level policy officials.  Truman‘s 
preferred model for assessing potential and existing problems in any given 
crisis involved different expertise from a wide range of resources. 
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Questions and Thesis Statement 
As the first segment of this case study, this chapter is divided into 
three main sections.  First, an historical introduction briefly outlines US 
foreign policy objectives and the different factors which influenced policy, 
as well as the creation of the CIA as America‘s first peacetime spy agency.  
This introductory material, serving chapters three and four, provides the 
context essential for understanding the political arena in which the CIA was 
expected to operate.  And since Germany has always held a prominent role 
in the European balance of power, it is necessary to do more than 
superficially recall relevant events.  After briefly outlining some of the 
existing literature, this chapter will provide an examination of the CIA‘s 
predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group.  The chapter will then examine 
the crisis following the CIA‘s creation in September 1947, continuing 
through to the spring of 1948.  Finally, summary conclusions will ascertain 
the CIA‘s analysis during the early stage of the Berlin crisis. 
The following questions will shine a brighter light on the CIA‘s 
contribution during the initial crisis period:  First, how well did the CIA 
read Soviet intentions and how effectively did it read the crisis?  In other 
words, what actions did the CIA believe were necessary to make certain 
Germany remained independent from the USSR, without provoking direct 
Soviet military retaliation?  Second, how accurate were its warnings and 
assessments?  And although it is a frustrating undertaking to join the dots 
up, it is hoped that more clues are revealed about the nature and the quality 
93 
 
of the CIA‘s influence during this particular crisis.201  Admittedly, the 
answers do not require any sweeping, radical revision to CIA or Cold War 
history, the answers to these key questions will, nevertheless, begin to fill 
some of the remaining gaps in the CIA‘s early history.  Nor will this case 
study put the controversy over the issues to rest.  Yet an examination of 
these questions can enhance our understanding of this fascinating, 
understudied piece of history. 
The chapter will advance two major arguments in order to 
demonstrate, through the careful analysis of intelligence and policy 
documents, how the Central Intelligence Agency intended to reassure 
policymakers who were unsure how much Stalin was willing to risk in 
Berlin, and thereby reduced the sense of immediacy in Germany.
202
  Even 
in this first real Cold War crisis, the CIA addressed issues in a way that was 
designed to moderate the potential for more extreme behavior by placing 
Soviet risk-taking within context and adjusting perceptions of Soviet 
behavior.  Despite the organizational problems and the newness of the CIA, 
its cautious position was designed to have a moderating influence to help 
reassure policy officials that the Soviet appetite for a direct conflict in 
Germany was largely limited.
203
  
The case study will also demonstrate that the CIA considered 
Western efforts in Berlin vital to U.S. national security.  This appraisal was 
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helpful, considering many government officials, especially within the 
Pentagon, argued that defending Germany, vis-à-vis Berlin, was not 
strategically viable.  The CIA‘s assurances that Soviet actions did not 
necessarily reflect a wider strategy for spreading hostility to other areas of 
the world helped senior policy officials better contextualize security threats, 
thereby reassuring an already anxious administration that the Soviet Union 
was unprepared for a military confrontation with the West.   
 Events elsewhere had left Washington unsure about which Soviet 
actions or reactions might precipitate a war, so that many in Washington 
were primed to react strongly to Soviet risk-taking.  But the CIA‘s 
analytical team recognized that the series of Soviet provocations in Berlin 
were designed to test Western firmness and patience, rather than to provoke 
an armed conflict.  The Soviet leader understood that the close proximity 
between Western and Soviet forces made the provocations in Berlin all the 
more dangerous.  In retrospect, we can see that the Kremlin‘s tightening of 
the blockade was progressive, providing historians with some indication 
that Stalin was fearful of disastrous results or of creating a situation that 
might spiral out of his control. 
 As noted in the introductory chapter, the following case study has 
drawn upon five principal sources:  1) declassified documents from the 
CIA;
204
 2) US State Department and National Archive publications; 3) 
government reports on matters of high policy; 4) memoirs of the major 
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participants in the national security process; and 5) scholarly studies related 
to the Berlin blockade.
205
 
 
 
Recent Views  
The varieties of historical interpretations on the Berlin blockade are 
virtually exhaustive.  Yet despite being the first political flashpoint in East-
West Cold War relations, the CIA‘s analytical efforts during this crisis are 
still, too often, overlooked.  This is primarily because the popular view 
considers the nascent intelligence agency too inexperienced and untested to 
have impacted decision-making.  Although few historians have dismissed 
outright the CIA‘s influence during the early Cold War, most treatments of 
the Agency‘s analysis during the Berlin crisis are brief.  Important 
contributions, such as Avi Shlaim‘s The United States and the Berlin 
Blockade, 1948-1949 and Melvyn P. Leffler‘s A Preponderance of Power, 
argue that the CIA‘s assessments were correct but present little more than a 
perfunctory examination of either why the CIA‘s analysis mattered or how 
it might have influenced policy decision-making.  Similarly, even such 
notable studies as Richard Aldrich‘s The Guiding Hand and Christopher 
Andrew‘s For the President’s Eyes Only provide but brief analyses of the 
CIA‘s early analytical efforts. 
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This study parts company with the general text American Foreign 
Policy:  Pattern and Process.  Here, political scientists Charles Kegley Jr. 
and Eugene Wittkopf argue that during the postwar period, the CIA was in 
a ‗commanding political position.‘206  Contrastingly, Loch Johnson insists 
that the Agency was beset by bureaucratic struggles and was incapable of 
consolidating its position within Washington until 1950.
207
  Although the 
basic assessment is valid, without any specific examples, Johnson seems to 
suggest that the CIA‘s influence was not only just limited, but 
insignificant.
208
  Donald P. Steury claims that neither the CIG nor the 
nascent CIA was capable of meeting the postwar intelligence requirements 
on the Soviet Union.
209
  In particular, Steury maintains that none of the 
early intelligence documents contained information of importance to the 
formulation of US foreign policy: 
 
The predominance of such a current, 
situational focus suggests a preoccupation 
with ‗answering the mail,‘ to the detriment of 
the longer range, more comprehensive 
intelligence assessments which the nation‘s 
central intelligence organization might have 
been expected to produce.
210
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Yet given the ad hoc nature of American foreign policy after the 
war and the restructuring of much of the federal government in these years, 
it seems unrealistic to expect that any newly created intelligence 
organization could have committed significant resources beyond immediate 
security concerns.
211
  It seems more realistic to expect that the atmosphere 
of uncertainty that permeated Washington would have determined much of 
the Agency‘s agenda. 
Thomas Parrish‘s brief treatment of the CIA‘s early years also 
appears to measure it against an unrealistic ideal.  Parrish argues that, 
months after the creation of the CIA, US intelligence had developed no real 
analysis of Soviet aims and strategy since the CIG‘s assessments in July 
1946.
212
  In Intelligence Effects on the Cold War, Michael Herman notes 
that, in general terms, the CIA held the position that a hot war was not 
inevitable, but that the Cold War would be ‗a long haul against a 
determined and calculating opponent.‘213  Although a sound work as a 
whole, Herman concludes that this position was reached in the first instance 
by policy makers and that the intelligence assessments were only 
supportive.   
Although less unyielding than Parrish, former CIA officer, Ray S. 
Cline asserts that, as an institution, the CIA ‗was not geared into the 
working machinery at the top level of government.‘  According to Cline, 
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the Agency‘s assessments were hampered in pulling together ‗coherent 
estimates on pressing foreign threats.‘214  In The CIA and American 
Democracy, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones correctly points out that the blockade of 
West Berlin provoked charges about the CIA‘s non-prediction, but never 
goes further to look at whether these charges were justified.
215
   
Walter Laqueur views the CIA‘s forecasts during the Berlin 
blockade crisis as ‗slightly manic-depressive…whether the tidings were 
good or bad.‘ He suggests that the Agency was hindered by ‗misplaced 
optimism,‘ failing to place the Berlin blockade in more alarming language.  
Laqueur occasionally adjusts his position, noting that the CIA‘s coverage of 
East European affairs was ‗generally accurate.‘  Yet even here he insists:  
‗Intelligence evaluators were inclined to be a little too optimistic.‘216  It 
should be remembered that although intelligence did not contain ‗alarming 
language,‘ this did not necessarily indicate that its appraisal was 
inconsistent with the reality of Soviet actions and intentions.  Moreover, 
given the potential danger of over reacting, alarming language was not 
always desirable or even constructive. 
These viewpoints are out of step with Avi Shlaim‘s position.  
According to Shlaim, by the time of the Berlin crisis, ‗the CIA was not only 
sufficiently established to ensure that an adequate intelligence base was 
available to sustain the deliberations of the NSC, but Truman had formed 
the habit of starting the day‘s work early each morning with an intelligence 
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briefing from the Director of the CIA.‘217  Moreover, few histories address 
what Woodrow J. Kuhns considers the most important ‗steadying 
influence‘ during the formative years of the Cold War—the CIA‘s repeated, 
correct assurances that a Soviet attack in Europe was unlikely.
218
  This view 
represents an unusual verdict but one which this study deals with directly 
and in much more detail than Kuhns‘ brief analysis. 
 
 
From CIG to CIA 
President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group on 
January 22, 1946 to provide strategic warnings and conduct clandestine 
operations in order to address growing concerns about Soviet 
intransigence.
219
  Although the CIG was dissolved before the Berlin crisis 
was truly underway, it would be a mistake to overlook its role as the crisis 
unfolded.  Not only was the CIG the largest pool of talent and experience 
from which the CIA had to draw, but the deterioration of East-West 
cooperation in Germany began during its watch.   
Policymakers began to receive daily intelligence briefs from the 
CIG‘s Daily Summary on February 15, 1946.220  With just twenty-nine 
                                                 
217
 Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 74.   
218
 Woodrow J. Kuhns, ed., Assessing the Soviet Threat:  The Early Cold War Years, 
Washington, DC:  Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997.  However, Kuhns, a member 
of the CIA‘s History Staff, only touches on this argument in a brief forward in his edited 
collection of Cold War intelligence documents. 
219
 In a letter to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy on 22 January, Truman directed all 
Federal foreign intelligence activities to be planned, developed and coordinated by the 
National Intelligence Authority. 
220
 The CIG‘s Daily Summary drew a great deal of criticism from policymakers.  Among 
the criticism was that the reports largely from State Department sources, was dependent on 
100 
 
permanent intelligence staff (seventeen were on loan from other 
departments), Director Admiral Sidney W. Souers was responsible for two 
functions:  planning and coordinating all federal intelligence and producing 
estimates of foreign situations for the President and senior policy 
officials.
221
  The CIG‘s first major report, issued in the summer of 1946, 
was a bellwether for future reports that year.  The paper judged the USSR 
was, in terms of a fundamental threat, determined to increase its power 
relative to its adversaries and anticipated an inevitable conflict with them, 
but that it was also intent on avoiding a conflict for some time to come and 
sought to avoid provoking strong reactions from its adversaries.
222
   
In foreshadowing Soviet tactics in Germany, CIG analysts pointed 
out that the Kremlin‘s goals would be sought after by more subtle methods, 
including economic and ideological penetration.  The paper continued to 
stress that although the Soviet Union was building its military strength, it 
would avoid future military conquests.
223
  In addition to the growing low-
level aggression in Berlin, the CIG was troubled by the inroads made by the 
communist parties in other areas of Europe, including Poland, France and 
Italy.
224
  The Kremlin, analysts concluded, was determined to frustrate 
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Western efforts and posed the first real, direct challenge to the United 
States‘ economic reconstruction policies. 
It should also be noted that US moves also unnerved the Kremlin.  
Greece, often the focal point of American aid, was engulfed in a bloody 
civil war and weakened by a beleaguered economy.  During 1946 and 1947 
the Greek monarchy, supported by the British, was fighting an insurgency 
aided by Soviet satellite forces from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.  
However, once the British government announced it was no longer able to 
assist the Greek monarch in the civil war, the United States was left with 
the decision to shoulder the assistance in Greece. 
Made anxious by this type of external pressure, the Western powers 
agreed on a number of key, decisive agreements on March 7, 1947:  1) the 
establishment of a federal system of government for Germany, 2) German 
representation in the European Recovery Program, 3) international control 
of the Ruhr region, and 4) closer economic integration of the French zone 
with the British-American zones.
225
  Then, in a message to Congress later 
that month, President Truman articulated his government‘s broader 
commitment to providing aid to countries most vulnerable to communist 
coercion and influence.
226
 
By spring, both sides appeared to be simply going through the 
motions of diplomacy and were unable to achieve any progress toward the 
                                                                                                                           
first attempt to subvert Communism through covert operations was successful, and on 
April 19, 1948 the Italian Communists lost the elections to the Christian Democrats.  
225
 Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior:  A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, pp. 80-81. 
226
 See, PPS 1, Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment:  Documents on 
American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.  
The State Department‘s Policy Planning Staff supported this ambitious goal on 23 May.  A 
PPS report emphasized that US policy should focus on economic rather than military aid. 
102 
 
reunification of Germany at the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in 
Moscow.  In addition, the four-power political bodies, the Allied Control 
Council and the Kommandatura (the quadripartite body responsible for the 
administration of Berlin), that were established to administer the zonal 
policies outlined in the Potsdam agreements broke down.
227
  Frustrated by 
challenges to its designs in Europe, the Soviet delegation actually walked 
out of the Allied Control Council on March 20.  Secretary James Byrnes 
recognized the failure of the quadripartite meetings early on:  ‗So far as 
many vital questions are concerned, the Control Council is neither 
governing Germany nor allowing Germany to govern itself.‘228  At the end 
of the month, the publication of NSC 7 reflected the deteriorating situation, 
in which it drew a comparison between Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin.  
Whether the reason for this was to heighten fears of an impending military 
conflict or not remains unclear.  Regardless, we can be quite certain of the 
National Security Councils‘ apparent attempt to paint the image of Stalin as 
a malevolent dictator.
229
 
With the adjournment of the Moscow Conference of Foreign 
Ministers on April 24, 1947, Western participants were left frustrated by 
the erosion of any remaining pretense of peaceful cooperation between the 
two sides.  At the diplomatic sessions in Moscow, Molotov had assured the 
West that the Kremlin was committed to the economic revival of the Ruhr.  
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However, most policymakers in Washington, hoping to be freed of any 
commitments with the Soviet Union, instead pursued a separatist policy in 
Germany.
230
  W. Averall Harriman, Secretary of Commerce and former US 
Ambassador in Moscow, reported to President Truman in the summer of 
1947 that US efforts were putting in too little too late.  ‗We cannot attain 
our basic objectives,‘ the ambassador argued, ‗unless we are ready to move 
rapidly to reconstruct German life from its present pitiful and chaotic 
condition.‘231 
A CIG report issued on May 2 advised its readers that, for the 
present, ‗the Kremlin appears to be pursuing a dual policy of preventing a 
European settlement while trying to keep alive western hopes that such a 
settlement eventually may be possible.‘232  Then on the last day of July, 
Richard Helms, the branch chief in Washington, issued an internal 
memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlining an informal account by 
the Chief of the CIG‘s Berlin detachment.  The report focused on the 
prospects of a hardening of East-West division in Germany and the extent 
of American setbacks in Berlin.  The memorandum was grim in tone; 
although an acknowledgment that many Americans had a tendency to 
‗magnify the significance of local developments‘ prefaced its assessment in 
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Berlin, it suggested that the unanimity of pessimism was certainly sobering.  
‗The month of June,‘ the memo stated, ‗marked a new and severe crisis‘ in 
the battle for Berlin.  In addition to conveying general sentiments of 
pessimism, the paper specifically cited a high-ranking Army officer‘s 
concerns about the ‗Asiatic cunning‘ of the Soviets prompting a surprise 
attack.  At no point, however, did either Helms or the Berlin detachment 
suggest that these localized assessments signified an impending invasion by 
Soviet forces. 
As might be expected, the rift between the US and the USSR 
widened as Stalin was faced with the increase of US assistance to the 
region, particularly as the European Recovery Program improved earlier 
methods of rendering assistance to other countries hit hardest by the war.  
This increase in assistance represented a considerably more active approach 
in American foreign policy.
233
  Brewster C. Denny provides a matter-of-
fact assessment of US foreign policy in Europe at this time: 
 
America‘s national interests provided a 
compelling case for rebuilding Europe, 
stabilizing the governments and the 
economies of the eastern Mediterranean, 
                                                 
233
 Although his unreserved support for the US recovery program is evident, Herbert C. 
Mayer‘s detailed study, German Recovery and the Marshall Plan 1948-1952, New York:  
Edition Atlantic Forum, 1969, still provides an important account of the impact US 
economic assistance had in Europe.  Secretary of State, George C. Marshall called for a 
European Recovery Program during his address at Harvard University (June 5, later 
dubbed the Marshall Plan).  Although initially envisaged by Marshall, a group at the State 
Department led by Dean Acheson further developed the Marshall Plan.  Acheson and 
others placed their hopes in American assistance abroad as the best chance of a stabilizing 
force that would re-establish a group of states which could stand up to the Communist 
encroachment.  In conjunction with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan was actually 
more than a political response to the perceived aggression by the Soviet Union.  This shift 
of US policy represented a new commitment to equip countries threatened by communist 
influence with economic aid, equipment or even military force. 
105 
 
launching a worldwide system of foreign aid, 
and making collective security commitments 
that the United Nations could not handle.  
These policies might have been developed, 
supported, and implemented without publicly 
rattling the Russian bear‘s cage.  But they 
were not.
234
 
 
Denny‘s assessment is perceptive.  The ramped up efforts of the US 
did indeed fuel suspicion within the Kremlin.  In fact, Stalin considered 
these developments as a ‗watershed‘—a smoke screen for aligning 
economically vulnerable countries with the West;
235
 and from his point of 
view, the Marshall Plan was nothing more than a wholesale attempt by the 
US to gain lasting influence in Europe and considered this flexing of 
economic muscle a threat to Soviet security.  The Soviet Premier ‗saw 
behind the plan a far-reaching design to revive German military-industrial 
potential and to direct it, as in the 1930s, against the Soviet Union.‘  Should 
American assistance threaten the Soviet zone in Germany, Stalin felt it 
necessary, through a show of strength, to put up a commanding 
counteroffensive in response to the ‗American politico-economic 
offensive.‘236   
Just a week following Moscow‘s rejection of the Marshall Plan, the 
CIG issued a report titled, ―Soviet Opposition to the Recovery Program.‖237  
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The report cautioned that Soviet counter-measures to further European 
reconstruction would be demonstrated at the Paris Conference on July 12.  
‗Less direct indications of Soviet opposition,‘ warned the CIG, ‗will be 
seen in the future in Communist interference within the participant 
countries and in vigorous propaganda emanating from Moscow.‘238  Here, 
the CIG‘s report should have confirmed Truman‘s belief in the 
inseparability between containment efforts in Berlin and the diplomatic 
implications of US economic rehabilitation in Europe.  This policy included 
the early establishment of a provisional German government for Germany, 
developing local and state self-government and the creation of a federal 
constitution. 
Shortly before its official dissolution on September 18, the CIG 
issued two assessments about Germany. The first, a Daily Summary issued 
on August 2, did little more than report on the USSR‘s disapproval of the 
union of the US and British Zones in Germany.  The second report was 
slightly more useful.  Here, analysts highlighted several issues that 
warranted consternation from policymakers, including the USSR‘s attempt 
to capitalize on America‘s position of relative weakness and to broker 
agreements to strengthen its position in Germany.  In addition to expressing 
doubt about any positive outcome at the Council of Foreign Ministers, the 
report predicted that the SED, (the Soviet-controlled Party of Socialist 
German Unity), would control the Soviet zone through the creation of 
communist front organizations.  Thus, the SED would have command of 
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the Soviet-zone, ‗regardless of CFM decisions.‘  An additional goal of 
these organizations, analysts surmised, was the penetration of West 
Berlin.
239
 
Aware that the CIG had been created under a cloud of confusion, 
Truman believed the current intelligence structure insufficient to provide 
much more than tactical or short-term estimates.
240
  According to former 
Deputy Director for Intelligence, Russell Jack Smith, conclusions were 
based ‗on informed speculation‘ during the early days of the CIG.241  
Without a clear mandate, rival agencies such as the military services, the 
State Department and the FBI would have continued to challenge the CIG 
on access to President Truman.  The establishment of a Central Intelligence 
Agency was designed so that military-political decisions could be based on 
a national rather than a departmental appraisal of the facts.
242
  Any newly-
formed spy agency would have to cope with military opposition, rival 
bureaucratic organizations and competition with other existing and 
forthcoming intelligence sources, including:  the Department of State, the 
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Defense Departments, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).
243
 
Once again, ideas about the purpose and efficacy of a peacetime, 
centralized intelligence organization were being kicked around 
Washington.  The CIG could not shake the general consensus that its record 
had fallen short.
244
  At the lowest point for postwar Germany, the 
peacetime intelligence organization had provided the President with few 
intelligence reports—a considerable fault at a time when the Soviet leaders 
were becoming ‗less and less tractable.‘245  The CIG also fell short in 
providing little in the way of long-range analysis of Soviet intentions, 
instead reporting on general Soviet tactics and opposition to German 
reunification.  
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From Birth to Berlin 
 
It is the role of intelligence to winnow the 
extraneous data from the vital facts, and to set 
these facts in proper perspective, thereby 
providing the factual basis for high-level 
policy decisions affecting our national 
security.  If we fail…we deliberately expose 
the American people to the consequences of a 
policy dictated by a lack of information.  For 
we are competing with other nations, which 
have been building their intelligence systems 
for centuries.
246—DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter 
 
Based on the blueprint of the Eberstadt Report, the Truman 
administration sought to restructure the US national security establishment 
in an attempt to more effectively coordinate a national security and defense 
establishment that could better integrate with the political, diplomatic and 
economic aspects of the government.
247
  In this effort to tighten up the 
coordination of American national security, the National Security Act was 
created to restructure the intelligence community with the formation of the 
Central Intelligence Agency on July 16, 1947.
248
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The DCI‘s position, at least equal to the Under Secretaries of the 
departments, was one of the most important shifts to the organization of 
influence in Washington; and by Act of Congress, was also ‗the equal of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff among the advisers of the President and the 
National Security Council.‘249  For its part, the NSC was called on to advise 
the President about national security issues.  The NSC quickly became ‗the 
most important forum in the government for discussing major intelligence 
proposals and formulating advice to the president on national security 
issues‘—making it an advisory committee with unparalleled leverage over 
discussions within Washington.
250
  Reflecting on being involved with the 
drafting of the National Security Act of 1947, Clark Clifford, remarked, 
‗We were blazing a new trail.‘251  According to Secretary Dean Acheson, 
the NSC was an innovative policy tool in part because it was kept small and 
on task.  In fact, aides and brief-carriers were excluded, ‗making free and 
frank debate possible.‘252 
Avi Shlaim stresses that the National Security Council ‗collectively 
played an increasingly important role in collating information from various 
sources and advising the President on national security aspects of the 
crisis.‘253  Not everyone agrees with this assessment, however.  Brewster 
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Denny argues that the NSC failed to play a ‗substantive policy role‘ during 
the Truman administration.
254
  To what degree the NSC played a 
procedural or facilitative role remains debatable.  Two points are clear, 
however.  First, the CIA‘s assessments of the world situation held ‗a telling 
force‘ for the NSC‘s agenda during the last months of 1947 and 1948.255  
Second, the increasing contribution made by the NSC, of which the DCI 
was an advisory member, underpins the central place the CIA held in the 
decision-making process. 
The CIA‘s first monthly intelligence report, ―Review of the World 
Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,‖ was issued on 
September 26, 1947 for the NSC‘s first meeting.  Agency analysts reasoned 
that, although the USSR was capable of overrunning Europe and Asia, it 
was unlikely to resort to open military aggression at that time.  On the issue 
of Soviet intentions, the CIA argued that economic recovery in Europe was 
the key to restraining the USSR.  However, the paper stipulated that if the 
USSR was to exercise its ability to overrun Europe or Asia, ‗the ultimate 
danger to the United States would be even greater than that threatened by 
Germany or Japan….  Thus the balance of power which restrained the 
U.S.S.R. from 1921 to 1941 has ceased to exist.‘  The report surmised that, 
since the destruction of Europe in WWII, the only effective counterpoise to 
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the power of the Soviet Union was that of the United States, but analysts 
cautioned that US power was ‗both latent and remote.‘ 256 
However, the paper stated a compelling reason why the Soviet 
Union would not resort to war.  As long as Europe was at risk of an 
economic collapse, analysts reasoned, there was little reason for USSR to 
wage war because there still existed favorable prospects of exerting its 
influence, particularly while Germany remained in acute economic distress.  
So the greatest present danger to the US security rested, not in Soviet 
military strength and the threat of armed aggression, but in the possibility 
of an economic collapse of Western Europe.  Analysts concluded, then, that 
Soviet policy was ‗to avoid war with the United States.‘257   
In late September 1947, while on vacation with Vyacheslav 
Molotov, Stalin created the Information Bureau of Communist Parties, the 
Cominform.  This signaled a marked shift in the international situation 
because, according to the authors of Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, it 
formally signaled ‗the beginning of a new and often brutal Soviet policy:  
The consolidation of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.‘258  
This new policy was, according to David Holloway, ‗a move in the war of 
nerves, an attempt once again to disabuse the United States of the idea that 
it could gain political advantage from the bomb.‘259  For Washington, this 
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shift in Soviet policy caused concern about the potential for a marked 
increase in hostility throughout Europe. 
Like the Central Intelligence Agency, Truman‘s Policy Planning 
Staff issued assessments aimed at these concerns.  On November 6 George 
F. Kennan drafted a memorandum, PPS 13, Résumé of World Situation, 
which stated, ‗The danger of war is vastly exaggerated in many quarters.  
The Soviet Government neither wants nor expects war with us in the 
foreseeable future.  The political advance of the communists in Western 
Europe has been at least temporarily halted.  This is the result of several 
factors, among which the prospect of U.S. aid is an important one.‘  At this 
point, the Policy Planning Staff appears to have shared the CIA‘s 
explanation for its analysis of the developing crisis. At least on the issue of 
Soviet intentions and behavior, the CIA‘s earliest analysis was compatible 
with Kennan‘s concerns.260 
PPS assessments also appear to have maintained a degree of faith in 
the quadripartite meetings, but, at the same time, were realistic about Soviet 
subversion and intransigence in Germany.  ‗All in all, our policy must be 
directed toward restoring the balance of power in Europe and Asia.  This 
means that in the C.F.M. meeting we must insist on keeping Western 
Germany free of communistic control‘261 because, the PPS argued, the 
Soviets ‗might well try to get us out of western Germany under 
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arrangements which would leave that country defenseless against 
communist penetration.‘  If this should happen, the PPS pessimistically 
cautioned that the United States should ‗proceed to make the best of a 
divided Germany.‘262   
Having said this, however, Kennan‘s early influence was also 
responsible for reinforcing much of the prickly Cold War rhetoric.
263
  In 
pointing out the implacable hostility of Soviet policy, Kennan stressed that 
the Kremlin‘s motivations were fundamentally tied to a need to legitimize 
domestic policies through external threats.  More importantly, his position 
stressed that the Soviet government was a ‗political force committed 
fanatically to the belief that with the United States there can be no 
permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal 
harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be 
destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power 
is to be sure.‘264   
Understanding Kennan‘s mindset is also helpful in placing his 
influence in the context of both policy formation and early Cold War 
intelligence efforts.  After all, Kennan had spent a few weeks consulting 
with the recently established CIA about information gathering in the Soviet 
Union and had spent a month on its payroll as a ‗special consultant‘ to 
General Hoyt Vandenberg while it was still being formed.  During this 
time, Kennan urged Truman that normal channels of information gathering 
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in the Soviet Union were inadequate and even dangerous to US security.  
Kennan considered it the ‗clear duty of the various interested agencies of 
our government to determine at once in Washington the measures which 
our government should take to obtain information with respect to Soviet 
progress in atomic research.‘265 
Truman‘s own assessments further underscore the difficulty in 
fleshing out the complexity of conflicting perceptions and receptivity of 
policymakers.  Alexander George argues that Truman often saw the USSR 
as ‗a wily adversary—deceitful, to be sure, but also unstable and, worst of 
all, unpredictable!‘  The President also believed that Moscow was inclined 
to risk a military incident during the crisis to test US firmness and patience. 
George highlights these inconsistencies: 
 
In his view it was possible that Soviet leaders 
might even be looking for a pretext to begin a 
war.  Thus, different images of the Soviet 
opponent among American policymakers at 
this time produced divergent perceptions not 
only of Moscow‘s intentions and its 
willingness to accept high risks, but also of 
the utility and risks of different measures the 
United States might take to maintain itself in 
West Berlin.
266
 
   
The CIA‘s November 19 Daily Summary touched upon the subject 
of Soviet tactics referred to by the PPS.  Although credible sources 
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confirmed that a Soviet state was imminent in the eastern zone, analysts 
asserted that, in an attempt to create a separate communist state, the USSR 
might take ‗possible subsequent applications as retaliatory measures.‘267  
This pointed to a deeper dimension to the East-West standoff, suggesting 
Soviet actions were less provocative than reactive.  On this issue, the Policy 
Planning Staff and the CIA were in agreement.  The summary went on to 
suggest that Soviet intentions might not include provocative actions against 
the Western powers, but instead, that the USSR was prepared for a 
protracted low-level standoff over Germany. 
A Weekly Summary later that month argued that, considering the 
failure of the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers, there was no reason to 
believe that subsequent international meetings would result in any change 
of the Soviet position on issues concerning Germany.  Even on minor 
matters, argued analysts, the USSR had failed to indicate the slightest 
adjustment of Soviet aims and objectives.  The report also predicted that 
these objectives at the London CFM in November-December 1947 would 
basically be the same as those pursued at the Moscow conference, because 
fundamentally, the Soviet Union‘s goal was, according to CIA analysts, ‗to 
communize Germany as an essential step in a plan to extend Communist 
control over all Europe.‘268  On this issue, the Weekly Summary points out 
the significant shift of Soviet tactics once the Kremlin had determined that 
its objectives in Western Europe were unobtainable: 
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…The Kremlin directed its efforts toward 
keeping the Soviet Zone in Germany 
economically sealed off from Western 
Europe.  Such a policy was designed to 
reduce western Germany to a social and 
economic morass and was supported by the 
conviction that the US would inevitably have 
a severe depression which would force the 
abandonment of European commitments.
269
 
 
 To the CIA, the London meetings, while unsettling, actually 
provided further evidence that the Kremlin was not instigating an armed 
confrontation, but instead, encouraging conditions that would precipitate an 
economic depression in Western Europe.  The failure of the meeting also 
reinforced the growing belief that a separate West German state could be 
created. 
By the end of 1947 the CIA had concluded that the successive 
failures of the international meetings would serve as a trigger for Soviet 
provocations.
270
  In a memorandum to President Truman on December 22, 
DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter stated that, in light of the breakdown of the CFM 
in London, the USSR would probably use every means short of armed force 
to compel the Western powers to leave the city.  Hillenkoetter suggested 
that this failure of diplomacy had ‗probably been caused in large measure 
by the firm attitude of US officials in Berlin.‘  ‗Soviet response,‘ he 
reasoned, ‗will be timed to follow overt allied implementation of the 
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London decisions….‘ Among the possible responses listed in the report was 
the implementation of a blockade of Western traffic and 
communications.
271
 
 
 
January to March 1948 
 
Let‘s make a joint effort—perhaps we can 
kick them out.
272—Joseph Stalin 
 
At no point was the CIA‘s influence more critical than during the 
early months of 1948.
273
  As the crisis heated up, the political pressure in 
Germany continued to mount.  For either side, there was little remaining 
desire for compromise, particularly as it became evident that US economic 
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aid was contributing significantly to the restoration of self-confidence in 
Europe.  Emboldened by recent successes, US officials seemed more eager 
to openly counter Soviet moves in Western Europe.  Discontented with the 
impasses of diplomacy, the Western powers excluded the Soviet Union 
from the London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers (February 
through June 1948).  The State Department had come to the conclusion that 
it would be better to divide Germany and further sour ties with the Soviets 
than to risk the ongoing plans for stabilizing and integrating western 
Germany.  As a result, two bold proposals were made at the conference:  to 
create a West German state and to institute currency reform.   
For the Soviet Union, however, these proposals were unacceptable.  
In response, the Kremlin ordered its delegates to walk out of the Allied 
Control Council in response to the proposals, shifting Soviet policy more 
decisively toward a ‗blocist definition.‘274  On January 20, Marshal 
Sokolovsky, ordered by the Kremlin, rejected outright US proposals for 
currency reform within occupied Germany. After consulting East German 
leaders, the Soviet premier decided to initiate measures designed to force 
the Western powers out of Berlin over the course of 1948, while at the 
same time stepping up security for various military exercises inside its 
eastern zone.
275
 
As the crisis deepened, CIA assessments continued with a moderate 
tone at a time when senior US military commanders were showing signs of 
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potentially reactive behavior.  In January 1948, Army Secretary, Kenneth 
Royall, sent a warning to Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, about the 
possibility of either direct military action or the imposition of 
‗administrative difficulties‘ by Soviet authorities in Berlin, and the Soviet 
refusal to participate in the Allied Control Council once plans for the 
integration of the western zones became known.
276
  CIA predictions were 
spot on.  The Soviets began to interfere with rail traffic to Berlin from the 
Western zones at the beginning of the year. 
By the end of February, the situation in Europe further deteriorated.  
Assured of Western complacency, members of the Soviet-backed regime in 
Czechoslovakia imprisoned opposition leaders in a successful attempt to 
end democracy.
277
  The coup d’état effectively strengthened Soviet control 
in Eastern Europe by removing the last remaining non-communist leader 
and created a war scare in Washington.  Gaddis makes two important points 
about the situation in Czechoslovakia.  First, the takeover in Prague 
accelerated plans by the West to consolidate their occupation zones in 
Germany and to proceed toward the formation of an independent West 
German State.  Second, Washington believed that further Soviet successes 
would embolden the Kremlin and push the United States to take on ‗direct 
military responsibilities‘ for defending the remaining segments of Europe 
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outside Soviet control.
278
  This line of reasoning makes sense since Joseph 
Stalin had strengthened his grip on Germany by 1948 by ordering a 
progressive tightening of a blockade around Berlin.   
In addition to communist inroads elsewhere in Europe, the 
developing crisis in Berlin was becoming increasingly explosive if for no 
other reason than the close proximity of the Western and Soviet ground and 
air units; and because so much of the decision-making was delegated to the 
military commanders on the ground—further increasing the chances for 
miscalculations.  In fact, General Clay neither requested nor received 
permission from Washington to begin the airlift.  But was the CIA more in 
tune with decision-making in Washington than the military commanders on 
the ground?  It was.  In part because of the CIA‘s assessments, Washington 
could be relatively certain that what they faced in Berlin was not a military 
but a political challenge. Christian Ostermann points out in US Intelligence 
and the GDR: The Early Years that, unlike OMGUS (Office of Military 
Government of the United States for Germany), which had warned 
Washington in early March that war might be imminent, the CIA argued 
‗more cautiously and ambiguously‘ that mounting tensions with the Soviets 
could be settled outside military means.
279
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In comparison, General Lucius D. Clay‘s assessments had the 
potential of being one of the most destabilizing influences in Germany.
280
  
On March 5, General Clay cabled a telegram from Germany warning 
Washington that a war with the Soviet Union might come suddenly: 
 
For many months, based on logical analysis, I 
have felt and held that war was unlikely for at 
least ten years.  Within the last few weeks, I 
have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude 
which I cannot define but which now gives 
me a feeling that it may come with dramatic 
suddenness.  I cannot support this change in 
my own thinking with any data or outward 
evidence in relationships other than to 
describe it as a feeling of a new tenseness in 
every Soviet individual with whom we have 
official relations.  I am unable to submit any 
official report in the absence of supporting 
data but my feeling is real.
281
 
 
Truman appears to have taken the warning seriously.  The following 
day, he went before a joint session of Congress and warned that the Soviet 
Union threatened disaster.  Overall, though, Truman faced the crisis with 
‗notable caution and firmness.‘282  On reading the cable, CIA‘s Berlin 
Operations Base was more surprised by Clay‘s certainty of Soviet 
                                                 
280
 The US military had other confrontational ‗Cold Warriors‘ who threatened to serve as 
destabilizing forces, notably Air Force General Curtis LeMay and Army General Douglas 
MacArthur. 
Walter Laqueur notes, however, ‗The possibility of Soviet military attack overshadowed 
all other issues facing U.S. intelligence for many years after the war.  Perhaps the first to 
sound the tocsin (in 1948) was General Lucius Clay.‘  See, Walter Laqueur, A World of 
Secrets:  The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, p. 118. 
281
 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, Garden City, NY:  Doubleday and Company, 
1950, p. 354.  In addition to the oval office, Clay‘s cables would have certainly been read 
in the crisis room communications center on the fifth floor of the State Department. 
282
 David McCullough, Truman, p. 630. 
123 
 
extremity.  Only after two senior intelligence officers visited Clay‘s 
intelligence chief did the Office of the US Military Governor in Germany 
concur that, although future Soviet aggression was likely, war itself was 
unlikely.
283
  Clay quickly attempted to distance himself from any 
perception that he might have been ‗war mongering.‘  In a memorandum to 
Maj. Gen. Floyd Parks, Clay referenced the immediate danger of war with 
Russia:  ‗I wish to emphatically record that I have never made any 
statement with reference to circulating war danger threats….‘284 
Although his March telegram was merely a report on his ―mind-set‖ 
at the time, General Clay, nevertheless, caused a great deal of anxiety in 
Washington, particularly at the Pentagon.  In his initial response to the 
telegram, Secretary of the Army, Royall, asked how long it would take to 
get a number of atomic bombs to the Mediterranean, should the Soviets 
initiate military action.
285
   
In light of Clay‘s cable and the announcement the following day 
that the West had reached a preliminary agreement on the formation of a 
West German state, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar N. 
Bradley, requested the CIA‘s Office of Reports and Estimates draft a 
memorandum that might provide the President with an estimate of the 
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likelihood of an escalation in Europe that would lead to war.
286
  Meeting 
for the first time on March 13 (under the chairmanship of the CIA‘s 
DeForrest Van Slyck) the ad hoc committee buckled down and began to 
draft its assessment of Berlin.  G-2 (US Army intelligence) drafted an 
estimate that called for general mobilization and increasing the alert status 
of the army.  Its draft, ―Estimate of the World Situation,‖ went on to warn: 
 
The risk of war is greater now…than was the 
case six months ago…war will become 
increasingly probable…. The Soviet Armed 
Forces…overshadow the whole of Europe 
and most of Asia…. The United States has no 
forces in being which could prevent the 
Soviet [sic] overrunning most of Eurasia…. 
Present forces…are incapable of offering 
more than a weak and unorganized delaying 
action in any of the likely theaters.
287
 
 
After considerable difficulty, the only remaining dissent in 
Hillenkoetter‘s report rested with the contributing military representatives‘ 
refusal to agree to a direct statement that a war was unlikely.  (However, 
the Intelligence Advisory Committee would not agree to the estimate when 
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presented with the committee‘s conclusions).288  By concluding that war 
was improbable for at least the next 60 days, the CIA helped to allay the 
sense of immediacy caused by Clay‘s earlier assessment.  The Agency‘s 
report of short-term projections also placed Soviet actions into the much 
broader context of the strengths and weaknesses of overall Soviet strategic 
posture.  The key to the committee‘s success, argues Steury, was the CIA‘s 
ability to ‗exert intellectual authority over a process that closely involved 
the departmental agencies.‘  The result, he argues, was ‗a much more 
balanced estimate that gave due weight to the restraints operating on Soviet 
military power,‘ while acknowledging the undoubted preponderance of 
Soviet military power in Europe.
289
  Moreover, the formation and 
successful deliberation of the ad hoc committee demonstrated that senior 
policy officials were already testing the CIA as a useful voice on which to 
help base key policy decisions during times of crisis.   
After reviewing the committee‘s report, the President demanded 
answers to three urgent questions:  
 
1) Would the Soviet Union deliberately provoke war in the next 30 days?   
2) Within the next 60 days?   
3) In 1948?290 
 
The CIA responded to each of these questions in a March 16 
memorandum.
291
  The report advised the President that, based on the 
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weight of logic and evidence, the Soviet Union did not intend to resort to 
military action for the next sixty days.  However, analysts pointed to the 
‗ever present possibility that some miscalculation or incident may result in 
military movements toward areas, at present unoccupied by the USSR.‘292  
This timely report that war was not probable within sixty-days provided a 
real analytical counterweight to Clay‘s telegram.   
A report on Soviet Pressure on Berlin argued that, following the 
London decisions the USSR would intensify its campaign to oust the 
Western powers from Berlin.
293
  The paper also listed the most urgent 
dangers facing the Western position in Germany, of which it warned 
against any ‗tendency towards war hysteria or lack of firmness and patience 
on the part of US officials in Berlin.‘  Analysts concluded that the USSR, 
therefore, would probably use every means short of armed force to compel 
these powers to leave the city.  Only the greatest determination and tact on 
both sides,‘ urged the CIA, ‗could prevent a serious incident from 
deteriorating beyond control of the Berlin authorities.‘294  Interestingly, Avi 
Shlaim suggests that these appraisals would not have been particularly 
reassuring for Truman (perhaps because the outbreak of violent provocation 
could not be ‗confidently ruled out‘); but he grants that the March 16, 1948 
reports were on firm ground and helped to calm tensions that had been 
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steadily building in inter-Allied relations.
295
  Former DCI, Admiral 
Stansfield Turner, concludes that the tension raised by Clay‘s telegram was 
eased by the CIA‘s analysis.296 
The CIA went on to issue additional reports during March within a 
similarly cautious framework.  On March 17, analysts stressed that it did 
not believe that the USSR planned a military venture in the immediate 
future in either Europe or the Middle East.
297
  This view contrasted sharply 
with Time magazine‘s lead story on March 21 that reported:  ‗All last week 
the halls of Congress, on the street corners, U.S. citizens had begun to talk 
of the possibility of war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.‘298 
Even when, days later, the Soviet delegates walked out of the Allied 
Control Council and the CIA received reports of the USSR tightening the 
borders in Germany, and that the closure of these borders ‗may be 
imminent.‘  Analysts believed that these moves were not necessarily 
overtures for any armed conflict.
299
  The overall perceptiveness of this 
analysis is significant, since these events were too often seen as explosive 
triggers.  For Truman, these events did not simply formalize what had, for 
some time, been an obvious fact; namely, that the four-power agreements 
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had become unworkable—They signified ‗the curtain-raiser for a major 
crisis.‘300 
The situation in Berlin took a dramatic turn on the last day of March 
when the Soviet Deputy Military Governor, General Dratvin, notified the 
US military government in Berlin that, beginning April 1, the Soviets 
would check all US personnel passing through their zone.
301
  Although only 
a partial blockade of Berlin, the announcement signified the beginning of 
an escalation of continual provocations deliberately manufactured to block 
the Western consolidation of Germany and place Washington on the 
defensive. 
Similarly, General Clay considered this egregious challenge a direct 
affront to the US position.  Avi Shlaim points out that Clay was convinced 
that the Russians would back down if put to the test and grew impatient 
when permission for his plans was not immediately granted.
302
  And 
although he requested full instructions from Washington, the Military 
Governor intended to instruct his train guards to open fire if Soviet soldiers 
attempted to board the trains.  Clay argued that such a firm response was 
necessary because, unless the US took a firm line, life in Berlin would 
become impossible.  ‗A retreat from Berlin at this moment would,‘ in his 
opinion, ‗have serious if not disastrous consequences in Europe.  I do not 
believe that the Soviets mean war now.  However, if they do, it seems to 
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me that we might as well find out now as later.  We cannot afford to be 
bluffed.‘303   
 
  
Midway Conclusions 
 As it became clearer that the Soviet Union was making Germany a 
major test of US political commitment, Berlin was shaping up to be the 
biggest battleground of the Cold War.  Even as the crisis began to reach its 
most critical stage, most American policymakers refused to take seriously 
the possibility of a blockade, despite mounting tension and the recent 
Soviet imposition of a temporary blockade of Western ground traffic to the 
Berlin.  We now know that Stalin had crudely justified gradually imposing 
a blockade in Berlin by reasoning that since the Western partners had 
violated the joint, four-partite administration in Germany, why should 
Stalin not be able to do the same in the Soviet zone?
304
  By the end of 
March 1948, General Clay and most senior policy officials in Washington 
were more inclined to believe that what they faced was not a threat of war 
but a political challenge to their presence in Berlin.  This broad conclusion 
would have proved more difficult without the CIA‘s assessments of the 
developing crisis.   
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 In many respects, the nascent spy agency was the ―calmest voice in 
the choir.‖  Intelligence had correctly surmised that the Soviet Union 
wanted to avoid a war with the United States, while also concluding that 
the Kremlin would remain antagonistic and opportunistic in Europe, 
particularly in East Germany.  Analysts also correctly perceived the 
Kremlin as intent on exploiting Germany economically and tightening its 
control politically.  While recognizing these antagonistic actions; the CIA 
cautioned that the USSR did not desire an armed conflict with the West. 
Certainly on the issue of Soviet intentions in Germany, CIA reports 
were most useful, helping senior policymakers better understand alarming 
events in more realistic, less alarming terms.  As the crisis deepened, the 
CIA had increasing relevance for policymakers in Washington and could 
even be credited with providing policymakers with the reassurance that, 
barring any miscalculations; the situation would not escalate into a war.  
Additionally, its guiding hand helped to prevent a further military buildup 
in Europe—a far-reaching effect at a time when the Pentagon was drafting 
plans for an eventual showdown with the Soviets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
Chapter IV 
The CIA and the De Facto Partition of Berlin 
 
 
Four years of increasingly purposeful effort 
had brought the beginnings of recovery in 
Western Europe and produced dangerous 
action farther east, of which the most 
ominous was the blockade of Berlin.—Dean 
Acheson
305
 
 
Preface 
  
By mid-spring the crisis was in crescendo—with increasing day-to-
day problems.  The economic conditions in Berlin were only beginning to 
improve while the political situation was becoming increasingly inflexible.  
In the Soviet sector, wartime reparations demands continued to strain the 
local population.  In the British, French and US sectors, agricultural 
production in the western regions of Germany was of particular concern to 
the American leadership.  Well into 1948, the caloric ration levels for West 
Berliners remained at ‗the absolute minimum from which any substantial 
economic recovery may be expected.‘306  Curtis E. LeMay, described 
conditions in Berlin: 
 
Everyone coming cold into Germany during 
that period [before the currency reform] 
shuddered at the trance-like conditions…the 
Germans were still in a state of utter shock.  
They looked like zombies, like the walking 
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dead.  There was an eternal nothingness 
about the place:  nothing happening, no work 
going on; nothing much to eat at home.  
People sat and stared.  The place was 
bewitched.
307
 
   
 
Above all this, the task of administering the isolated sectors was 
placing considerable strain on the quadripartite relationship in Germany, 
leading to the final breakdown in diplomacy.
308
  As the crisis deepened, 
policymakers were faced with three possible courses of action:  to fight, to 
leave Berlin or to find some middle ground and somehow make a stand 
against the Soviet clamp down.   However, there existed a number of broad 
concerns for policymakers to consider:  How far would the Soviets probe 
the West?  Would the Soviets miscalculate US actions/reactions?  How 
might the Soviets react if they felt trapped?  And, if faced with a 
humiliating situation, would the USSR retaliate? 
Despite the weight of these pressing questions, the Soviet Union‘s 
challenge to the Western partition of Germany and its tight control over 
East Germany should not have come as any great surprise.  Still, lingering 
fears of a major armed conflict were stirred by the suddenness and 
brazenness of the Kremlin‘s actions, so that by the spring of 1948, the 
confidence that the Soviet Union would not actually resort to armed 
aggression in the near future was severely shaken.  Russell Jack Smith 
describes Washington‘s anxiety as the Soviets steadily tightened their hold 
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on Eastern Europe and their sector of Berlin: 
 
A very considerable segment of official 
Washington spoke frequently of the ‗Russian 
timetable for world domination‘ and 
expressed the view that the only real question 
was when the Soviet armies would launch 
their attack and sweep across Europe.
309
 
 
 This principal concern, more than any other, was what made the 
CIA‘s assessments so crucial during this time.310 
 
 
Questions and Thesis Statement 
Like the previous segment of this case study, this chapter is divided 
into three main sections.  First, a brief historical background will provide 
some context for America‘s foreign policy objectives and the different 
factors which influenced policy decisions.  This is helpful for a proper 
understanding of how the CIA contributed to the dialogue on national 
security—both by providing additional warning and, once the crisis was at 
hand, by providing a guiding hand that was designed to moderate policy 
decisions.   
Second, the central and most dramatic phase of the crisis will be 
dealt with.  The chapter will focus on these central questions:  First, how 
well did the CIA read Soviet intentions and how effectively did it read the 
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crisis?  In other words, what actions did the CIA believe were necessary to 
make certain Germany remained independent from the USSR, without 
provoking direct Soviet military retaliation?  Second, how accurate were its 
warnings and assessments?  The chapter will show that the CIA‘s cautious 
position was intended to have a moderating influence designed to help 
reassure policy officials that Soviet overtures and risk-taking in Germany 
were largely opportunistic in nature.  The chapter will also demonstrate 
that, beyond its intentions to moderate the potential for more extreme 
behavior, CIA assessments were carefully worded to adjust the perceptions 
of many government officials, especially within the Pentagon, who argued 
that Germany, vis-à-vis Berlin, was a powder keg but not strategically 
viable for the United States.
311
  On this issue, the chapter will demonstrate 
that, given the potential explosiveness of the military‘s influence during the 
decision-making process, the CIA‘s assessments were an important voice 
during this phase of the crisis.  Since government officials often determined 
what immediate course of action would take place on the ground, the 
mindset of General Clay (as well as LeMay, Forrestal and Royal) must be 
considered as more than a mere side note.  In an attempt to place these 
difficult, but important questions into context, the chapter summary will 
provide conclusions about why the CIA‘s analysis of the crisis mattered. 
Finally, this chapter will challenge assertions, like Melvyn P. 
Leffler‘s, that the CIA was hamstrung in its efforts because analysts were 
bogged down with daily reports and unable to look at the larger policy 
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issues to effectively provide estimates and suggestions.
312
 Similarly, 
intelligence historian Donald Steury concludes that throughout 1948-1949 
the CIA‘s analytical branch was ‗handicapped by a consistent lack of 
reliable information on Soviet intentions and capabilities.‘313  To be sure, 
analysts often based assessments on State Department and Defense 
Department information, even, at times, having to heavily rely on logic and 
common sense.  However, intelligence collection in Germany was actually 
quite remarkable.  Intelligence historian Paul Maddrell‘s expert and 
thorough study of Western covert operations and intelligence collection in 
postwar Germany argues that a great deal of information was flowing in 
from Soviet defectors, Nazi POWs and German agents, with some limited 
success at covert operations.  Maddrell also demonstrates that the Berlin 
base was confident in their network because it had multiple agents in 
Germany, many of them Germans.
314
  Tim Weiner also points out in 
Legacy of Ashes that the CIA even had agents among Berlin‘s police and 
politicians and a line into the Soviet intelligence headquarters at Karlshorst 
in East Berlin.
315
 
It should be remembered, however, that the CIA faced early 
obstacles in its covert actions in Europe.  Perhaps most importantly was 
Hillenkoetter‘s belief that the spy agency lacked the legal authority to 
conduct covert operations without specific approval from Congress. The 
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DCI even sought to limit covert actions as a means of gathering intelligence 
overseas.  Frustrated by the political wrangling over the CIA‘s covert 
branch (the Office of Special Projects), Hillenkoetter wrote in a letter to the 
Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, J.S. Lay:  ‗I 
should like to suggest that, since State evidently will not go along with CIA 
operating this political warfare thing in any sane or sound manner, we go 
back to the original concept that State proposed.  Let State run it and let it 
have no connection at all with us.‘316  Richard Aldrich argues that instead 
of taking covert action away from the State Department and placing it with 
the CIA, all of the CIA should have been placed under the umbrella of the 
State Department.
317
  Although this would have served to further centralize 
Washington‘s bureaucracy, it should be remembered that the State 
Department did not consider it politically prudent to be directly associated 
with any of the covert/psychological activities associated with the Office of 
Policy Co-ordination (OPC).  Kennan was particularly cautious on this 
matter, fearing that such realignment would further ignite Soviet fears. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
316
 CIA, Memorandum, ―Hillenkoetter to J.S. Lay,‖ 9 June 1948.  CIA Electronic Reading 
Room. 
317
 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 13. 
137 
 
The April Crisis 
 
In this electrical atmosphere of suspicion and 
mistrust there are many varying opinions.  
General Clay considers that World War III 
will begin in six months time:  indeed he 
might well bring it on himself by shooting his 
way up the Autobahn if the Russians become 
difficult about things, he is a real ‗He-
man‘…318—Gen. Bernard Montgomery 
 
******* 
I sent [a] special message to Chief of 
Staff…to instruct train commandants to resist 
by force Soviet entry into military trains if 
necessary.
319—Gen. Lucius Clay 
 
By the spring of 1948, US policymakers were increasingly nervous 
about the crisis, although, by this point, were more certain that Soviet plans 
for Germany were based more on political motivations than economic 
factors.
320
  Charles Bohlen, reflecting on that spring, noted that fears were 
‗genuinely felt.‘321  Avi Shlaim asserts that the effects of the war scare 
which followed the Czech coup and Clay‘s March 5 report had not 
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completely subsided.
322
  ‗Whether or not European fears of an armed 
Soviet attack were exaggerated,‘ Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas argue 
that since the war scare over Czechoslovakia, the US had entered ‗a strange 
new era, an age of perpetual crisis‘ and was, in fact, ‗readying its forces for 
the outbreak of war.‘323  USAFE Commander Gen. LeMay later observed, 
‗It looked like we might have to fight at any moment, and we weren‘t self-
assured about what we had to fight with.  At a cursory glance it looked like 
USAFE would be stupid to get mixed up in anything bigger than a cat-fight 
at a pet show.‘324  Yet while most Western observers were anxious about 
Soviet actions, most would have taken issue with Winston Churchill‘s 
suggestion that the Soviets should be told to retreat from Berlin and East 
Germany or face having their cities razed.
325
 
Washington‘s fears seemed justified on April 1, 1948 when the 
―little blockade‖ began as the first of a series of Soviet restrictions applied 
to Western reconstruction efforts.
326
  This restriction of rail and road traffic 
from Western zones to the city of Berlin caused a great deal of 
consternation and confusion about the existing quadripartite agreement, 
thus increasing the risk of an incident involving a violent confrontation that 
could precipitate war.  Commander in Chief of US Forces of Occupation, 
General Clay, had urged Washington that he be permitted to proceed by his 
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own judgment.
327
  On the day of the imposed restrictions, Clay conveyed to 
Chief of Staff, Gen. Omar Bradley, that in an effort to force the issue with 
the Soviets, he was considering sending an armed truck convoy through the 
checkpoints.   
No one in Washington understood the inherent risks in Germany 
better than the Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson,
328
 who stated in 
clearly defined terms:  ‗…It has never seemed wise to me to base our own 
action on a bluff or to assume that the Russians are doing so.‘  In response 
to Clay‘s proposal, Acheson wrote: 
 
Neither side wishes to be driven by 
miscalculation to general hostilities or 
humiliation.  Therefore initial moves should 
not, if it is possible to avoid it, be 
equivocal—as a small ground probe would 
be—or reckless—as a massive one would 
be.
329
 
 
The first day of the ―little airlift‖ showed that these new restrictions 
were not a bluff.  Surprisingly, no formal agreement existed between the 
occupying powers with regard to the Western powers‘ right to occupy and 
gain access to Berlin.  The problem was that the Quadripartite Agreement 
did not specifically deal with the issue of access under the joint 
administration in Berlin.  In fact, the State Department was trying to locate 
just such documentation after traffic restrictions were imposed!  In lieu of a 
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more detailed written agreement, then, the Soviets capitalized on the fact 
that any rights to occupy Berlin were merely implied. 
General Albert Coady Wedemeyer, Army Director of Plans and 
Operations, advised that any retaliatory measures taken against the latest 
Soviet moves could be disadvantageous for the United States.
330
  In 
particular, Gen. Bradley advised that the deployment of an armed convoy 
should not be considered without first consulting the Joint Chiefs.
331
  
Determined to avoid an embarrassing compromise, Gen. Clay responded to 
the restrictions by requesting authorization to proceed on his judgment and 
send a ‗test train‘ to see how far the Soviets would go.332  He also proposed 
to double the number of armed guards on the passenger trains entering the 
Soviet zone.
333
  Most alarmingly, Clay and his political advisor, 
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, suggested that Washington should inform 
the Soviets that US troops would force their way into Berlin by means of an 
armed convoy, equipped with engineering materials to overcome the 
obstacles put in place by Soviet representatives.  In addition, Clay 
recommended that the US retaliate by closing its ports and the Panama 
Canal to Russian ships.  The authors of The Wise Men write that Clay 
wanted to stand up to the Soviets and believed that they could be bluffed; 
and that the Soviets would back down if he were allowed to ‗ram through 
an armored column, like the cavalry rescuing a wagon train.‘334  In his 
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memoir, General Curtis LeMay, often hawkish during times of crisis, 
outlined his support for Clay‘s position in Germany: 
 
Always I felt that a more forceful policy 
would have been the correct one for us to 
embrace with the Russians, and in our 
confrontation of their program for world 
Communism.  In the days of the Berlin Air 
Lift I felt the same way.  I wasn‘t alone in 
that regard, either.  General Lucius D. Clay 
concurred in the belief.
335
 
 
Truman and the National Security Council called for a cautious 
approach and dismissed Clay‘s idea on the grounds that, if forced, the 
Russians might meet the convoy with armed force.  The White House 
maintained that the integrity of Western zone trains was a part of its 
sovereignty and a symbol of its position in Germany and Europe.
336
  
Truman outlined a more moderate course of action when Clay checked in 
with his superiors in Washington: 
  
You are authorized to move trains as you see 
fit.  It is considered important that the normal 
train guard be not increased and that they 
carry only the arms normally carried.  Also 
that the Russians be not prohibited from 
taking actions which have been customarily 
followed.  [sic]  Furthermore, it is important 
that our guards not fire until fired upon.
337
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General Lucius D. Clay, according to Avi Shlaim, was convinced 
that any failure to meet the Soviets squarely would have ‗serious 
consequences.‘338  The real danger in this was the fact that there was a 
tendency to ‗sit back and wait for Clay to come up with suggestions, which 
would be examined on their merits as they came up.‘339  By virtue of 
position then, General Clay had a great deal of authority, as outlined in JCS 
1067:  ‗take all measures deemed by you necessary, appropriate or 
desirable in relation to military exigencies and the objectives of a firm 
military government.‘  In retrospect, it seems clear that the broad, sweeping 
directive of JCS 1067 further increased the potential for a dangerous 
misstep.
340
  During the crisis, the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied 
Areas, Charles Saltzman, recalled that, even more than Truman or his 
policy advisors, Clay‘s decisions determined ‗the initiative, the impetus, the 
guide, the force of anything that was done.‘341  Although overstated to a 
degree, Saltzman‘s observation underscores the inordinate weight Clay held 
in the decision-making process. 
Determined by the Soviet challenge on April 1, Clay argued that the 
US could supply itself and meet the needs of US personnel by airlift for a 
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while but not Germans in the city.
342
  In an April 2 teleconference with his 
superiors, Bradley and Royall, Clay conveyed that he anticipated the 
Soviets would demand a withdrawal within the next few weeks.  Moreover, 
he believed this action would be most damaging to US prestige and would 
be met by ‗new acts.‘343   
Instructed to avoid a game of brinkmanship, General Clay was 
allowed to order three trains into the Soviet zone.
344
  The result was not 
disastrous but foreshadowed future frustrations.  One train commandant 
lost his nerve and permitted Soviet representatives to board the train.  The 
remaining two trains were stopped by Soviet authorities and denied access.  
Frustrated by an apparent Soviet victory, Clay continued to urge 
Washington to take some action that would demonstrate a clear sign of 
resoluteness.  He responded immediately by cancelling all military traffic 
into the Soviet zone and began a ‗little airlift‘ to supply the occupation 
forces in Berlin.
345
 
Throughout April, the US Military Governor continued to fear that 
the Soviets considered it so vital to get the West out of Berlin that they 
would ‗face the prospect of war in doing so.‘346  For him, the West could 
deprive the Soviets of a success if it could just ‗sit tight‘, evacuating only 
those dependents and unessential employees who were nervous and 
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requested to leave Berlin.
347
  Although many members of Congress called 
for an immediate evacuation of the German capital, the position of standing 
firm was ultimately supported by Washington and formally decided at the 
sixteenth meeting of the National Security Council on July 22.
348
  This firm 
stand against Soviet pressure resonates in Secretary Marshall‘s message to 
the Soviet Ambassador in Washington: 
 
The United States categorically asserts that it 
is in occupation of its sector of Berlin with 
free access thereto as a matter of established 
right deriving from the defeat and surrender 
of Germany and confirmed by formal 
agreements among the principal Allies.  It 
further declares that it will not be induced by 
threats, pressures or other actions to abandon 
these rights.  It is hoped that the Soviet 
Government entertains no doubts whatever 
on this point.
349
 
   
So how, exactly, did concern about these early restrictions fit in 
with the CIA‘s position on Germany?350  As the Soviets tightened their 
grip, CIA analysts recommended a moderate, firm course of action, 
warning about the consequences of compromise, but also warning against 
the more retaliatory moves proposed by Clay.  At this point, the Agency‘s 
position was clear and accurate—Soviet provocation, expected for some 
time, was not a bluff but a power move designed to force the Western 
powers out of Berlin and, ultimately, Germany. 
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The same day as Clay‘s teleconference with General Bradley and 
Secretary Royall, the CIA‘s ORE 22-48 weighed in on the possibility of 
Soviet military action during 1948.
 
 The paper contained situational factors, 
ranked by order of probability, in which analysts outlined certain basic 
factual data to determine ‗whether or not Soviet leaders would stand to gain 
or lose by exercising their current military capability of overrunning 
Western Europe and part of the Near East.‘351  Most importantly, the 
document stated that the USSR would not resort to direct military action 
during 1948.  In addition, ORE 22-48 outlined a number of developments 
which, warned analysts, might convince Soviet leaders that the US had 
intentions of military aggression in the near future.  Among the 
developments listed were:  1) the passage of a peacetime Draft Act, 2) the 
continued deployment of atomic weapons, 3) the general acceptance of 
increased military appropriations, 4) the establishment of US bases within 
range of targets in the USSR, 5) the activities of US naval forces in the 
Mediterranean, 6) and the movement to Europe of US strategic Air Force 
units.  On their own, however, analysts believed it unlikely that these steps 
would actually lead Soviet leaders to the conclusion that US aggression was 
to be expected. 
This appraisal helped place recent Soviet actions within a more 
moderate context, providing policymakers with the ability to formulate 
policy with a greater degree of confidence.  Although this particular report 
was admittedly based on ‗logic rather than upon evidence,‘ it is worth 
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considering for a moment what possible responses Washington might have 
pursued had the CIA suggested any increased possibility that the USSR was 
likely to resort to direct military action within the near future.  John 
Ranelagh reminds us that although the CIA‘s assessments at this time could 
be ‗far from daring‘ and offered projections similar to those of the State 
Department, they nevertheless posed clear challenges to the traditional 
supremacy of the Defense and State Department…in foreign-policy 
formation by seeming ‗more immediate and relevant‘ in its reports.352  
To be sure, the CIA‘s Office of Reports and Estimates met 
considerable dissent from other departments.  In particular, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were not reassured by ORE‘s assessment.353  In mid-spring, the 
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the 
current belief that the USSR did not plan overt warfare for at least five 
years was not necessarily correct and that there was increasing doubt in 
many quarters as to its soundness.
354
  Adding to this position, the Director 
of Intelligence of the Air Force argued that, given the fluidity of events and 
threatening moves of its adversary, an abrupt change in the situation could 
occur at any moment.
355
  To what extent this opposition was motivated by 
the Pentagon‘s frustration with the CIA‘s assessment placing limits on the 
tenets of containment is unclear. 
Soon after ORE 22-48 was issued, a major incident occurred that 
tested the limits of the CIA‘s position of moderation.  A British transport 
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plane traveling through the British sector of Berlin collided in midair with a 
Soviet yakovlev fighter.  It was revealed that the yak fighter plane had 
buzzed the transport plane that was approaching Gatow airport.  The 
immediate result was the death of the Soviet pilot and all fourteen crew and 
passengers aboard the British plane.  Washington, unnerved about the 
explosive potential of further mistakes, did little more than demand an 
admission of responsibility from the Kremlin.  Marshal Sokolovsky, 
appearing ‗gravely disturbed and defensive,‘ assured Western leaders that 
its planes would not be molested in traveling the Berlin corridor.
356
 
Intelligence analysts avoided any direct speculation as to whether 
the Soviets would attempt to shoot down any allied aircraft.  However, 
several reports during April foresaw the possible use of Soviet fighter 
planes to ‗threaten and intimidate‘ allied pilots; yet analysts never 
suggested that the US should expect any intentional violence resulting from 
Soviet interference in the Allied flight zones.  Shortly after the plane 
incident, analysts warned that any present hope for a solution by 
negotiation was small:  ‗The USSR is now apparently preparing to tighten 
its grip on the city by attempting to enforce new restrictions on air traffic 
which would make all allied transport subject to Soviet regulation.‘357 
Analysts warned policymakers that interference with traffic 
indicated Soviet plans to accelerate consolidation of power in East 
Germany.  Unless Allied determination remained obviously strong, analysts 
cautioned, ‗further Soviet attempts to eliminate these hindrances may be 
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expected.‘358  Though the USSR was unwilling to resort to direct military 
action, the CIA cautioned that if the US-UK reaction to this probing 
showed indecision, ‗the USSR may be expected to take strong action to 
compel western air traffic to submit to Soviet controls.  Such action would 
probably include use of Soviet fighter planes to threaten and intimidate 
allied pilots.‘359  Even after the midair collision, CIA analysts restated their 
April 2 assessment that the preponderance of available evidence and 
considerations derived from the ‗logic of the situation‘ supports the 
conclusion that ‗the USSR will not resort to direct military action during 
1948.‘360 
The most significant feature of an April 23 report titled, ―Soviet 
Military and Civil Aviation Policies,‖ was its conclusion that, with the 
implementation of military air policy, major policy decisions probably were 
made at the very top level, which would go beyond the Council of 
Ministers into the Politburo itself.
361
  Given the numerous agencies in the 
Soviet Union which participated in the formulation and implementation of 
military policy, then, Washington could be further assured that it was 
unlikely that a hot-headed Soviet General had the ability to hastily order a 
provocative military action against the Western Powers without being 
sanctioned from the Politburo.  Beyond this general problem regarding 
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command structure, analysts reported on the current trends:  ‗Within the air 
force itself, it is believed first priority is being given to the development of 
an interceptor fighter force based on jet aircraft, and second priority to 
creation of an effective long-range bomber force.‘  The CIA‘s report on 
Soviet prioritization might have come as some relief to policymakers and 
military planners fearful of some pressing Soviet designs for an attack on 
the United States.
362
   
In addition to these broad findings, the report included summaries 
on Soviet military air in foreign relations, fiscal information with regard to 
military preparation, and research and development in the air force.  This 
material was also paired with very specific figures on the Soviet Air Force.  
The CIA estimated that Soviet air strength included 6,000 fighter craft, 
4,000 ground attack aircraft and 3,000 bombers.  Of these figures, 5,100 
aircraft were stationed in Europe, outside the USSR.  Beyond these figures, 
analysts hinted at a possible explanation for the midair collision.  ‗The 
USSR is convinced of the highly important part played by training in the 
development and sustained operation of an efficient air force.‘  The report 
added, however, that the quality of air training had been ‗low in 
comparison with US standards because of a certain amount of lag behind 
the Western Powers in development and utilization of the highly technical 
aspects of an air power.‘363 
Although few were inclined to believe that the collision was 
intended as an intentional precursor for a military conflict, some assurances 
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were helpful in helping to extinguish the incendiary flames that threatened 
to ignite further anxiety within policy circles.  On April 5, acting without 
instruction from Washington, Clay announced that fighter planes would 
escort all US planes unless the Soviet government could issue some 
assurances that Western planes would no longer be harassed by Soviet 
fighters.  On this issue, Avi Shlaim argues that Clay‘s prompt demand ‗may 
have had some salutary effect in discouraging any Soviet brinkmanship in 
the air.‘364  While this may be true, this unilateral action, taken in the 
absence of direct approval from Washington, was also a potentially 
provocative response to a Soviet mistake.  In the end, though, the Russians 
backed down from their demand to inspect Western military trains en route 
to Berlin. After eleven days and three hundred tons of supplies airlifted to 
Berlin, US transport was able to resume by land again by April 12, 
effectively ending the temporary airlift.
365
 
While the transportation issue appeared to have improved, tension 
between the two adversaries had done anything but.
366
  After the Soviet 
fighter incident, the most pressing question facing Washington was whether 
it should maintain its position in Berlin.  Overtly threatened by Soviet 
action and considered by many in the Pentagon to be a strategic liability, 
the US position in the German capital remained uncertain.  The CIA, 
however, was convinced that the allied powers should stand firm.  On this 
point, Clay shared the CIA‘s position.  In a teleconference with Gen. 
                                                 
364
 Avi Shlaim, The Berlin Blockade,  p. 135. 
365
 Curtis LeMay, Mission with LeMay, p. 415. 
366
 On April 18, Italy‘s Christian Democrats beat a Communist-Socialist bloc by a 
surprisingly large margin in the country‘s first national election under its republican 
constitution.  While considered a victory against advancing Communist interests, 
Washington‘s involvement further incensed Soviet leaders. 
151 
 
Bradley on April 10, Clay openly doubted that the Soviet would go so far 
as to stop all food supplies to the German population in western sectors 
because ‗it would alienate the Germans almost completely.‘  However, the 
General also added that while he did not believe the Soviet would do this 
now, ‗they may be able to do so by harvest time in late summer.‘  In more 
general terms, Clay concluded that the Soviets would not apply force in 
Berlin ‗unless they had determined war to be inevitable within a 
comparatively short period of time,‘ making clear his doubt and frustration: 
 
Why are we in Europe?  We have lost 
Czechoslovakia.  We have lost Finland.  
Norway is threatened.  We retreat from 
Berlin.  There is no saving of prestige by 
setting up at Frankfurt…. After Berlin, will 
come western Germany and our strength 
there relatively is no greater and our position 
no more tenable than Berlin.
367
 
  
On other issues, however, the CIA‘s position sharply contrasted 
with that of the military.  In a report forwarded by the Secretary of Defense 
to the National Security Council on April 19, the JCS warned: 
 
In simplest terms, it is plain that, whether or 
not either the USSR or the United States now 
intends to persist in the present struggle to the 
extent of open warfare, the possibility of this 
result is so evident that it would be not a 
calculated but an incalculable risk for the 
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United States to postpone further the steps for 
readiness demanded by ordinary prudence.
368
 
 
Against the advice of Major General Bryant E. Moore (CG, US 
Forces, Trieste), Clay recommended the immediate reinforcement of the 
US military position in Germany by at least battalion strength.  The 
Military Governor also recommended an increase in air strength by an 
additional fighter group, although the move was admittedly psychological.  
Moore‘s concern over Clay‘s request was not baseless.  Reinforcements, he 
reasoned, were inadvisable unless the situation in Germany worsened 
because ground reinforcements would elicit a negative Russian reaction.
369
 
The day following Clay‘s request for reinforcements, the CIA 
issued an estimate on possible Soviet moves in Germany.  Analysts broke 
little new ground, instead reviewing possible Soviet intentions and how the 
USSR might respond to recent Western Power actions.  Still, the picture 
drawn by ORE 29-48 appears, in retrospect, remarkably accurate: 
 
a. Hope no longer remains for interfering 
through quadripartite means with the 
production of Western Germany upon 
which the success of the European 
Recovery Program substantially depends; 
b. The Soviet Zone must be placed under 
permanent  control of a well organized 
German group, loyal to the USSR, and 
supported by police state measures; 
c. The Peoples‘ Congress should be the 
instrument for the formation of such a 
provisional German Government; 
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d. In order to prevent Allied interference 
with this process of political 
consolidation, the Allied Control Council 
should be abolished, or permanently 
boycotted, and the Western powers forced 
out of Berlin; 
e. The new German ‗Government‘ should 
be acknowledged, at a propitious time, as 
the official administration for Eastern 
Germany, with propaganda pretentions to 
authority over all of Germany; 
f. The Soviet Army should remain as the 
‗protector‘ of the new Reich pending 
creation of a new German Army, by 
agreement with this government; and  
g. In an effort to undermine the Western 
Power program Western Germany should 
be pressed, by all possible methods, to 
‗rejoin‘ the Reich. 
 
By late April, the CIA believed that a blockade was imminent.  
Beyond this, analysts cautioned that the USSR would consequently desire 
to effect a Western Power evacuation of Berlin ‗as expeditiously as 
possible.‘  Although each of these successive steps involved the risk of war 
in the event of miscalculation of Western resistance or of unforeseen 
consequences, ORE 29-48 added, ‗each move on the program could be 
implemented without the application of military force if adroitly made as 
merely a retaliatory measure necessitated by unilateral Western Power 
action, and if pressed only at opportune moments.‘   The report concluded 
that, because the presence of the Western Powers in Berlin added to the 
difficulty of the Kremlin establishing a Soviet-directed puppet government 
in Eastern Germany, the Soviets were most likely to force the West out of 
Germany by imposing restrictions on transportation.
370
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As predicted, the situation between the two powers failed to 
improve in the following months.  In response to Soviet provocations in 
Europe, the Mediterranean and the Near and Far East, the US Congress 
instituted a peacetime draft, only after receiving reassurances in a CIA 
memorandum dated March 16, 1948 that, should Congress pass a universal 
military training act and/or a selective service act that these measures, that, 
taken singly or together, would not cause the USSR to resort to military 
action within the next sixty days.
371
  (This assessment was supported by the 
Departments of State, War, Navy and Air Force).
372
  That same day, US 
officials received notification that no flights would be permitted that night 
over the greater Berlin area.  The US, in turn, responded that it did not 
recognize such unilateral action.  CIA analysts considered the Soviet 
behavior probing, rather than provocative, but warned that this attempt at 
imposing regulations might be followed by more determined moves to 
restrict air traffic.
373
  Relations between the two countries further soured 
when, on the day following Ambassador Walter Beedle Smith and 
Vyacheslav Molotov‘s exchange, the Under Secretary of State, William 
Henry Draper Jr., requested the latest assessment of the situation from Gen. 
Clay.  Clay, in London at the time of his reply and seemingly routed in 
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spirit, offered a rather dour assessment:  ‗At the moment, we propose no 
further action and in fact there is little we can do in Germany.  I doubt there 
is anything else to be done there at this stage.‘374  
In the final month before the larger blockade, the CIA, directed by 
NSC 10/2, began implementing political and economic warfare and 
paramilitary activities.
375
  NSC 10/2 stated, ‗…taking cognizance of the 
vicious covert activities of the USSR…The Central Intelligence Agency is 
charged by the National Security Council with conducting espionage and 
counterespionage operations abroad.‘376  Although the CIA‘s covert 
operations would not really get off the ground until the 1950s, the 1948 
directive NSCID 7 made clear that the National Security Council 
recognized the importance of countering Soviet intelligence efforts.  This 
authorization most likely stemmed from NSC‘s concern over the 
forthcoming Italian elections. 
At the same time the NSC had issued this directive, the Agency was 
facing difficultly in predicting possible Soviet reactions in such a fluid 
crisis, especially after the six-nation London recommendations were 
announced on June 7.
377
  The main purpose of the London Conferences 
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was, according to Henry Ashby Turner, ‗to focus the political Cold War on 
Germany by calling for formation of a West German government.‘  (The 
London Conference actually took place in two sessions—February 23-
March 5 and April 30-June 2).  A major step toward a consolidation also 
came in June, when a common currency was approved by the Western 
powers.
378
  US policy leaders considered currency reform as the centerpiece 
to their plans for improving the German economy, although with some 
degree of trepidation.  Truman later pointed out that this decision became 
one of the major points of contention.  ‗The importance the Russians 
attached to our move,‘ he argued ‗was soon obvious.‘379  Ambassador 
Smith considered the question of currency control to be ‗the greatest 
ostensible stumbling block.‘380  Clay believed the currency issue to be the 
precipitating event of an upcoming crisis. ‗You will understand‘ he warned 
Gen. Bradley, ‗that over separate currency reform in near future followed 
by partial German government in Frankfurt will develop the real crisis.‘381  
Shortly after, Clay wrote that while he appreciated the arguments of 
sovereignty and prestige that a separate currency promised, he considered 
the establishment of separate western sector currency ‗most difficult and 
probably untenable in [the] long run.
382
 However, the US Military 
Governor was correct in suggesting that the currency issue was a trigger 
point because, as Gaddis points out, Stalin‘s decision to begin tightening 
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the Western access to Berlin was, in general, a reaction to the London 
Conference program; and in particular, Western actions toward currency 
reform.
383
   
An intelligence memorandum followed on the heels of the London 
Conference that outlined possible Soviet responses to the London 
proposals, ‗If the trizonal merger appears successful and promises to 
rehabilitate western Germany as well as contribute to the European 
recovery program,‘ the memorandum warned, ‗the Kremlin will probably 
be impelled to alter its present tactic.‘  Hillenkoetter added that, exclusive 
of a resort to military force, the Kremlin can logically pursue one of two 
courses:  ‗(1) ostensibly abandon its recalcitrant attitude and make an 
attractive offer to form a unified German Government under quadripartite 
control (in order to slow the progress of German recovery); or (2) retaliate 
by establishment of an eastern German state.‘384  Whatever its course, the 
CIA acknowledged that the Kremlin was unlikely to make the concessions 
that the Western powers demanded.   
The report went on to add that zonal unification by the US, the UK 
and France would be ‗interpreted by the Kremlin as potential barriers to the 
basic Soviet objective of preventing the economic recovery of European 
countries outside the Soviet sphere.‘  In addition, the memorandum advised 
that a Soviet reaction might include some delay of any counter moves until 
the Kremlin could be sure that the western German organization was 
becoming ‗a threat to Soviet foreign policy,‘ adding that the USSR might 
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be expected to continue its hindrance of western powers in Berlin and 
elsewhere in Germany by means ‗short of military force.‘  But once the 
trizonal merger appeared successful at contributing to the economic 
recovery of the region, the Kremlin would be ‗impelled to alter its present 
tactics.‘  In other words, it would resort to more provocation to force the 
Western powers to capitulate their position of power in Germany.
385
 
An even more comprehensive assessment of the developing crisis 
followed on June 14.  ORE 41-48 discussed the possibility of an imposition 
of unilateral traffic regulations on inbound food and freight shipments, as 
well as an attempted enforcement of unilateral regulations on the flight of 
Western aircraft over the Soviet Zone.  ORE 41-48 urged policymakers to 
consider the full range of effects that Soviet restrictions were having on the 
US position: 
 
Contrary to many published reports, the chief 
detrimental effect on the US of the Soviet 
restrictive measures imposed in Berlin, since 
the walkout of the USSR from the Allied 
Control Council, has not been interference 
with transportation and supply but 
curtailment of certain US activities having to 
do for the most part with intelligence, 
propaganda, and operations of the 
quadripartite Kommandatura.
386
 
 
Here, the CIA appears to have been particularly concerned about the 
USSR challenging the United States‘ influence in Germany and America‘s 
ability to frustrate the Soviet consolidation of power in Germany.  Avi 
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Shlaim calls ORE 41-48 a ‗detached and candid appraisal,‘ that went 
beyond the more obvious effects of the Soviet transportation restrictions.
387  
What's more, this succinct analysis represented the cornerstone of the 
CIA‘s position:  that Washington should accept that within the Soviet zone, 
there was little, short of war, that the Western powers could do to thwart 
Soviet designs for political and economic control.  It appears that CIA 
analysts were realistic about any designs for a unified Germany, while 
simultaneously advising a firm position against Soviet maneuvers to force 
the US from Berlin. 
Two days after ORE 41-48 was issued, Soviets delegates walked out 
of the Allied Kommandatura.  By this point most US officials seriously 
doubted that a workable solution could be found by diplomatic 
deliberations.  This frustration was perhaps best played out in the London 
Conference recommendations announced earlier in the month and when, on 
June 18, the Western powers carried out the currency reform for West 
Germany (excluding Berlin).  For the Soviet leaders, however, the actions 
taken as a result of the London Conference were a shrewd move towards 
the creation of a West German State.  Stalin considered this action an 
illegal breach of the Potsdam agreement, which stated that Germany would 
be treated as a single economic unit.  General Vasily Danilovich 
Sokolovsky proclaimed to the German people that the Deutschmark was 
not legal for Berlin or any part of the Soviet Zone.
388
  This new currency 
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was viewed by US policymakers and the CIA as the final provocation that 
caused the Soviets to react by suspending all interzonal passenger traffic 
and incoming traffic on all roads, including the Autobahn.
389
   
However, it seems reasonable to believe that Stalin‘s response of 
suspending all railway and highway passenger traffic to and from Berlin 
was more likely a pretext that the Soviet leader had been looking for by 
which to force the Western powers out of Berlin.  The Soviets had probed 
Western responses since April by halting rail traffic between Berlin and 
West Germany for two days and closing the main highway bridge to Berlin 
for ―repairs‖.  The Soviet Union responded more directly to the 
implementation of Western currency reform at a conference in Warsaw on 
June 23.  Here, with Soviet leaders and satellite foreign ministers, the 
Soviet Union ordered its own currency reform in East Germany and in 
Berlin.
390
  Agency analysts suggested that the purpose of the Warsaw 
Conference was essentially threefold: 
 
a. To form an ‗Eastern union‘ against 
further German aggression sponsored 
by the western powers; 
b. To announce a program for the 
creation of a provisional government 
matching in independence, and 
possibly in timing, the one 
contemplated in the west; and 
c. To indicate a desire, possibly couched 
in face-saving terms, for resumption 
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of negotiations with the western 
powers ostensibly to permit the 
unification of Germany, but actually 
to prevent the realization of Allied 
plans for western Germany.
 391
 
 
An assessment of Soviet intentions was also issued by Kennan‘s 
Policy Planning Staff at the same time.  The PPS paper, submitted on June 
23, argued that although the Soviets still relied on political means to 
achieve their ends, they were likewise prepared to use military intimidation, 
which, in turn, might lead to miscalculation.  The PPS also suggested that 
US military posture, measurably weak at the moment, must reflect this 
factor of Soviet policy.
392
  The tone of this assessment differs slightly from 
those of the Central Intelligence Agency, which assessments placed Soviet 
intentions within a more limited scope. 
The CIA‘s subsequent report, titled ―The Soviet Withdrawal From 
the Berlin Kommandatura,‖ was issued the same day as the announcement 
of currency reform.  The July Weekly Summary reported that the Soviets 
had ‗abandoned completely the façade of quadripartite control of the 
German capital.‘  Agitation for a Western withdrawal from Berlin might 
increase, warned analysts, ‗but it appears doubtful that the USSR will make 
a formal demand for such withdrawal.‘  On this issue, intelligence 
cautioned that Soviet withdrawal from the Kommandatura would ‗make 
possible increased pressure for the withdrawal of the western allies on the 
grounds that, having partitioned Germany, the western powers have no 
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place in the Soviet zone.‘393  In broader terms, this failure to reach an 
agreement also left the USSR free to consolidate further its political and 
economic control of the Soviet zone and would facilitate, in the near future, 
the creation of an East German state. 
 
 
The Blockade Begins in Earnest 
Beginning on June 24, Soviet authorities in Germany cut all 
services from its controlled zone and halted all land and water traffic into 
West Berlin.
394
  This maneuver, according to Daniel Yergin‘s Shattered 
Peace, not only created a ‗precarious balance‘ between East and West, but 
became ‗a crisis always just short of catastrophe.‘395  US policymakers 
initially responded with some degree of uncertainty and surprise, despite 
the number of estimates that had suggested future Soviet actions designed 
to force the Western powers out of Berlin. 
To be sure, policy officials had been warned.  Historian James 
Kenneth McDonald points out that Berlin, like most Cold War crises, did 
not arise suddenly without signs of ‗impending trouble before the situation 
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became urgent.‘396  Even Sarah Sale‘s The Shaping of Containment, argues 
that, in spite of warnings months prior to the blockade, ‗the NSC took no 
initiatives regarding military and diplomatic commitments to Berlin.‘397  
Intelligence analysts had urged that whatever response Washington chose 
needed to be firm and measured (fitting for the threat at hand), without 
being seen as retaliatory.  Alexander George points out, ‗it was easier to 
believe that the Soviets would not undertake serious actions against West 
Berlin than to decide beforehand what the American response should be to 
such an eventuality.‘  He adds: 
 
For U.S. policymakers to have taken 
available warning of a possible Soviet 
blockade of West Berlin seriously would 
have carried with it the ‗cost‘ of having then 
to face up to and resolve difficult, 
controversial policy problems.  At the time an 
American commitment to West Berlin did not 
yet exist.
398
 
 
  Yet despite the cautious assessments and warnings, anxiety during 
the summer and autumn of 1948 was ‗simple and obvious.‘399  The question 
that stuck with policymakers was:  Why had the Kremlin authorized such a 
risky maneuver after witnessing the West‘s resolve during the less 
restrictive airlift in April?  The authors of Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War 
suggest that, for Stalin, accepting a defeat in Germany would have been 
worse than risking a military confrontation with the only country to possess 
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the atomic bomb.
400
  What must also be considered is that the Kremlin had 
believed that the Allied actions during the spring were a failure.  From the 
Soviet perspective, then, their action had been ‗a well-calculated, 
controllable low risk.‘401  In fact, Soviet leaders reported in April that 
Clay‘s attempts to create ‗an airlift‘ connecting Berlin with the western 
zones had ‗proved futile.  The Americans have admitted that the idea would 
be too expensive.‘402  Certainly by the summer of 1948 the risk that war 
might come from some unforeseen incident or from a miscalculation was 
significantly increased.  In spite of the imposition of the blockade and the 
subsequent ratcheting of tensions, however, the CIA‘s analytical branch did 
not revise its earlier assessment as the crisis developed.  More importantly, 
by concluding that the imposition of the blockade was not a preamble to 
further Soviet aggression, analysts were able to provide assessments on 
other critical issues that directly impacted the crisis.
403
 
The Daily Summary and the Weekly Summary issued the day 
following the imposition of the blockade provided nothing sensational or 
particularly ground-breaking.
404
  Evan Thomas reminds us, though, that in 
an era when Washington was anxious and the Pentagon believed that 
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Russian tanks were ready to roll, ‗no news was good news.‘405  This was, 
perhaps, never more true than in Berlin.  That being stated, though, the real 
value of many of these assessments rested in their moderation in tone and 
consistency of analysis.  The June 25 Daily Summary urged that any 
apparent weakening of tripartite solidarity on the Berlin situation would 
‗greatly reinforce Soviet determination to drive the western powers from 
the city.‘  Expecting this determination, then, analysts advised that 
Washington respond firmly and moderately to Soviet provocation.  
Similarly, the Weekly Summary demonstrated the context in which the 
Soviets had intensified their resistance in Berlin.  Intelligence believed that 
the Kremlin reasoned that a blockade of Western traffic was an acceptable 
risk if certain objectives could be met.  Soviet obstructionism, analysts 
argued, hinged on ‗obtaining some measure of control of western Germany, 
particularly the Ruhr, or at least to sabotage or slow down the western 
program, including European recovery.‘406   
The day following these reports, General Clay started an airlift to 
supply the 2,500,000 Berliners that, in scope and scale, was to become an 
unprecedented effort to supply a major city still suffering from the lingering 
effects of war.  The airlift, although soon to be organized as a full-scale 
operation, was originally authorized merely as a stop-gap measure until the 
diplomatic deadlock could be broken.
407
  In the face of Soviet efforts, 
American C-47 aircraft delivered food, medicine and coal to awaiting 
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Berliners, day or night, or in inclement weather.  During the summer, the 
airlift averaged 1,147 tons; by autumn it had reached 4,000 tons.
408
  The 
main question to the blockade problem was:  How could the US remain in 
Berlin without risking all-out war?
409
  To the American ambassador in 
Moscow, the situation at the time did not look promising.  In fact, 
Ambassador Smith had serious doubts whether the Allies could supply such 
a large city by air for a prolonged period, especially during the winter 
months.  Nor was Smith certain that the morale of the German people 
would stand the strain of the embargo.
410
  However, in part because of the 
CIA‘s reassurance that the Soviets were not positioning themselves to 
attack the US position in Berlin, Washington was able to move forward and 
later intensify the airlift. 
Just days after the airlift commenced, the CIA issued a number of 
reports to the Secretary of Defense and to the senior military leaders 
making the strategic decisions on the ground.  A June 28 memorandum 
reported on the subversive mindset of the Soviet leadership, warning that 
because the Soviets no longer considered the Western powers as allies, the 
German Communists would not be limited in the means they employed 
against the West.  In fact, analysts cautioned that Soviet inspired 
communist terrorism should be expected.  In general terms, the report 
provided the official position of the Communist Party of Germany, stating 
that the currency change produced ‗a revolutionary change in Berlin which 
                                                 
408
 Walter Isaacson and Even Thomas, The Wise Men, pp. 460-461.  The C-47 had the 
cargo capacity of approximately two and a half tons.  The larger class C-54 transport 
plane, in addition to a number of smaller British planes, would later be added to the airlift 
effort. 
409
 Harry Truman, Memoirs, p. 125. 
410
 Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years, p. 242. 
167 
 
must be used to bring a Communist victory which is considered 
synonymous with the withdrawal of the Western Allies.‘  The report also 
listed a still classified source that indicated that an East German 
government would be announced in the near future—estimated to take 
place no later than July 3, 1948.
411
 
In a fascinating memorandum issued to the Secretary of Defense, 
DCI Hillenkoetter reported on a conference between Russian officials in an 
effort to determine what influence the blockade on the Western Zone would 
have on the Eastern Zone of Germany.  Hillenkoetter reported that Soviet 
officials had been shocked by statements made at the conference about the 
dramatic impact the blockade was expected to have on trade and industry in 
the Eastern Zone.  Most shocking, however, was the Soviet response to the 
German representatives‘ assessments:  ‗‘We had no idea of this situation; 
Russia is suffering from heavy droughts and is counting on German food 
supplies this year.  Food supplies must be maintained, come what may.  If 
we had known this, we would not have gone so far.‘412  It was also revealed 
that the head of the conference, Marshal Sokolovsky, stated that given the 
difficulties the travel restrictions placed on Soviet trade and industry, three 
courses of action were available:   
 
a. Start a war.   
b. Lift travel restrictions on Berlin.   
 c. Leave entire Berlin to West, giving 
 them the rail line. 
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By itself, an analysis of these options would have provided limited 
benefit for US policy officials.  However, the memorandum also included a 
report of a senior Soviet official present at the conference who stated that 
war was impossible due to bad harvest prospects and that lifting travel 
restrictions would make the Russians ‗lose face.‘  This left only one 
possible course of action for the Soviets:  The West would have to feed all 
of Berlin, leaving them with ‗more on their hands than they bargained 
for.‘413  This information on Soviet unpreparedness would have been 
particularly valuable for policy planners.  Most notably, it revealed that the 
Soviet leadership, though decidedly not prepared for the consequences of 
the travel restrictions, believed that once started, their course of action was 
dictated not so much by any firm belief that the blockade would be 
successful, but more by the fear of capitulation or war.  This report was 
useful in two other respects.  First, it revealed a side of Soviet vulnerability; 
and second, it demonstrated that the Soviets were unprepared for a 
sustained US response to the blockade. 
Further analysis of the situation was issued the same day, although 
the Daily Summary did little more than cite a well-informed but untested 
source that reported on Soviet plans for an East German state.  The 
implementation of any plan, analysts reasoned, would probably be delayed 
until the USSR could ‗justify‘ its action by claiming that the western 
powers had ignored the plea for German unification.
414
   
                                                 
413
 Ibid. 
414
 CIA, Daily Summary, ―Implications of Possible Approach to West by Tito; Germany:  
Alleged Plans for East German Government,‖ 30 June 1948.  CIA Electronic Reading 
169 
 
Two memoranda were also issued to President Truman by DCI 
Hillenkoetter.   One reported on a Russian directive indicating that the 
Soviets intended to incorporate Berlin into the Soviet Zone.  This directive, 
based on the supposition that Berlin was part of the Soviet Zone, indicated 
to CIA analysts that, although in a difficult position, the Soviets meant 
business in the present crisis.  ‗Having gone this far,‘ reasoned analysts, ‗it 
is difficult to see how they could back down without a maximum loss of 
face even in their own camp.‘415  The other memorandum updated the 
President with current estimates of Communist intentions in Germany.  
Through ‗reliable channels,‘ Hillenkoetter advised that current Soviet 
tactics appeared to be calculated, in large part, to force the Western Powers 
into local negotiations on the Berlin situation.  However, these negotiations, 
the DCI pointed out, would increasingly rest on Soviet terms the more the 
Western logistical position in Berlin deteriorated.
416
 
These assessments, issued on the heels of the travel restrictions, just 
days after the blockade began, show that the CIA effectively understood 
that the USSR never expected West Berlin to hold out for nearly a year.
417
  
Taken as a whole, these reports also highlight the consistency of the 
Agency‘s assessments on important issues during this stage of the crisis.  
Moreover, whether reporting to senior policy officials in Washington or to 
the military commanders making the strategic decisions in Berlin, the 
CIA‘s position was never alarmist.   
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Throughout the summer of 1948 the CIA‘s position remained 
unchanged. A Weekly Summary issued on July 2 reported on the most 
recent developments.  Analysts cited reports that the Soviet Commander, 
Marshal Sokolovsky, had attempted to reassure the Germans and the 
western powers that his new restrictions might only be temporary.  
Sokolovsky‘s remarks, they cautioned, were to be taken ‗with a large grain 
of salt.‘  The CIA also noted a few points that the US should consider if it 
was to maintain its position in Berlin.   First, the German population in the 
western sectors was ‗markedly anti-Soviet‘ and supported the strong stand 
taken by the Western powers.  Second, German faith had been further 
strengthened by determined US-UK efforts.  Analysts added, though, that 
this loyalty and support would be severely tested should the population face 
starvation or should it be determined that a Western withdrawal was 
inevitable.
418
  The CIA believed that this recent intelligence further 
supported its previous position that the USSR did not seem ready to force a 
definite showdown for the present, despite Soviet efforts to create an 
unstable situation for the western powers.  Analysts also sought to place the 
threat within context, suggesting that that the primary purpose of the Soviet 
blockade was to compel the Western powers to revisit quadripartite 
negotiations under conditions favorable to Soviet plans, hoping to make the 
US position in Berlin untenable.
419
 
Even with such reassurances, Truman believed it prudent to 
demonstrate a show of force to the Soviets, approving the deployment of 
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sixty B-29 bombers to British air bases to be dispatched on July 16.
420
  
Although not deployed as any atomic threat against Soviet Russia, the 
maneuver was one of the clearest indications of America‘s resolve in 
Berlin.  The day following the dispatch of American bombers, the CIA‘s 
Daily Summary failed to mention any specific military issue; only weighing 
in on the strong Soviet reply to Western efforts in Berlin.
421
 
A Daily Summary issued at the end of July, titled ―Control of Berlin 
Believed Primary Soviet Objective,‖ commented that Ambassador Smith 
had suggested that there existed an ‗urgent Soviet desire‘ to negotiate the 
overall German question, with the liquidation of Berlin as the center of 
Western influence.  Analysts cautioned, though, that although concessions 
on western Germany were the primary Soviet objectives that unilateral 
control of Berlin remained a secondary aim of the USSR.
422
  However, the 
CIA maintained the position that, although the Kremlin was interested in an 
eventual ‗face-saving‘423 solution on the Berlin dispute, the Kremlin still 
held out hopes that, although with extreme difficulty, the eastern zone 
economy could be eventually integrated with that of the Western zones, 
albeit under Soviet terms.
424
  This somewhat optimistic assessment was 
quickly shelved after the Western representatives met with Soviet delegates 
in Moscow on August 2.  The Moscow discussions, like the London CFM, 
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dominated the international scene by raising issues of legality for the 
opposing powers in Germany.  The new round of meetings in Moscow 
continued throughout August in an effort to permit a judgment to be made 
about the introduction of Soviet-sponsored currency under four-power 
control throughout Berlin.   
The CIA believed, however, that these diplomatic meetings had 
little chance at arriving at more than patched-up, temporary solutions for 
the secondary problems to the crisis.  At the time of the meetings, a Review 
of the World Situation reported on the dramatic and far-reaching political 
and economic control in the Soviet Zone.  Russian leaders, reported the 
CIA on August 6, were effectively consolidating their control by 
liquidating or eliminating leaders of the Christian Democrats and Liberal 
Democrats, both members of the Popular Front.
425
   
Such limited direct diplomacy that had taken place appears to have 
only further frustrated policy officials on both sides.  Actually, the only 
face to face discussion with Stalin had been a two hour meeting with the 
blunt and pragmatic American Ambassador in Moscow on August 2.  
When presented with the United States‘ position over the Soviet imposed 
blockade, Stalin announced emphatically that it was not the purpose of the 
Soviet Government to force the Western governments from Berlin.  ‗‗After 
all,‘ he said, ‗we are still Allies.‘‘426  When back in Washington, 
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Ambassador Bedell Smith relayed to those present at a Policy Planning 
Staff Meeting on September 28 that, as to the likelihood of war, ―there is a 
real possibility of it in the Berlin situation.‘427 
At the time, the CIA appeared more assured of Soviet moderation 
than Smith, but still feared that tension in Berlin was coming to a head: 
 
…even if the USSR makes the concessions 
needed to resolve the Berlin issue, differences 
in fundamental objectives  will still offer 
serious obstacles to the preparation and 
successful conclusion of a subsequent Four-
Power Conference.  Failing a compromise of 
these differences, the USSR would probably 
renew its determined pressure in Berlin and 
bring the Western Powers closer to the 
ultimate choices that appear to face them 
there—resort to force or planned 
withdrawal.
428
 
 
Analysts surmised that without satisfactory resolution, the Western 
position in Berlin was ‗untenable in the long run.‘  If sufficient pressure 
was not brought to bear on the Soviet Union, the report estimated, the 
USSR ‗could afford—without losing its initiative—to outwait the Western 
Powers in Berlin.‘  Discouraging as this assessment might have first 
seemed, analysts added that, from the Soviet point of view, the option of 
force ‗must appear an unlikely choice;‘ whereas the second option, from 
the Soviet point of view, ‗must seem inevitable.‘  This framework of Soviet 
perceptions further reinforced the position that the blockade of Berlin 
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should not be viewed as a calculated provocation for an armed conflict.  
Instead, the Soviets could be expected to wage a ‗cold war‘ through devices 
such as propaganda, economic sabotage and political penetration.
429
 
The CIA carried its concern about Soviet actions in eastern 
Germany into a September report, cautioning that the Soviet regime was 
being ‗implacably inimical‘ toward the United States.430  Analysts candidly 
pointed out that, given the weakness in the military posture of the US in 
Europe and Asia, ‗the principal restraint on hostile Soviet action is the 
greatest potential strength of the United States.‘  Given this, analysts 
reasoned that this lack of military power most probably led to the 
Kremlin‘s intention to avoid war with the United States for the next decade.  
However, Washington could expect the Soviets to exploit US weakness to 
the utmost within that broader limitation.
 
 Intelligence analysts concluded 
that the current situation remained critical, ‗pending the successful 
accomplishment of US efforts to redress the balance of power.‘431 
Western leaders were also frustrated by the continuing impasse and 
referred the Berlin dispute to the United Nations later that month, on 
September 29.  However, the CIA was careful about placing too much 
stock in UN authority.  Arguing that presenting the blockade issue to the 
UN Security Council would ‗interject the tension of the Berlin situation 
into all other issues no matter how remote,‘ analysts advised that it was 
difficult to see how the UN could take any action that would ‗resolve the 
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basic oppositions involved.‘432  That the Soviet Union believed the United 
Nations incompetent to discuss the German situation and challenged its 
legality to take up the Berlin issue was not the only crack in the edifice of 
the UN‘s ability to change the political dynamics in Germany.  ‗It cannot 
be too strongly repeated,‘ urged analysts, ‗that no matter what finally 
comes out of the process of debating and voting in the UN, the basic 
problem of what the next step is to be in Berlin will once more be presented 
to US policy.‘  Intelligence later reasoned that the Soviet Union‘s 
acceptance of the proposal by the United Nations to continue negotiations 
on the Berlin currency question was not so much because of any 
willingness to compromise, but rather because the USSR had ‗utilized the 
UN negotiations to gain time for consolidating the Soviet position in Berlin 
and eastern Germany, ultimately seeking to block UN interference in Berlin 
affairs.‘433 
US policymakers faced an increasingly grim situation in Berlin by 
fall, even though supplies from Allied planes were being unloaded at an 
almost breakneck pace.  American and British transport planes were taking 
off from Tempelhof Airport every four or five minutes to deliver food and 
material to Berliners.  Military planners, concerned about the approaching 
winter months, were unsure that their efforts would be enough to sustain 
the city‘s population during the coldest months.  Truman wrote in his diary 
about a meeting held with the service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs, Marshall 
and Forrestal, who briefed the President on bases, bombs, Moscow, 
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Leningrad, etc.  ‗I have a terrible feeling afterward,‘ wrote Truman, ‗that 
we are very close to war.  I hope not...Berlin is a mess.‘434  His concern 
was, indeed, valid.  The situation in Berlin remained bleak.
435
   
Intelligence continued to keep the Kremlin‘s accelerated 
preparations of the past several months on the front burner.  The Daily 
Summary issued on October 9 conveyed concern about Soviet preparations 
for an East German Government.  Warning that a constitution for an 
‗Eastern German Republic‘ was to be announced in the near future, 
analysts noted that Otto Grotewohl, Co-chairman of the Socialist Unity 
Party, was considered to be the most likely minister-president of the Soviet 
Zone government.
436
  However, analysts believed that the German 
figurehead for the government would be Wilheim Pieck, not Grotewohl, 
and that the real Communist leader in Germany would continue to be 
Walter Ulbricht. 
An intelligence report issued on October 27 considered the strategic 
value to the USSR of the conquest of Western Europe prior to 1950.  In 
doing so, analysts examined a number of specific facts and figures that it 
believed were significant to forecasting the probability of Soviet aggression 
and the strategic and theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the Soviet 
army overrunning Western Europe.  The analysis included a number of 
important components of Soviet preparedness:  machinery, munitions, 
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aircraft, economic organization, transportation, atomic energy, biological 
and chemical warfare, electronics and guided missiles, naval weapons and 
personnel.  In addition to a number of scientific forecasts, the report 
concluded that political considerations did not favor a Soviet decision to 
overrun Western Europe prior to 1950.  This conclusion was principally 
based on two considerations: 
 
1. Occupation of Western Europe and the 
Near East would vastly increase Soviet 
security and administrative problems, and 
would create serious political instability 
throughout the Soviet orbit in the event of 
war. 
2. The traditional Communist methods of 
subversion and infiltration, which are less 
costly and involve less risk than military 
action, still offer substantial possibilities 
for continued achievement of Soviet 
objectives.
437
 
 
 
In addition to the relevance that these scientific forecasts would 
have had for policymakers, this 14-page report represents one of the best 
examples of the CIA‘s early efforts to provide a more detailed breakdown 
of strategic intelligence.  It is also worth pointing out once more that the 
report‘s political conclusions were consistent with previous assertions that 
restraint and caution continued to influence Soviet decision-making. 
A Weekly Summary issued two days later reported that the 
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communist-backed SED was ‗undergoing a purge which will ultimately 
replace all members of non-Communist parties and unreliable Communists 
now holding key positions in the SED with reliable Stalinist Communists.‘  
The CIA rightly concluded that this more disciplined SED would facilitate 
Soviet-Communist control of the Soviet sector of Berlin, though analysts 
estimated that Communist cadres were already practically in full control of 
the zonal government down to county level.  The most shocking aspect of 
this report, however, was that the framework of the SED party structure 
was strikingly similar to the centralized police system of the Nazi 
regime.
438
 
Soviet political maneuvers aside, the Weekly Summary revealed a 
surprising degree of optimism that the Soviet Union could possibly be 
inclined toward conciliation because, it reasoned, Moscow recognized that 
the Berlin blockade had ‗failed to dissuade the western powers from 
proceeding with a separate organization for western Germany or to force 
them out of Berlin.‘  The Agency also reported that the success of the 
airlift,
439
 combined with the firm stand of the western powers, had: 
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1) raised western prestige in Germany and 
increased German hostility to the Soviet 
Union; 
2) spurred western plans for rearmament and 
military coalition; and 
3) precipitated the local problem of Berlin 
into a crisis of world scope, far exceeding 
Soviet calculations.
440
 
  
The CIA followed this perceptive assessment with another 
pragmatic Weekly Summary which cited Stalin‘s interview in Pravda, 
suggesting that the Soviet premier‘s remarks were an indication of a shift in 
the Kremlin‘s estimate of its capabilities for achieving its immediate 
objectives in Berlin.  Considering the ‗uncompromising stiffness‘ of 
Stalin‘s remarks, the interview might, argued the CIA, ‗have been intended 
to prepare the ground, both within the Soviet Union and abroad, for further 
unilateral action on Germany, possibly including partition and the 
establishment of an east German state.
441
    
Intelligence Memorandum No. 77, issued later in November, 
provided estimates of the possibility of a unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal 
from Germany prior to February 1, 1949.  A unilateral evacuation, the 
memo argued, ‗is not believed possible without jeopardizing the 
Communist Party machinery that the USSR has been attempting to build as 
a control mechanism in the Soviet Zone.‘442  Having pressed the point that 
the Soviet position was to ―sit tight,‖ analysts surmised that the immediate 
effect in Berlin of the creation of a separate Communist government would 
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be ‗to intensify the political and economic impasse by making normal city 
government virtually inoperable.‘443   
An earlier report dismissed any notion of Soviet sincerity towards 
negotiations, arguing that any softening by the Soviet Union should be 
regarded only as ‗a temporary tactical adjustment and not as a prelude to a 
sweeping revision of Soviet policy toward the West.‘444  Furthermore, on 
the issue of Soviet actions in eastern Germany, analysts believed that the 
Kremlin‘s tightening control of the government would have to be shored up 
before the Soviets could begin to consider any conciliatory actions over the 
blockade.
445
  However, the establishment of a Soviet-controlled East 
German government came as a surprise to few the following year.  (The 
provisional constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, FRG, went 
into effect in May 1949.  The German Democratic Republic, GDR, was 
established the following October). 
It should be noted that by the time the FRG had been established, the 
United States had drafted a more official response to the Soviet Union.  
Here, at last, was the firm policy position that had been argued by so many 
in Washington.  Passed on November 23, NSC Directive 20/4 represented 
the first comprehensive strategy to be adopted as national policy.  In 
essence, NSC 20/4 outlined Kennan‘s political viewpoints from three years 
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earlier, stating that the US must ensure that Europe did not yield further to 
hostile aggression or subversion by ‗using all methods short of war‘ to 
reduce ‗the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer 
constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the 
world family of nations.‘446   Most importantly, 20/4 outlined what steps 
the US needed to take to counter Soviet threats by methods short of war.  
The directive sought to counter these threats by reducing the power and 
influence of the USSR and bringing about basic changes in the conduct of 
international relations with the country.  These two broad aims pursued by 
the US, however, would have to be executed while guarding against the 
continuing dangers of war.
447
  NSC 20/4 also positioned the communist 
―threat‖ within a more realistic context, stating that the Soviet Union‘s 
intentions were to enhance its political standing in the world, rather than 
outright military domination. 
During the last weeks of 1948, the CIA left policymakers with several 
familiar, cautionary assessments.  On the question of Soviet tactics, 
analysts argued that in an attempt to counter the December 5 elections in 
the western sectors, the Soviets should be expected to complete the political 
and administrative division of Berlin and increase the obstacles to a 
settlement of both the Berlin disputes and the entire German question.
448
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On the question of Soviet strategy, however, analysts shifted their 
position.  When the blockade was first imposed, the CIA believed that the 
primary purpose of the blockade was to compel the Western powers to 
revisit quadripartite negotiations under conditions favorable to Soviet plans, 
hoping to make the US position in Berlin untenable.
449
  Citing further 
consolidation of Soviet influence in the eastern zone and the persistent 
inflexibility of the Kremlin, analysts revised their appraisal, suggesting by 
mid-December that the USSR was concentrating upon its secondary 
objective:  forcing the West either to evacuate Berlin or to negotiate on 
terms which would make the western position ‗ineffective and eventually 
untenable.‘450   
In light of the fact that Moscow was considered to have accepted the 
partitioning of Germany as a fact, analysts warned that the USSR would 
impose a more stringent blockade in pursuit of its objective of 
consolidating its zone.  Stalin was blunt on this matter:  ‗It is all lies…. It is 
not a blockade, but a defensive measure.‘451  The CIA readdressed the fact 
that the speed and success with which the consolidation of Western and 
Eastern Europe could be achieved by the US and the USSR was directly 
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affected by economic factors.  ‗Although, at the present time,‘ it noted, ‗the 
political and security aspects of the situation are unfavorable to the US, the 
general economic aspect is more satisfactory in spite of an inflationary 
tendency and may prove to be of considerable significance for the longer 
run.‘452 
True to the prediction of more stringent transportation controls, an 
intelligence memorandum issued later that month reported that the head of 
the Kriminel Direktion of the East Berlin Police stated that the ‗complete 
sealing of Soviet Sector streets leading into the western sectors is to be 
carried out soon.‘  Security measures were to include wooden barriers on 
open thoroughfares and increased foot patrols.  In addition, the East 
German police would be restructured to facilitate this increase of border 
control.  A problem with this, warned another December report, was that 
the US and Western Europe still had ‗a long road to travel before they 
achieve an equally effective coordination of their interests and policies with 
respect to Germany.‘453  
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1949:  The Soviets Blink 
The intensification of the blockade, combined with the 
consolidation of power within the Soviet sector, had considerably enhanced 
the USSR‘s bargaining position by 1949.454 ‗Apparently believing that they 
could bring the confrontation to a decisive conclusion,‘ Donald P. Steury 
notes, ‗the Soviets prepared to isolate West Berlin from the eastern half of 
the city and abrogate what remained of the quadripartite governing 
arrangements.‘455  There was at least one reason for optimism, however.  In 
a press interview on January 31, Stalin, for the first time, stated conditions 
for ending the blockade without reference to the currency problem.  The 
intelligence reports issued throughout the spring remained consistent with 
earlier assessments that the crisis was, for all intents and purposes, 
stabilizing and that the USSR was neither planning nor prepared for a 
major armed conflict.
456
  In fact, buoyed by the US position in Germany 
(the West tightened its counter blockade, stopping all truck traffic between 
West Zones and the Soviet Zone on 4 February), the CIA reported that 
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containment efforts had checked Soviet-Communist activities that were 
‗seeking to break down Western Europe.‘457 
 The blockade continued, although few additional developments 
affecting the Berlin situation had occurred.  The Soviets hoped to capitalize 
on the Allies‘ difficulties in supplying Berlin, which during the winter 
months almost reached the breaking point.  Because of frigid temperatures, 
Berlin suffered drastic coal and food shortages.  Yet morale remained high, 
despite the hardships.  The West was unwilling to capitulate and doubled its 
efforts and continued the airlift throughout the winter, meeting the basic 
needs of the Berlin population.
458
  The White House began feeling more 
confident that the situation, desperate as it was, would not lead to war. 
Most significantly, the Soviet Union was doing little to challenge 
the persistence of the Allied airlift—perhaps because Soviet leaders 
believed the airlift incapable of succeeding through the winter.  So with a 
solution to the Berlin crisis still on the horizon, the CIA addressed the 
distressing question of the risk of war in 1949 in Intelligence Memorandum 
No. 118.   Analysts cautioned that the risk of a general war would be 
substantially elevated by an attempt by the US to force the Berlin blockade.  
The warning suggested it was probable that, faced with such a challenge at 
this stage, ‗the Kremlin would seek to maintain the blockade of Berlin at all 
costs including, if necessary, war with the Western Powers.‘  Such a 
decision was based on the following considerations: 
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a.  the Berlin blockade has achieved such 
significance that its abandonment by the 
USSR, in the face of a Western threat, 
would constitute for the Kremlin a 
disastrous loss in terms of prestige and 
initiative. 
b. a Soviet retreat on the blockade issue 
would vastly encourage resistance to 
Soviet aggression in the West and to 
Communist domination throughout the 
Soviet orbit. 
 
 Intelligence Memorandum No. 118 concluded that, while the Soviet 
Union appeared to accept war if necessary, it would, nevertheless, ‗first 
exhaust all means short of armed force, such as sabotage, demolition, and 
obstruction, to maintain the blockade.‘459  It is important to note that even 
as the crisis had stabilized considerably since the early crescendo of the 
previous spring, CIA analysts still considered it vital to provide 
Washington with a risk assessment of war with the USSR.  Evidently, this 
was because, although the crisis appeared to be stabilizing and the mindsets 
of policymakers reflected a more moderate approach, the situation on the 
ground remained a potential powder keg. 
 The Soviet Union eventually agreed to end the blockade of Berlin—
a humiliating setback to Soviet foreign policy.  More than fourteen months 
had passed since the first restrictions were imposed on the German city.  By 
the time the Soviets officially lifted the blockade on May 12, 1949, the 
Western powers had, over a period of a little more than a year, supplied 2.2 
million Berlin inhabitants (located 100 miles inside the Soviet Zone) by the 
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airlift of approximately two hundred fifty thousand tons of supplies.
460
  In 
the end, Stalin‘s plans had backfired.  Faced with the alternative of either 
failure or possible war with the United States, Moscow believed it had 
achieved all it could from the blockade and, according to CIA analysts, 
desired a peaceful agreement in order to pursue its long-term objectives by 
other methods.
461
   
 To what degree the Soviet leader was pressured by the unfavorable 
world opinion that turned against the blockade in Berlin remains unclear.  
Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas point out that because of the success of 
the airlift, ‗The Soviets began to look like barbarians, bent on starvation, 
while the Americans seemed like saviors.‘462  Stalin also may have, as 
Forrest C. Pogue suggests, seen the danger of a prolonged confrontation in 
the air corridors of Berlin.
463
  John Lewis Gaddis rightly points out that, 
despite American efforts and Western solidarity, the airlift survived only 
through ‗forbearance in Moscow.‘464  In fact, by the time the blockade was 
lifted, the West had found indirect ways to challenge Soviet security, 
including:  further expansion of European economic assistance, the 
announcement that the mark would be the sole legal tender in West Berlin 
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on March 20, 1949, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
by twelve Western countries on April 4 (signed May 12) and the creation of 
the Federal Republic of Germany on May 23.
465
   
 The CIA rightly pointed out that, while it was not likely that the 
USSR ever considered the communization of Europe to be a ‗pushover‘, it 
probably did not anticipate the difficulties that arose in 1948.
466
  We can 
now safely presume that the eventual strength of the Western reaction (to 
include economic assistance), the recession of Soviet influence elsewhere 
in Western Europe, the reorganization of Western Germany and the 
growing success of its economy, and the negotiation of NATO  placed a 
great deal of pressure on Moscow.  The CIA believed the Soviet Union had 
two basic courses open to it after capitulating.  The first was to enter 
negotiations solely in order to attempt to ‗delay and confuse‘ Western 
policy.  The second was to enter negotiations with the intention of reaching 
an agreement that was favorable to Soviet long-term plans.  On the issue of 
the CIA‘s balance sheet of the relative security positions of the US and the 
USSR, many in Washington would not have been surprised to see that 
analysts believed ‗the global situation had slightly changed in favor of the 
US,‘ primarily because of its improved position in Europe.  However, 
another, more distant, issue raised by CIA analysts remained under the 
political radar:  ‗Agreement on Germany, or a détente in Europe primarily 
means that time is being taken to build up strength and to maneuver for 
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positions elsewhere.‘  It was considered by analysts that, at the conclusion 
of the crisis in Berlin, the position in the Far East was definitely less 
favorable to the US.
467
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The essential continuing purposes of the US 
and the USSR were so opposed in Germany 
that the rapid development of a deadlock in 
Berlin was inevitable.
468—CIA 
  
 The concrete and barbed wire partition of the Germany city 
continued to cast dark shadows of distrust and apprehension.  The Berlin 
crisis was arguably the most enduring crisis of the entire Cold War, not 
only because it remained the battleground for espionage and diplomatic 
trepidation, but because it demonstrated, so soon after the Second World 
War, that provocative actions could be taken without necessarily leading to 
an armed conflict.  Berlin remained at the forefront of East-West tensions 
for the duration of the Cold War.  This atmosphere of uncertainty led Dean 
Rusk to later write, ‗When I go to sleep at night, I try not to think about 
Berlin.‘469   
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This chapter set out to answer several central questions:  First, how 
well did the Central Intelligence Agency read Soviet intentions and how 
effectively did it read the crisis?  Second, how accurate were its warnings 
and assessments?  Third, we‘d hope to have a clearer understanding of what 
influence the CIA might have had on the formulation of policy decisions 
during the Berlin crisis.  This chapter has demonstrated that political events 
had primed Washington to react strongly to the perceived Soviet threat, 
thus the mindset of policymakers was potentially on track for extreme or 
reactive behavior.  A number of policymakers were quick to sound the 
alarm over Berlin.  Eager to uncover anything dramatic about Soviet 
intentions, many policy leaders‘ decisions were shaped by their sense of 
urgency and uncertainty.  In particular, General Lucius Clay‘s inability to 
yield to compromise outside of Washington‘s careful oversight could have 
provoked a situation where bullets trumped diplomacy.  In particular, 
Clay‘s uncompromising leadership style during the crisis period was, at 
times, a destabilizing influence; especially when the General initiated 
measures without waiting for Washington to make up its mind.  The 
restraint called for by the White House and its intelligence agency flew in 
the face of the military leaders who tended to deal with the crisis in more 
urgent terms.
470
   
 Considering Washington‘s slow reaction to the developing crisis 
and its rejection of negotiating on Russia‘s terms at the very outset of the 
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crisis, coupled with Clay‘s intense preoccupation with damage to American 
prestige, the Central Intelligence Agency‘s appraisals of Soviet intentions 
and capabilities should not be disregarded.
471
  Despite a deficit of hard 
intelligence, analysts threw considerable light on Soviet decision-making 
and risk-taking.  In fact, President Truman remarked as early as April 1949 
that the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency 
were ‗one of the best means available for ‗obtaining coordinated advice as 
a basis for reaching decisions.‘472  In the eyes of CIA analysts, the blockade 
of Berlin and the airlift was, in many ways, a test case of East-West 
strength.  ORE recognized that the US was not dealing with a maniacal 
risk-taking regime, but rather a calculating dictator that based his decisions 
more from choice than from necessity.
473
 
Certainly in the case of Berlin, the CIA appears to have been better 
positioned in its assessments of the crisis than many US military leaders.  
CIA appraisals of Soviet capabilities and intentions were intended to 
prevent the possibility of the crisis further escalating; advising that, 
although Soviet behavior in Berlin had been far from conciliatory, it had 
not been as definitive or final as to suggest a direct military conflict.  With 
relative consistency, these assessments were drafted to help contextualize 
security threats and reassure an already anxious administration that the 
Soviet Union was unprepared and unwilling for a sustained military 
confrontation with the West.   
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Thus, given the possible outcomes of the confrontational posturing 
of the Soviet Union, the CIA‘s guiding hand during the Berlin crisis cannot 
be overstated.  The potential for mistakes and miscalculations during the 
most dangerous stages of the crisis further underscore the value of the 
CIA‘s position in the policy process.  In fact, its assessments were sound on 
a number of central issues.  First, analysts urged policymakers that any 
negotiations pursued by the Soviets would be done with the design of 
preventing a western German state and frustrating economic rehabilitation 
in Germany.  Second, the CIA advised Washington to establish a firm yet 
moderate position with the Soviets, outlining how the US could avoid a 
military showdown, while maintaining its position in Berlin.
474
  Third, in 
addition to understanding the broad Soviet threat, CIA analysts were quite 
perceptive about specific issues such as currency reform, Soviet control 
tactics in the eastern sectors of Germany and the breakdown of diplomatic 
negotiations. 
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******* 
 
Even before the crisis in Berlin had drawn to a close, the CIA‘s position 
was challenged by one of the most unusually unyielding views of the 
Agency‘s early years:  the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report.  Submitted to the 
NSC on January 1949, this report criticized the performance of the CIA‘s 
Office of Reports and Estimates.  Politically, however, the report had wider 
ramifications by calling Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter‘s leadership into 
question.  And although the Committee was formed before the revelation of 
Soviet nuclear capability or the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East, these 
predictive ―failures‖ would provide political fodder for future intelligence 
reforms.   
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Chapter V 
The CIA and the Emerging Crisis in Korea 
 
Shortly [after the Berlin blockade] there came 
the crisis of the Korean War, where the 
Soviet attempt to employ a satellite military 
force in civil combat to its own advantage, by 
way of reaction to the American decision to 
establish a permanent military presence in 
Japan, was read in Washington as the 
beginning of the final Soviet push for world 
conquest; whereas the active American 
military response, provoked by this move, 
appeared in Moscow…as a threat to the 
Soviet position in both Manchuria and in 
eastern Siberia.— George F. Kennan 
(1954)
475
 
 
 
Preface 
Like the preceding case study, the following two chapters examine 
what the Central Intelligence Agency was telling policymakers about 
Soviet objectives, tactics, intentions and capabilities during a time of 
crisis.
476
  In part, because of the failure of the USSR‘s blockade of Berlin 
and the success of the Chinese Communists, a distinct shift in Soviet 
foreign policy focus had occurred in 1949.  Comparatively, US policy in 
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the region underwent a diminutive change.  With Washington‘s focus still 
on Europe, the political storm surging in the Far East would test the CIA 
even further.  US-USSR tensions continued to be the dominant 
consideration in intelligence dissemination to policymakers.  Before Soviet 
efforts could even be checked in Berlin, the undercurrent in the Far East 
was dragging the United States into another crisis.   
Gaddis points out that the civil war in Korea was not a result of 
Soviet and American designs, but rather ‗self-centered‘ behavior that 
threatened to embroil the major powers in ‗unintended confrontations with 
one another.‘477  Yet it was Soviet-American involvement that made the 
crisis so dangerous.  But why was the United States pulled into the fighting 
in Korea when it remained outside in other crises involving Soviet 
opportunism?  After all, the ORE‘s Korean Desk Officer had noted that US 
officials sought to limit future involvement in Korea and interest in the 
peninsula had already begun to decline by the summer of 1948.
478
  Yet by 
1950, the United States found itself jumping head-first into Korea, 
principally because of two reasons:  the domestic conditions permitted US 
military action and, as William Blum points out, the presence of a 
communist side in the conflict.
479
   
As early as the Cairo Conference (22-26 November 1943) the US, 
Great Britain and China pledged that Korea would become free and 
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independent.  However, the spirit of wartime cooperation ran high in 
December 1943 and leaders on both sides were still optimistic.  In fact, 
Korea‘s fate as a partitioned state, much like Berlin, appears to have been 
sealed at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.  Here, the victorious Allies 
agreed on a temporary partition of the Peninsula along the 38
th
 Parallel.  
Once Korea had been liberated from Japanese control, however, a lasting 
political solution became less and less certain as the prospect for the 
reunification of Korea was further complicated by the military occupation 
by the United States and the Soviet Union.  (The Korean Communist 
government was founded in September 1948).  On December 12, 1948, in 
an attempt to buffer against a communist North Korea (the Democratic 
People‘s Republic), the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution declaring the establishment of the Government of the Republic 
of Korea.  
 As the first major military conflict of the Cold War, Korea was a 
seminal event in the history of the CIA.  The developments leading up to 
the attack on pro-Western South Korea and Washington‘s response to the 
unfolding crisis can be better understood through the careful study of the 
intelligence reports issued to policy officials.  This study provides a fresh 
perspective on the CIA‘s influence during the buildup to the crisis, 
examining the often neglected, yet critical aspect of Cold War history—the 
hand of intelligence in the policy decision-making process.  
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Questions and Thesis Statement 
The chapter will first briefly examine Washington‘s policies that 
placed the United States on a collision course in the Far East.  As in third 
chapter, careful attention has been given to the political backdrop during 
the buildup to the crisis.  I will show that policy decisions were shaped by 
fears of Soviet successes overseas and sensational stories of espionage, the 
loss of China and the USSR‘s seemingly overwhelming preponderance of 
power.  America‘s assumption that communist aggression was a wider 
strategy for spreading hostility to other areas of the world threatened to 
become a political flashpoint during the early stages of the conflict.  Like 
Berlin, political events had primed Washington to react strongly to the 
perceived Soviet threat, thus the mindset of policymakers was potentially 
on track for extreme or reactive behavior.   
 The chapter will bring the reader up to June 1950, showing how the 
Central Intelligence Agency issued assessments regarding the possibility of 
an invasion of South Korea and how it helped contextualize security threats 
by reassuring an already anxious administration that the Soviet Union was 
unprepared for a sustained military confrontation with the West.  These 
broad intelligence assessments became increasingly important leading up to 
the invasion of South Korea, especially given the potential for US 
policymakers to react strongly to the larger issue of global conflict with the 
Soviet Union.  With relative consistency, the CIA‘s appraisal of Soviet 
capabilities and intentions concluded that the Kremlin was unable and 
unwilling to risk a war against the United States.  It will also be 
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demonstrated that when hostilities threatened to spiral out of control the 
CIA was one of the calmest voices in the choir. 
 In fact, without the CIA‘s earliest assessments Washington would 
have had greater difficulty in placing the emerging crisis in a proper 
strategic context.  With little US political interest or influence in the region, 
the CIA‘s reports were designed to provide policy makers in Washington 
with a quantifiable assessment intended to inform policy decisions.  Since 
Washington considered Korea to be such a low security priority and was (at 
least initially) neither willing nor prepared to defend the peninsula from a 
communist incursion, it is important to call attention to the intelligence 
agency‘s position on the Far East.  Like the preceding case study, this 
chapter focuses on these central questions:  First, how well did the CIA 
read Soviet intentions and how effectively did it read the crisis?  Second, 
how accurate were its warnings and assessments?  And third, after carefully 
considering the evidence, it is hoped that more clues are revealed about the 
nature and the quality of the CIA‘s influence during this particular crisis. 
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Recent Views 
 No study can hope to answer all the important questions left 
unfielded by other historians.  All too often, though, even the most credible 
recent historical literature offers something of a sweeping brush over the 
CIA‘s role during the Korean crisis.  Intelligence historian Michael Warner 
considers the Agency‘s broader usefulness, pointing to the final sum 
product of intelligence leading up to the Korean War.  The CIA‘s analysis 
of the developing crisis, Warner argues, provided the ‗key end product to 
the policymaker‘ that could ‗…help the US Government craft effective 
foreign and security policies.‘480  This observation resonates but does not 
go further to explain how far the CIA‘s assessments  influenced the policy 
direction.
  
Similarly, John Lewis Gaddis only goes as far to suggest that the 
CIA‘s contributions were influential because the Korean War was rife with 
unpredictable results to the extent that the outbreak, escalation and ultimate 
resolution surprised everyone.
481
 
 Other views are more dismissive.  Historian Charles D. Ameringer 
argues in U.S. Foreign Intelligence that intelligence was ‗like the piano 
player in the brothel.  It adds a touch of class to the place, but had had 
nothing to do with what is going on upstairs.‘482  Not surprisingly then, 
Ameringer supports the widely accepted view that the CIA failed to predict 
                                                 
480
 Michael Warner in Woodrow Kuhns‘ Assessing the Soviet Threat:  The Early Cold War 
Years, p. 1 
481
  John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, 1997, p. 70.  
482
 Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence:  The Secret Side of American History, 
p. 223. 
200 
 
the outbreak of the Korean War.  Similarly, Evan Thomas writes that in 
June 1950, there was a failure of the CIA ‗to predict anything right.‘483   
 The nascent CIA is frequently blamed for failing to predict the date 
of North Korea‘s (the People‘s Democratic Republic of Korea) invasion 
and the date of Communist China‘s intervention in the war.484  Harry Howe 
Ransom argues that the North Korean invasion of South Korea came as a 
surprise in June 1950.  ‗American leaders,‘ Ransom states, ‗were misled by 
national intelligence estimates.  The net estimate at the time was that a war 
in Korea would not happen.‘485  Mark M. Lowenthal also levels his aim at 
the CIA, arguing that the ‗unexpected invasion‘ of South Korea was a result 
of the CIA‘s failure to predict the invasion.486  Other historians, like John 
Ranelagh, Ray S. Cline and Christopher Andrews, argue that the CIA was 
responsible for the invasion launched against South Korea being a 
surprise.
487
   
 Not everyone is in agreement, however.  Kathryn Weathersby 
argues that it had been obvious for a year that war would break out in 
Korea.
488
  Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones argues that the North Korean invasion 
‗had indeed caught American forces unaware, but not because of the 
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paucity of warnings by the CIA.‘  However, the author also suggests that 
the CIA was panicked into issuing ‗an indiscriminate profusion of warnings 
in an attempt to insure against potential criticism‘ and covered itself against 
‗guessed-at contingencies.‘  This ―cry-wolf‖ syndrome, argues Jeffreys-
Jones, stemmed from the CIA‘s evocation of ‗the Kremlin bogeyman‘ and 
its underestimation of North Korea‘s autonomous tendencies.489 
 Amy Zegart goes even further with her study of the connection 
between agency structure and policy outcomes in Flawed by Design:  The 
Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC.  She would have the reader believe 
that the Agency‘s inability to coordinate intelligence led to the Korean 
War, even arguing that Korea ‗might not have occurred had the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and Central Intelligence Agency been able to do their jobs better.‘  
She adds that had the CIA been better able to read the situation in Korea 
then the United States‘ military involvement there ‗might have been 
avoided altogether.‘490  Yet her study largely fails to fully address other 
causative agents that hastened the crisis, including:  misperceptions by 
policymakers from both sides, a bumbling US policy, the opportunistic 
nature of communist leaders and, above all, the self-determining objectives 
of Kim Il Sung.  In the end, though, Zegart‘s showcase of the ‗missteps and 
misadventures‘ of the CIA rests on shaky ground because her reasoning, 
like the title of her book, is ―flawed by design.‖ 
The evidence also appears stacked against Raymond L. Garthoff‘s 
claim that the CIA‘s analysis in the formative years of the Cold War ‗was 
                                                 
489
 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA & American Democracy, p. 64. 
490
 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design, pp. 230-231. 
202 
 
weak and not very influential.‘  His greatest slip is suggesting that it was 
not until January 1952 that the CIA had reached a ‗cautious and qualified 
judgment‘ about Soviet intentions.  Contrary to the central thesis of this 
chapter, Garthoff argues that the CIA‘s earlier evaluations lacked a 
somewhat ‗reassuring formulation‘ that estimated it was unlikely the 
Kremlin would deliberately initiate a global war.
491
  Although a more 
balanced approach than Zegart and Garthoff‘s assessments, Walter Laqueur 
argues in A World of Secrets that the CIA played ‗no significant role‘ in 
changing the perceptions in Washington about the Soviet image, ‗except 
perhaps by providing occasional information on Soviet military capabilities 
that said the Russians did not intend to launch a general war.‘492 
 The evidence presented in this chapter will test these assertions.  In 
addition to highlighting the CIA‘s voice of moderation, this case study 
demonstrates that the invasion of South Korea was not a complete 
‗surprise.‘493  Instead, it will suggest that the CIA represented an important 
voice of caution during the months leading up to the outbreak of war.  The 
business of quality analysis and threat assessments often required complex 
considerations, valuations and variables that made it difficult for analysts to 
provide policymakers a cut and dry analysis of most complex situations.  
Therefore, some explanation of shortsightedness and instances of 
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inaccuracy is warranted.  This chapter will also demonstrate that the 
pervasive focus on warnings estimates has clouded the broader picture of 
the CIA‘s importance during the Korean crisis—that North Korea did not 
invade the Republic of South Korea without warning.
494
  Therefore, this 
case study will join the debate of intelligence-policy culpability. 
 
 
A Question of Priorities 
 
If we interpret the origins of the Cold War in 
terms of misperceptions, we can appreciate 
the role of mutual fear, oversensitivity about 
the motives of the other, and insensitivity 
about the impact of one‘s own actions.495   
 
Before examining the CIA‘s role in the policy-intelligence 
relationship, it is necessary to first consider Washington‘s lack of urgency 
in the Far East.  Former combat historian Bevin Alexander argues that US 
policy was beset by a flawed mindset in the Far East.  ‗The simple verities 
about total victory and the conflict between good and evil that had guided 
American policy for many years,‘ Alexander states, ‗were inadequate in the 
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dismaying world that arose from World War II.‘496  This chapter will 
demonstrate that the lack of a consistent, well-defined regional policy 
contributed greatly to the misperceptions and unpreparedness in Korea.
497
   
Mark M. Lowenthal reminds us that intelligence works best, both 
analytically and operationally, ‗when tied to clearly understood policy 
goals.‘498  In the case of the Korean War, policy goals were not clearly 
established.  The continuation of Rooseveltian policies led to the primacy 
of US interest in Western Europe, and, as a result, the Far East slipped into 
the backwaters of strategic planning.  The declassified intelligence reports 
suggest that the initial US shocks in Korea were not so much the result of 
any failure to predict the rapid deterioration of regional security, but more 
as the result of policymakers lacking sufficient receptiveness to the 
unfolding reality in the region and their failing to appreciate the potential 
explosiveness of the situation.  
A report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee offered one of the 
first official assessments that underscored Washington‘s approach in Korea 
and its reliance on the untested military capabilities of the UN.  The report 
ranked sixteen countries according to their importance to US security 
interests.  Korea ranked 15th.  The report also highlighted the issue of finite 
resources, emphasizing the difference between peripheral areas and regions 
vital to national security: 
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If the present diplomatic ideological warfare 
should become armed warfare, Korea could 
offer little or no assistance in the maintenance 
of our national security.  Therefore, from this 
viewpoint, current assistance should be given 
Korea only if the means exist after sufficient 
assistance has been given the countries of 
primary importance to insure their continued 
independence and friendship for the United 
States and the resurgence of their 
economies.
499
 
 
 As one might expect, Great Britain, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, and Italy were the nations that continued to 
receive the greatest proportion of assistance from the United States until the 
onset of the Korean War.
500
  Korea‘s poor strategic standing and Truman‘s 
―Europe first‖ was also reflected in George Kennan‘s premise of 
containment.  Kennan argued that the principles of containment did not 
apply to the peripheries of US interests, but rather to the three regions that 
held concentrations of industrial strength that could alter the balance of 
power (the UK, the Rhine valley, and Japan).  Because the Soviets were 
‗prepared for the long haul,‘501 Kennan reasoned that it was paramount for 
the Western powers to build up the economic production of Europe so that 
the US might eventually turn the tide of Soviet power and undercut 
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communist regimes around the world.
502
  To be fair, though, even the CIA 
was far from sounding the alarm in mid-1949.  ‗There have been no 
significant changes in the general trend in the Far East,‘ CIA 5-49 reported.  
‗The problems that have been created for US security are continuing to 
expand under the impact of numerous detailed events; but there has been no 
definite speeding up of admittedly unfavorable developments.‘503  The 
CIA‘s Korean Desk Officer from 1948-1950 makes an important point on 
this: 
  
The [CIA‘s] Far East Division was to some 
extent reflecting studies of Soviet intentions 
done during 1949 in connection with NSC-
68.  These studies examined a number of 
potential trouble spots; the section on Korea, 
written from the point of view of Soviet 
global experts, made official the doctrine that 
the USSR would probably not risk instructing 
its satellite to make an all-out invasion; rather 
it would favor guerrilla and subversive 
techniques.
504
 
 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, writes in his memoir that, for 
some months after tensions had mounted after the Berlin blockade, the US 
had exercises on danger spots for ‗renewed Soviet probing of our 
determination.  Korea was on the list but not among the favorites.‘505  In 
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fact, it was Acheson‘s declaration of US policy in his famous speech to the 
National Press Club on January 12, 1950 that publicly declared 
Washington‘s view that the strategic defense line in the Far East ran from 
the Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines—an exclusion 
that frustrated the UN sponsored elected leader of South Korea, Syngman 
Rhee.  Truman‘s Secretary of State pointed out that even if South Korea 
was invaded, Rhee should not expect the United States to protect the South 
from the initial invasion from the North.  Instead, it was assumed that 
Rhee‘s government could rely on ‗the commitments of the entire civilized 
world under the Charter of the United Nations.‘506  The problem with this 
position was that it lacked a long-term contingency plan because it was 
assumed that Korea would not be the first battleground of the Cold War.  
As a result, the momentum of existing policies continued to dictate the 
United States‘ course of action, until the invasion of South Korea.  In fact, 
as early as May 1950, the question was raised by the Central Intelligence 
Agency of how foreknowledge of an invasion would have even altered US 
involvement in Korea given the lack of receptivity and momentum.
507
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 Although John W. Spanier points out that it was not American 
words, ‗but American policy that probably encouraged the Communists to 
believe that the United States would not defend South Korea,‘508 an early 
intelligence report suggested that an American policy of ambivalence might 
have encouraged eventual Soviet dominance in the region and would 
initiate a series of subversive moves ‗in an effort to force the withdrawal of 
U.S. forces and to frustrate implementation of the UN resolution on Korea.‘  
Analysts suspected that despite UN action, the Soviet Union would 
maintain the North Korean People‘s Army in a ‗state of readiness‘ to 
occupy South Korea…509 
 In regard to the success of the United Nations as a power and in 
terms of political broker in the region, Brewster Denny argues that the 
organization was designed for ‗deterrence and collective security against 
major war between the great powers.‘  Even against incredible odds, the 
UN had been an important organization working toward a resolution to the 
‗irreconcilable conflict.‘510  Acheson later reflected that his hope was that 
the United Nations might bring about the withdrawal of both Russian and 
United States troops from that divided country, to be followed by its 
unification.
511
   However, Breckinridge is less confident in this assessment.  
Pointing to the UN‘s overall ineffectiveness during the Berlin crisis, he 
argues that, even before the Korean War, the United Nations had proved 
unable to cope with the tensions resulting from Soviet policy:  ‗It was 
                                                 
508
 John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, 
Cambridge, Mass:  Belknap Press, 1959, p. 21. 
509
 CIA, Daily Summary, ―Korea:  Future Soviet Tactics in Korea,‖ 9 December 1947.  
CIA Electronic Reading  Room. 
510
 Brewster C. Denny, Seeing American Foreign Policy Whole, p. 136. 
511
 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 257. 
209 
 
unable to establish an international peacekeeping force; it had no way of 
enforcing its general declarations of law and principle; and nations were 
obliged to rely on their own resources.‘512 
In lieu of US troops in Korea, Truman approved legislation for 
supplemental appropriation aid with the 1950 China Aid Act.  The bill, 
passed on February 14, 1950, failed to include any language that might 
indicate a sign of US intentions to defend its interests in the Far East.  (The 
State Department quickly realized that they had neglected their usual 
precautions and had encouraged Soviet opportunism).
513
  One possible 
explanation for Washington‘s approach was its basic assumption that the 
United Nations would intercede in the case of an attack.  A caveat to this 
tactic was, of course, the faith that South Korean forces were sufficiently 
strong to delay a North Korean attack long enough for UN reinforcements 
to arrive. 
Compared to Europe, Korea was unimportant to the Pentagon as 
well—its position lending further credence to Acheson‘s defense perimeter 
speech.  The Pentagon‘s official position was embodied in Offtackle (JSPC 
877/59).
514
  Offtackle acknowledged that placing the Far East as a low 
strategic priority was a serious risk, but held that the Soviet Union would 
attack Western Europe first.  The JCS concluded that to achieve success in 
defending the initial aggression of the Soviet threat in Europe, Korea must 
be considered as incidental strategic value.  Moreover, without additional 
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forces or a reduction of military obligations elsewhere, the United States 
should not obligate itself to defend Korea.
515
  General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 
head of military aid at the Defense Department, believed the question of 
military assistance to the Republic of Korea was essentially a political one, 
in as much as South Korea was not regarded of any particular value to 
overall American strategic position in the Far East. 
Before moving on to the developing crisis, it is also necessary to 
consider Communist China, because at the nub of the United States‘ Far 
East policy was a general misunderstanding of the Sino-Soviet relationship.  
Moreover, America‘s foreign policy approach in China served as a 
cornerstone for Far East policy and laid an uneven foundation for the crisis 
in Korea.  Policy officials worried about the pervasive ‗spirit of defeatism‘ 
throughout Nationalist China and believed that the tide ran against Chiang 
Kai-Shek‘s regime.  The State Department resigned itself to the looming 
defeat of the Nationalist Government.  In fact, its course of action was to 
take no course of action; and by August 5,
 
1949, it had accepted the 
impending political crisis and halted aid to support Chiang Kai-shek‘s 
government.
516
  Walter Laqueur correctly points out that the United States‘ 
‗capacity to act was much greater in Europe‘ and could do little about the 
outcome of the struggle in mainland in China.
517
   
 Several days after Dean Acheson had delivered his ―perimeter 
speech,‖ analysts issued a report on Soviet-based Communism.  ‗The 
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urgent question,‘ wrote the CIA, ‗is whether Soviet-oriented, China-based 
Communism can continue to identify itself with nationalism, exploit 
economic privations and anti-Western sentiment, and sweep into power by 
one means or another elsewhere in Asia.‘518  At this point, analysts offered 
more questions than answers about Chinese Communism.  Still, these 
questions were important because they framed potential political and 
military flashpoints in the Far East.   Most often, the CIA echoed the State 
Department‘s bleak assessment of China in its assessments of probable 
developments there, concluding that the Nationalist resistance had a short 
shelf life.  As early as February 1948, a Weekly Summary advised 
policymakers that with the imminent collapse of the Chinese National 
Government, the communists were likely to establish a political structure 
which would be designed to become a component part of a Communist 
government of China but would have ‗an almost free hand in managing its 
own regional affairs.‘519  More than a year later, analysts viewed the 
situation in China in more favorable terms.  In addition to laying out the 
military situation, strength and disposition of communist ground forces and 
the organization and strength of Chinese Communist forces,  ORE in June 
1949 warned that the US could not reverse or significantly check the fact 
that communist military forces were capable of ‗destroying all semblance 
of unity‘ in the Chinese Nationalist Government.520 
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Truman believed that it was crucial that the ‗spread of communism 
did not automatically and permanently increase Soviet power.‘521  But how 
this concern might apply to a coherent Far East policy had not yet been 
determined.  Initially, policymakers sought to limit hostile US rhetoric 
directed at Communist China in an attempt to foster goodwill with 
Chairman Mao‘s regime and drive a wedge between Peking and 
Moscow.
522
  This early approach was in step with the foreign policy 
publication of NSC 48/1 and 48/2 which outlined the official position of the 
United States with respect to Asia.  Even before the communist flags had 
unfurled in China, NSC 48/2 declared, ‗The United States should 
exploit…any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR.‘523  
Washington hoped that the newly formed People‘s Republic of China 
would develop its own power base independent of Moscow and held out for 
the promise of a Tito-type split with the Kremlin. 
Other events cast dark shadows of anxiety over Washington, further 
distracting policy leaders from the Far East.  President Truman announced 
on September 23, 1949 that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an 
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atomic bomb.
524
  The CIA was fully aware that the USSR had had an 
atomic energy program since 1945 and was ‗vigorously pursuing‘ a nuclear 
program as a top priority.  However, the CIA‘s prediction that the most 
probable date by which the USSR might be expected to produce an atomic 
bomb was mid-1953 became a political black eye for Hillenkoetter‘s spy 
agency.
525
  In fact, as early as March 1948 the CIA had already professed 
that there was no useful information on nuclear capabilities coming out of 
the Soviet Union.
526
  Even DCI Hillenkoetter admitted that roughly eighty 
percent of intelligence was derived from such open sources as foreign 
books, magazines, technical and scientific surveys, photographs, 
commercial analyses, newspapers and radio broadcasts, and general 
information from people with knowledge of affairs abroad.
527
  The CIA‘s 
ability to acquire direct evidence from field collection never really 
improved before the Soviet Union‘s detonation of the nuclear device.  
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Moreover, other pressing security threats in Europe, the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East and, to a lesser extent, the Far East dictated priorities for the 
intelligence agency. 
 There existed a few reasons for why it was so difficult for analysts 
to track the developments of the Soviet atomic program.  First, collection of 
hard intelligence was so difficult because analysts often had to rely on 
diplomatic and military attaché reports, media accounts and their own 
judgment.  Second, Soviet nuclear weapons facilities were located deep 
inside the USSR and were carefully monitored and managed by the MVD 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs). Security measures were strict and available 
information after World War II ceased to come out of the Soviet Union.
528
  
‗Faced with a dearth of detailed information on the Soviet atomic energy 
program,‘ Steury writes, ‗ORE analysts focused on programmatic factors—
such as broad measurements of industrial capacity; resource commitments 
and limitations; and the location and size of the facilities involved—as a 
means of backing into a measure of Soviet progress in atomic energy.‘  As 
a result, he argues, ORE was responsible for producing the intelligence 
community‘s best judgment on when the Soviet Union would first produce 
an atomic bomb.  ‗In retrospect, it seems that ORE‘s failure to accurately 
predict the advent of the Soviet‘s atomic bomb was due less to any 
particular shortcoming than a general failure to piece everything 
together.‘529 
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The CIA did, however, offer an update of the security situation after 
news broke.  ORE cautioned that Stalin‘s opportunism would lead him to 
‗use the new situation to his advantage as additional support for nearly all 
the major policy lines it [he] has followed since the end of World War II.‘  
Soviet possession, analysts reasoned, would greatly strengthen the current 
Soviet ―peace offensive.‖530  Despite this basic objective, however, the CIA 
was careful not to suggest that Soviet opportunism meant that the USSR 
would ‗resort to military action at any time they considered it advantageous 
to do so.‘531   
At least on the pervasive question of nuclear brinkmanship—how 
nuclear capability might embolden Stalin and increase his tolerance for 
risk-taking in Korea and elsewhere—the CIA‘s assessment was correct.  
The CIA‘s Office of Reports and Estimates argued that there appeared to be 
no firm basis for an assumption that ‗the USSR presently intends 
deliberately to use military force to attain a Communist world or to further 
expand Soviet territory if this involves war with a potentially stronger US.‘  
ORE suggested that the Soviet policy objective was to achieve ‗a Soviet 
dominated communist world through revolutionary rather than military 
means.‘532  This assessment proved to be perceptive and accurate.   
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Broadly speaking, the CIA‘s assessments highlighted three salient 
points for policy makers to consider.  First, Soviet possession of a nuclear 
arsenal might embolden Stalin‘s willingness for risk-taking.533 Second, the 
CIA made clear that the term ‗revolutionary‘ tactics meant ‗all means short 
of all-out war involving the US.‘  Third, the Soviet Union could soon 
narrow the economic and military gap simply by augmenting its nuclear 
arsenal.  However, the CIA‘s failure to accurately predict the time of the 
Soviet detonation of an atomic device on July 14 resulted in a blistering 
review from Washington.   
To worsen matters, the People‘s Republic of China was proclaimed 
in Beijing on October 1, 1949, almost in concert with Truman‘s 
announcement of the Soviet detonation of an atomic device on September 
23, 1949.
534
  Robert J. Donovan, principal founder of the CIA, observed 
that the ‗political fault line of Asia…sent shock waves through American 
politics, impeded the Truman administration, fatefully changed the course 
of American foreign policy and resulted, in Korea, in what was then the 
third greatest war in American history.‘535  (It will be shown later that, once 
Mao had consolidated his base of power, the CIA had difficulty 
understanding the complexity of the Sino-Soviet relationship). 
 In an attempt to undercut the Kremlin‘s influence in the Far East the 
State Department attempted to court the new Chinese leadership.  In an 
addendum to the China White Paper, Dean Acheson discouraged basing 
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policy on wishful thinking but continued to believe that the profound 
civilization and the democratic individualism of China would reassert 
themselves and ‗throw off the foreign yoke.‘  Acheson considered the US 
should encourage all developments in China ‗which now and in the future 
work toward this end.‘536  His letter also conveyed optimism about the 
possibility of an independent Communist China:  ‗The possibility that Mao 
might follow in Tito‘s footsteps was widely discussed in the State 
Department especially at the American Embassy in Moscow, which in 
October even recommended recognizing the new Chinese communist 
government as a means of facilitating that process.‘537   
 ORE conveyed apprehension about pandering to Chinese 
friendship.  In spring 1949 it advised Washington that the Kremlin intended 
to use China ‗as an advanced base to facilitate Soviet penetration of 
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia and the Philippines; to outflank India-
Pakistan and the strategically important areas of the Middle and Near East; 
and to eventually take control of the entire Asiatic continent and the 
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Western Pacific.‘538  But by January 1950, the CIA had revised its 
assessment of the Sino-Soviet problem. Analysts concluded that Mao‘s 
protracted nine-week visit to Moscow for his first visit with Stalin had 
‗aroused speculation regarding a deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and 
Chinese Communist resistance to Soviet encroachment.‘  The CIA 
reasoned that Beijing could initiate and maneuver its own political agendas 
independently from the Kremlin.  The Agency concluded that the Kremlin 
probably realized that for some time its position in China would be best 
served by ‗retaining the voluntary cooperation of the Chinese Communists 
rather than by using open or implied coercion.‘539   
The following month, however, analysts argued that the immediate 
result of the Sino-Soviet Pact would be the strengthening of the Stalinist 
faction of the Chinese Communist Party against the nationalistic Chinese 
Communists.
540
  These intelligence assessments were significant in at least 
one respect: they highlighted the inconsistent mindset of intelligence 
analysts.  However, these inconsistencies also reveal that the CIA 
understood that communism in the Far East was not so black and white as 
Washington presumed. 
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Prelude to War 
The crisis unfolded rather quickly once American and Soviet forces 
were withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula.  The Soviet Union completed 
its military withdrawal on December 25, 1948, although the Kremlin left a 
number of military advisors and operatives in the region.
541
  ORE‘s Far 
East/Pacific Division later suggested that the reason for this continued 
―advisory presence‖ was because industrialization of the Far East would 
serve the ultimate Soviet aim of world domination.  Specifically, the 
Korean Peninsula was capable of contributing major industrial productivity 
towards furthering Soviet ambitions: 
 
China, finally at peace, must of necessity 
devote its economic effort towards 
rehabilitating its devastated internal 
economy.  Northern Korea, however, 
suffered no lasting damage as a result of the 
Soviet [Occupation].  If the Soviets are to 
industrialize the Far East, an industrial base 
must be formed.  Present analysis indicates 
that northern Korea is being utilized to 
contribute to these aims.
542
 
 
A Weekly Summary advised that, while the USSR sought to avoid 
direct implication in its involvement in Korean matters, there was no doubt 
that the Kremlin was engineering a series of favorable developments to 
establish an independent regime in North Korea and eventually unify Korea 
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under communist rule.  In addition, the CIA reasoned that Soviet 
‗intransigence and expansionism‘ was exemplified by the efforts of Soviet 
advisers to train a North Korean Army clandestinely and to equip it with 
Soviet weapons.
543
 
However, analysts cautioned that any invasion of South Korea was 
not likely ‗until US troops have been withdrawn from the area….‘544 This 
long-range analysis proved to be substantially correct in terms of 
communist actions and also in describing the true significance of Korea to 
US interests.  Admiral Stansfield Turner considered the report ‗relatively 
successful‘ at highlighting the destabilizing effect the US withdrawal would 
have on the region.  In fact, Turner argues that this was exactly the sort of 
‗underpinning for policy‘ that intelligence should provide, but argues the 
warnings were completely ignored.
545
 
The United States did not complete its withdrawal of military forces 
from Korea until June 1949.
546
  Washington buoyed its withdrawal from 
the peninsula by promising the Republic of Korea continual political, 
economic, technical and military support, despite the fact that a series of 
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earlier CIA estimates on Soviet tactics argued that without the investment 
of ‗considerable effort over an extended period‘ (US aid and UN support) a 
withdrawal of US troops would leave the security of the Republic of South 
Korea unstable and ‗incapable of offering any serious resistance to eventual 
domination by the North.‘  The report concluded that North Korean 
domination of the South would be ‗an inevitable consequence of the US 
troop withdrawal.‘547  Analysts predicted that the Soviet aim would be to 
deprive the US of an opportunity to establish a native security force in 
South Korea ‗adequate to deal with aggression from the North Korean 
People‘s Army.‘548  Washington believed that any US forces remaining in 
South Korea might either be destroyed or be obliged to abandon Korea‘ in 
the event of a major invasion.  Either would cause serious damage to US 
prestige.   
Still, Truman was firm about achieving stability in South Korea, 
without the direct assistance from the US military.
549
  Even after the 
withdrawal of US troops had significantly hampered intelligence collection 
on the ground (specifically signals intelligence), CIA assessments argued 
that South Korean security forces were not substantially trained, prepared, 
and readied for combat as policy officials in Washington had judged.
550
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The CIA offered another cautionary report about communist 
complicity in the Far Eastern mainland in an October Weekly Summary.  
The report had predicted that the Soviet Union‘s withdrawal did not 
necessarily preclude plans for an invasion and concluded that an armed 
conflict was likely.  Most importantly, the estimate warned that a 
withdrawal from Korea would probably, in time, be followed by an 
invasion: 
 
Eventual armed conflict between the North 
and South Korean governments appears 
probable…in the light of such recent events 
as Soviet withdrawal from North Korea, 
intensified improvement of North Korean 
roads heading south, Peoples‘ Army troop 
movements to areas nearer the 38
th
 Parallel 
and from Manchuria to North Korea, and 
combined maneuvers.
551
   
 
 The most striking element to the intelligence reports regarding the 
Soviet withdrawal from Korea was the conclusion that the Soviet Union 
was unwilling to draw the United States into a direct armed conflict.  This 
is not to say that there was no evidence to suggest that the USSR‘s actions 
were not threatening.  The CIA expressed concern about the USSR 
encouraging a conflict that analysts believed would remain localized.  Such 
actions would not only create a destabilizing force but also increase the 
danger of an undesired confrontation with the West.  Moreover, analysts 
reported on Russia‘s extensive armament of Communist China and North 
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Korea by providing significant Soviet material in volume.
552
  Even in light 
of the USSR‘s open assistance to North Korea, however, the CIA 
maintained its position that the Soviet Union was unwilling to provoke a 
direct military confrontation. 
 On February 21, 1949, ORE issued an assessment of communist 
capabilities in South Korea.  The report advised there was a possibility of a 
Korean invasion as early as February or March 1949.  Earlier in the month, 
analysts had reasoned that the subversive efforts of communist forces in 
South Korea to undermine popular government support would be met with 
limited success: 
 
The present Communist strength in South 
Korea does not appear great enough to 
support a sustained, country-wide [sic] 
campaign that would accomplish this 
mission.  The limitation of their future 
potential, however, depends primarily on the 
ability of government officials and the people 
to resolve their personal or party differences 
in presenting a united front to the 
Communists, and on the ability of the 
government to insure a minimum standard of 
living for both the farmer and the urban 
worker.
553
 
 
 The CIA‘s Review of the World Situation placed this risk-taking 
within a wider security context, reminding Washington that American 
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security was global and could not be protected in Europe alone.  Analysts 
cautioned that the trend in the Far East was profoundly important, 
particularly if it became a springboard for future communist expansion.  
The report took an opportunity here for a little back patting.  Containment 
policies, it stated, had checked the Soviet-Communist activities that were 
‗seeking to break down Western Europe.‘554  Although present prospects 
for communist subversion in South Korea were gradually eroding, the 
threat from North Korea was constant.  The paper vacillated on the degree 
of probability, but without direct military provocation from North Korea, 
the CIA was unable to offer an exact prediction of an invasion.  The CIA 
reinforced its reassurances in a Weekly Summary dated April 28, 1949, 
when it stated: 
 
Soviet objectives have not changed and the 
tactics now being used differ only in intensity 
and scope from those employed since the end 
of World War II.  Although the USSR has 
improved its power position by announcing 
its possession of atomic secrets, increasing its 
military and industrial strength, consolidating 
its control of Eastern Europe, and making 
spectacular gains in the Far East, there is no 
indication that the USSR is yet willing to 
initiate armed conflict with the West.
555 
 
The CIA‘s ORE 17-49, also issued in April, further stressed the 
growing strategic importance of the Far East.  ORE 17-49 brought to the 
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attention of policymakers the inconsistency between wishful thinking and 
the eventual reality of the United States‘ waning influence in the region.  
The report argued that the US‘s position was ‗untenable‘ should Soviet 
influence expand any further in the region and that current US policies 
would only result in a protracted war.  ‗Once having lost its present 
minimum position in the region,‘ analysts wrote, ‗the U.S. might lack the 
resources needed to maintain a major war effort against Soviet centers of 
power.‘  The CIA concluded that, given the probability of a conflict 
between the two Koreas, the region was quickly becoming of increasing 
‗significance to U.S. strategy.‘556   
 In terms of a more general Soviet threat, analysts issued an 
assessment of the possibility of direct Soviet military action during 1949.  
Based on its understanding of the fundamental objectives and strategies of 
the Soviet Union, the CIA warned that international tension would continue 
to increase further during 1949, as it had done the previous year.  However, 
although the USSR had ‗an overwhelming preponderance of immediately 
available military power on the Eurasian continent and a consequent 
capability of resorting to direct military at action any time,‘ analysts 
believed there was no conclusive evidence to support a Soviet preparation 
for direct military aggression, correctly surmising that the Soviet Union 
was too weak for a protracted war and would have been unable to 
consolidate any military gains acquired by military force.  Furthermore, a 
lack of industrial strength, weak morale, and a fledgling economy 
prevented Soviet Russia from posing a real military threat to American 
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security.   Several factors encouraging Soviet restraint were also listed, 
including:  increasing US determination to resist further Soviet 
encroachment, increasing rigidity in the partition of Germany, and further 
communist success in Asia and the Near and Middle East.
557
  
Considering the dangerous circumstances in Korea, the CIA urged 
policymakers that an undesired outbreak of hostilities through 
miscalculations was increasingly possible:  
 
Such miscalculation could occur in 
underestimating the determination of the 
opposing side or in exaggerating its 
aggressive intentions.  Both miscalculations 
would be present in a situation in which one 
side took a position from which it could not 
withdraw in the face of an unexpectedly 
alarmed and forceful reaction on the part of 
the other.
558
 
 
At first look, such an analysis might appear to have been of little 
value.  But when considering the potential for overreaction, we find that 
these estimates of Soviet intentions served as important reassurances.  The 
fact remained that Washington was unclear about Soviet actions in 1949.  
Certainly in the case of the Far East, Korea was shaping up to be a political 
and military flashpoint where undesired consequences could ignite a larger 
conflict.  On this issue, the CIA appears to have been correct.  The Office 
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of Reports and Estimates cautioned, however, that any effective opposition 
to communism in Asia would have to be differently applied to each given 
situation, rather than a single strategic plan.  For the CIA, the threats from 
the communist movement posed unique vulnerabilities to the security of the 
local government of southern Korea.
559
 
Assessments issued in August 1949 again touched on the 
consequences of withdrawing direct support from southern Korea, 
highlighting the dangerous situation in northern Korea.  ‗Development of 
internal security forces and a Peoples Army was a matter of first priority,‘ 
the Office of Reports and Estimates warned.  In contrast to the security 
vacuum in southern Korea, an ORE memorandum pointed out that Soviet 
troops were not withdrawn until the security forces were considered 
sufficiently trained and that this Soviet trained and equipped People‘s 
Army had an estimated strength of 56,000 and was expanding.  Combined 
with the 57,000 strong internal security forces, the CIA believed that North 
Korean armed forces could not only repel an invasion from South Korea 
but, with assistance from its communist allies, conduct a successful 
offensive action against the defenses of southern Korea.
560
  The CIA 
followed up on this assessment by pointing to the extent of Soviet 
involvement in Asia: 
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The USSR, its satellites, and other 
―advanced‖ Communist Parties assist the 
local Communist organizations through 
diplomatic missions, trade delegations, 
propaganda and ―cultural‖ activity, 
international organizations (labor, women‘s, 
youth), and by providing financial assistance, 
organizational specialists, advisers, and in 
some cases weapons.
561
 
 
 By 1950, these types of assessments were becoming more frequent, 
but analysts were also finding it increasingly difficult to offer strategic 
forecasts.  The Agency reported in January that North Korean military 
strength had been ‗further bolstered by the assignment of tanks and heavy 
field guns to units in the thirty-eighth parallel zone and by the development 
of North Korean air capabilities,‘ but considered the possibility of an 
invasion unlikely unless the North Korean forces could develop a ‗clear-cut 
superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.‘  The report 
went on to state that the continuing southward movements of the expanding 
Korean People‘s Army toward the 38th Parallel probably constituted a 
‗defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded 
South Korean Army.‘562  Here, the inconsistencies regarding the Sino-
Soviet question begin to surface.  As central intelligence saw it, the North 
Korean army would be acting independently of Communist China, and the 
Chinese, independently of the Soviets.  Washington remained unclear 
whether Kim Il Sung sought the Kremlin‘s support, or whether North 
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Korea‘s dictator was taking orders from Stalin.563  The Pentagon shared 
these uncertainties.  However, the Pentagon was focused on Western 
Europe and likely to support any evidence that might suggest South Korea 
no longer required military assistance.   
A week before the June invasion, the CIA submitted a timely report 
entitled ―Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime‖ that warned 
that the North Korean Communists could take Seoul in a short decisive 
war.  This threat was placed within the following context: indigenous 
leadership, organization of the government and its party organization, 
methods of Soviet control, effectiveness of the political system, current 
situation of the economy, and North Korea‘s military capabilities and 
operations against Southern Korea.  Here, the report argued that North 
Korea‘s armed forces had the capability for attaining ‗limited objectives‘ in 
short-term military attacks against South Korea and its capital, Seoul.  The 
report concluded, however, that North Korea‘s capability for long-term 
military operations were still ‗dependent upon increased logistical support 
from the USSR.‘  The report was replete with limitations on Soviet 
intentions, arguing that the Soviet Union‘s strategic concern in Korea was 
positional and that it would be ‗restrained from using its troops by the fear 
of general war,‘ surmising that the USSR would ‗militate against 
sanctioning the use of regular Chinese Communist military units except as 
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a last resort.‘  This was not to imply, however, that these constraints meant 
that the North Korean regime was not capable in the ‗pursuit of its major 
external aim of extending control over southern Korea.‘564   
Just two days before the invasion of South Korea, DCI Hillenkoetter 
opened his agency to a litany of reproaches by reporting before a secret 
hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that there was no 
particular world crisis at hand.  Hillenkoetter‘s only cautionary remarks 
dealt with the ongoing conflicts between the CIA and other government 
agencies.  The Washington Post‘s correspondent Drew Pearson reported on 
June 29, 1950, two days before the Korean attack, that the CIA stated, ‗not 
since V-J Day had the world seemed more peaceful.‘565  In retrospect, 
Hillenkoetter should have kept his optimism closer to the cuff.   
Clearly, the DCI‘s remarks to the House Committee were 
inconsistent and did not accurately reflect the more pragmatic assessments 
the CIA issued to policymakers.   Even so, Hillenkoetter‘s comments 
merely reflected his lack of knowledge of North Korean plans to invade 
within the next few days.  His optimistic view was not an indication that the 
situation in Korea was not still a looming security crisis.   
 Harry A. Rositzke points out that, as an occasional political patsy 
for the President, ―it is part of the CIA director‘s job to be the fall guy for 
the President.‖566  Berkowitz and Goodman argue that, despite the many 
documented successes of the intelligence community, ―there is, with just a 
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few exceptions, scarcely a positive mention of a Director of Central 
Intelligence in such books.  Usually the DCI or CIA is mentioned in the 
context of an unsuccessful intelligence operation or the failure of the 
intelligence community to anticipate events.‖567  However, Truman‘s letter 
of farewell to Hillenkoetter seems to make clear his lukewarm attitude 
towards the CIA director:  ―So I say to you as you return to active service 
with the Navy:  Well done.‖568 
 During Hillenkoetter‘s final months at the CIA, analysts had 
repeatedly expressed concern about the fluidity and volatility of the border 
and reported that both sides took considerable risks by conducting a series 
of raids along the 38
th
 Parallel.  Truman‘s memoirs state that throughout 
spring 1949 the Central Intelligence Agency reported that the North 
Koreans might ‗at any time decide to change from isolated raids to a full-
scale attack.‘569  These border conditions created many questions about 
what calculated risks might be acceptable, even though these frequent 
skirmishes across the border could amount to nothing more than ‗guerilla 
scale clashes.‘570  The difference, however, was that South Korea had no 
immediate plans for an invasion of the North.  The CIA believed (as did 
Washington) that these skirmishes were not necessarily an indication of a 
larger military threat.   
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 John Lewis Gaddis addresses this difficulty of predicting such a 
shift from the pervasive hostilities that were so frequent along the 38
th
 
Parallel. It is difficult to see, Gaddis reasons, ‗how anyone in Seoul, Tokyo, 
or Washington could have been certain that one more such incursion from 
the south would provoke a massive invasion from the north.‘571  Historian 
James McDonald also weighs in on the difficulty facing the CIA. 
‗Sometimes, indications of a possible attack ebb and flow for weeks or 
months without an actual outbreak of hostilities.  This erodes credibility if 
repeated warnings prove wrong-the ―cry wolf syndrome‖-and may inure 
officials and policymakers to warning indicators that do actually predict 
hostilities.‘572  Alexander George insists that while high-confidence 
warning is desirable, ‗often it is not available.‘  But, he argues, ‗neither is 
high-confidence warning always necessary for making useful responses to 
the possibility of an emerging crisis.‘573    
 Phillip C. Jessup, a senior State Department official, called attention 
to the difficulty the CIA had in predicting the timing of an invasion, 
pointing to the constant fighting between the North and South Korean 
armies:  ‗There are very real battles involving perhaps one or two thousand 
men.  When you go to this boundary, as I did… you see troop movements, 
fortifications, and prisoners of war.‘574  Furthermore, not even high-level 
interception of information in the Kremlin could have helped the CIA since 
nothing suggests that even Stalin had any foreknowledge of the exact 
timing of the invasion.  In short, intelligence could not always be as 
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straightforward as policymakers would have liked.  Intelligence, by its very 
nature, can never be complete.  In any event, given its current Far East 
policy and the fact that the crisis appeared to be in a continual state of flux, 
Washington was unlikely to change course.  In fact, policymakers were still 
calling for plans to reduce US military advisors in the Republic of Korea, 
just two days before the invasion.
575
 
 Brewster Denny argues that information by the intelligence 
producer must not only be ‗accurate, relevant, responsive and timely, it 
must often be attention getting as well.‘576  But even without a clear 
prediction, the CIA had given enough information to keep Washington 
from being completely taken by surprise.
577
  To be sure, clues were given—
some ambiguous, but many were direct.  Reflecting on Washington‘s 
perception of the situation in Korea, Acheson wrote that in June 1950, 
‗Korea did not seem the most likely trouble point.‘578  Furthermore, none of 
the NSC documents recognized a need for US military presence in 
Korea.
579
  Immediately before the invasion of South Korea, ‗Washington 
was making light of the crisis in Korea and completely ignoring its urgency 
from the viewpoint of military strategy.‘580   
Even General Douglas MacArthur, one of America‘s most revered 
military commanders at the time, miscalculated the risks taken in Korea.  
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Paul Nitze notes that the intelligence originating from General MacArthur‘s 
headquarters in Tokyo hinted at ‗nothing to provoke undue worry or alarm 
over an impending invasion.‘581  Beyond this, MacArthur made three 
erroneous calculations.  First, that the North Korean army did not have 
designs for the conquest of the entire Korean Peninsula; second, that the 
Kremlin was the mastermind behind North Korea‘s actions; and third, that 
the Republic of Korea could repulse the communist incursion and 
ultimately achieve victory.
582
   
It has even been argued that the US was taken by surprise because 
Douglas MacArthur‘s G2 intelligence services in the Asian theater failed 
not only to predict the attack but ‗grossly underestimated‘ the North 
Koreans.
583
  Richard Aldrich, perhaps more fairly, points out that 
MacArthur was ‗weak on intelligence‘ and simply not up to the job.584  
There remains little doubt that the Truman administration was also ill- 
informed, in large part, because the military advisors failed to keep the 
White House informed.  Yet Army intelligence continued to dominate 
intelligence operations in the Far East because the commander refused to 
allow the CIA to operate in the region.  It also seems that the CIA‘s more 
pragmatic assessments of the Far East were muffled because MacArthur‘s 
optimistic intelligence was so contagious to policymakers. 
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The Invasion 
 
American intelligence was aware that 
conditions existed in Korea that could have 
meant an invasion this week or the next.—
Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter (in testimony 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
20 July 1950)
585
 
 
The crisis in Korea boiled over at 4:40 on Sunday morning, June 25, 
1950.  After a two-hour artillery bombardment, North Korea‘s Secretary 
General, Kim Il-Sung ordered approximately 135,000 troops across the 38
th
 
parallel.  The attack was devastating.  The meager defenses of South 
Korea‘s 38,000 troops were out-manned, out-gunned and in full retreat 
within hours of the assault.  The invading army captured Seoul on the 
afternoon of June 28 and had all but secured its goal of dissolving Rhee‘s 
government.  The situation in South Korea appeared hopeless without 
swift, decisive action from the West.   
On the morning of the invasion, US policy officials scrambled to 
pin a response to the unfolding crisis.  When Dean Acheson heard the 
news, the Secretary of State seemed certain that Korea was the vanguard 
battleground for World War Three:
586
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I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed 
to fall, Communist leaders would be 
emboldened to override nations closer to our 
own shores…if this was allowed to go 
unchallenged it would mean a third world 
war.  If we let Korea down the Soviets will 
keep right on going and swallow up one piece 
of Asia after another.  We had to make a 
stand some time or else let all of Asia go by 
the board.  If we were to let Asia go, the Near 
East would collapse and no telling what 
would happen in Europe.
587
 
   
 The President was on vacation with his family in Independence, 
Missouri when Secretary Acheson phoned to inform him that the North 
Koreans had launched a full-scale invasion.  ‗The attack upon Korea,‘ 
Truman stated, ‗makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has 
passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and 
will now use armed invasion and war.‘588  Gabriella Heichal brings 
attention to the White House‘s approach to the crisis.  The President‘s 
initial reaction, she argues, was the result of ‗treating the threat involved in 
global concepts, instead of the sub-systemic regional and hence localized 
level.‘589   This suggests why Truman might have believed that any 
communist threat had to be Soviet driven.   
The President was not alone in his belief that Korea would spiral 
from a civil conflict into a global war.  US policymakers and the military 
establishment assumed ‗any outbreak around the containment periphery 
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would [be] the opening battle of a global Soviet-American war.‘590  Later 
that evening, the President met with his top advisors at the Blair House.  
(The President and his family lived at the Blair House from 1949 to 1952 
during which time repairs were being made to the White House).  The 
meeting concluded that the attack on South Korea was not an isolated 
incident.  They feared that the attack was a clear indication of a pattern of 
aggression under ‗a general international Communist plan.‘591  The 
Department of the Army shared this opinion.  In view of the swift 
American response in June 1950, the US Army believed it ‗most probable‘ 
that retaliatory Soviet action might be taken against Japan (the gem of 
Asia) or South Korea.
592
   
Washington‘s official response was anything but irresolute or 
circuitous.  Standing security priorities were ultimately sidelined.  President 
Truman was not looking at whether he should intervene, but rather at how 
South Korea could be saved.  The question of how was strewn with 
political pitfalls.  Without consulting Congress, the President ordered 
America‘s ‗over-stretched forces‘ to the Far East on June 27, 1950.593  
These sudden reactions to the invasion further highlight the importance of 
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the CIA‘s position as a guiding hand during the early stages of the crisis.  
Compared to most of the Agency‘s earlier assessments, the immediate 
conclusions drawn by policymakers were more extreme and appear 
panicked. 
The CIA responded to the invasion with a warning that success in 
Korea might encourage the Soviet Union to launch similar military 
ventures in the region if the Kremlin believed that ‗no firm or effective 
countermeasures would be taken by the West.‘  However, the report 
ultimately concluded that the Kremlin was not willing to undertake a global 
war at the time.
594
  According to analysts, a firm US response in Korea was 
not likely to be met with a direct Soviet counter assault.  In fact, firmness 
and determination in Korea could provide the United States with an 
opportunity to ‗unmask important Soviet weaknesses‘ and dispel the 
‗popular ideas of Soviet power‘ that had been ‗grossly exaggerated as a 
result of recent Soviet political and propaganda successes.‘595  This position 
offered a measure of restraint without deviating from the official position of 
resolve the United States had taken.  In no uncertain terms, the analysis also 
questioned the political and military value of the recent Soviet successes 
that had caused such alarm in Washington. 
Two days later, the CIA offered further reassurance that, although 
the Kremlin might exploit other areas of the world, the Soviets were not 
seeking a larger conflict.  No evidence was available that indicated Soviet 
preparations for military operations in the West European theatre, although 
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analysts included a caveat:  ‗…Soviet military capabilities in Europe make 
it possible for the USSR to take aggressive action with a minimum of 
preparation or advance notice.‘596 
 
 
Midway Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that, despite any inconsistencies and, 
at times, the paucity of specific, detailed information, the Central 
Intelligence Agency‘s assessments were remarkably perceptive during the 
early stages of the crisis in the Far East.  According to analysts, the Soviet 
Union was cautious about extending military action beyond Korea and even 
apprehensive about rousing the United States‘ support for its Korean 
ally.
597
  The CIA seemed to understand that, at the time of the invasion, 
Stalin hoped that any Communist gains could be carried out with minimal 
risk to the Soviet Union.  Like the Berlin crisis, the Agency‘s analytical 
branch appears to have been good at the broad intelligence problem of 
whether the USSR had substantial capabilities for initiating hostilities 
elsewhere.  Moreover, the published intelligence reports never proposed a 
zero-sum approach nor suggested aggressive posturing against the Soviet 
Union, nor did its reports seem to convey a sense of panic. Instead, analysts 
repeatedly called for firmness, coupled with restraint and caution, while, at 
the same time, warning policy leaders of the dangers of sidelining security 
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interests in the region.  On the larger issue of global war, the Agency‘s 
position that the June invasion was not indicative of a larger military 
conflict was remarkably accurate. 
Historians‘ subsequent views have tended to endorse the 
perceptiveness of this broad analysis.  Edward Acton, for example, suggests 
that as a ‗relatively passive beneficiary of post-war upheaval,‘ Moscow‘s 
designs in Asia were far more cautious and less calculated than US policy 
officials initially believed.
598
  Similarly, Kathryn Weathersby points out 
that Moscow was most concerned about a solution whereby it could protect 
its interests.  The invasion of South Korea simply presented the Soviet 
leadership with an indirect means by which (it believed) it could create a 
unified government on the Korean peninsula that was friendly to Soviet 
interests.
599
 
After carefully considering the political context and examining the 
daily, weekly and ad hoc intelligence reports, it becomes clearer that the 
invasion of South Korea was not as great of an ―intelligence surprise‖ as a 
number of historians suggest.  Unlike the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 
intelligence described North Korea‘s forces, pointing to superiority in 
armor, heavy artillery, aircraft, and equipped units of the ―People‘s Army‖ 
being deployed southward toward the 38
th
 Parallel.
600
  The reports issued 
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by the CIA show that the warnings offered should have been sufficient to 
capture the attention of policymakers.  In a testimony by John D. Hikerson, 
Assistant Secretary of State, it was revealed that warnings about the 
invasion had been received.  Hikerson commented, ‗We knew…they had 
the capability and that certain preparations had been made, but we did not 
know when the attack was coming.‘601   
Furthermore, many of the CIA‘s reports leading up to the outbreak 
of the war were positioned as a corrective tool for decision-making by 
defining the limits on what security threats America faced and by asserting 
that the Soviet Union did not desire any large-scale military action outside 
the Korean peninsula.  The Agency‘s paradigm of restraint helped 
policymakers to focus on the unfolding crisis and checked growing fears of 
a wider military conflict in Western Europe and other areas of the world.  
As the crises unfolded, it seamed to reason that if the Soviets could achieve 
success in Korea, then it could happen in Europe or other areas of the 
world.  Simply put, if the American leadership had been unable to assess 
Moscow‘s appetite for risk, then the danger of reactive policy-making 
might have been significantly elevated.  After all, it was the Korean War 
which stimulated the transformation of NATO into a standing military 
alliance rather than just a promise to go to the aid of Europe in the event of 
a Soviet attack.  Moreover, the North Korean attack had a profound effect 
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on American calculations of risk in areas far away from the Korean 
Peninsula.  Given all of this, the CIA‘s guiding hand during these early 
months of the crisis should not be dismissed.  
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Chapter VI 
Fumbling the Far East 
 
[Being DCI] is one of those jobs where one 
can never be right as the American people 
expect the incumbent to be able to predict 
with accuracy just what Stalin is likely to do 
three months from today at 5.30 a.m. and, of 
course, that is beyond the realm of human 
infallibility.  Furthermore, whenever there is 
a failure, everybody begins to shriek 
―intelligence.‖—Walter Bedell Smith602  
 
Preface 
The unprovoked attack on South Korea by the Soviet-controlled 
North Korean army opened a new phase in the power conflict between the 
East and West.  Within days of North Korea‘s invasion across the 38th 
Parallel, it appeared that the communist army was capable of taking South 
Korea out of the fight before it could be adequately reinforced.  After the 
rapid fall of Seoul, South Korea‘s tactical position sharply deteriorated.  
There was acute concern from Washington that North Korea would succeed 
in its ultimate objective of reunification.  Even more troubling, both China 
and the Soviet Union stood to gain immediate advantages from a successful 
intervention, despite the grave risks associated with such a venture. 
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But by June 30, 1950, sixteen countries had committed military 
forces in a ―police action‖ on behalf of the UN for the defense of South 
Korea.
603
  The US was the first of the North Atlantic powers to mobilize its 
military strength to deter the open communist aggression, with the first 
combat troops arriving on July 1.  The American forces, under the 
command of Lieutenant General Walton Harris Walker, set up a series of 
costly delay tactics to halt the advance until a perimeter of defense could be 
established.
604
  From July 12-23, North Korea‘s 3rd and 4th Divisions routed 
the US 24
th
 Infantry Division, captured most of its equipment, and took its 
commander, Major General William F. Dean, as prisoner.
605
  The 
communist offensive also captured the city of Yongdong and the South 
Korean city, Taejon.  From July 24-25, North Korea‘s 3rd Division defeated 
the 5
th
 and 8
th
 Calvary Regiments.  Simultaneously, the 6
th
 Division 
descended down the West Coast, capturing Chongju and murdering the 
city‘s civil servants.  Most alarmingly, the 6th Division had outflanked the 
US Eighth Army in an attempt to reach the cordon sanitaire of Pusan and 
cut off all UN forces in Korea.   
North Korea‘s offensive dealt a significant blow to early US 
optimism.
606
  The virtual collapse of non-communist resistance raised a 
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number of problems to US security.  Intelligence warned that a prolonged 
battle in South Korea now seemed probable.  Remaining steadfast in its 
global assessment, however, the CIA pointed out that while there were a 
number of areas that showed mounting signs of impending military action 
during the ‗limited war‘ phase of Korea, Soviet objectives were limited to 
the support of the North Korean forces‘ efforts to bring about the 
unification of Korea, rather than to provoke a global war involving the 
United States.
607
   
With the defeat of communist forces in Korea far from a foregone 
conclusion, Truman and his top advisors were forced to reshuffle policy 
priorities to include not just creating a cooperative partnership with German 
and Japanese powers but to cast a wider policy net across the Far East.
608
  
Much of Washington viewed the North Korean aggression as a dangerous 
action that threatened world peace and stability.  Even without resorting to 
a direct military conflict, the attack on South Korea had shown that it was 
possible for the Soviet Union to weaken the United State‘s strategic 
position.  Policymakers were desperate to prevent further catastrophes and 
to contain the conflict in Korea.  However, as argued in the previous 
chapter, US policy was mired in misperceptions about the region and its 
importance (symbolic and strategic) to the spread of communism in the Far 
East. 
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Questions and Thesis Statement 
 Like the previous chapters, this segment will examine how well the 
CIA read Soviet intentions and how effectively it read the crisis, as well as 
the accuracy of its warnings and assessments.  In particular, this component 
of the case study will examine what the Central Intelligence Agency was 
saying to US policy makers and its place in the decision-making process, 
showing that Truman and his policy circle continued to look to CIA 
assessments for explicit warnings and for candid assessments that would 
shed more light on the rapidly unfolding crisis.  The CIA was charged with 
providing estimates on a number of critical situations during different 
phases of the war, including:  1) the threat of full-scale Chinese Communist 
intervention in Korea, 2) the threat of Soviet intervention in Korea, and 3) 
general Soviet and Chinese Communist intentions and capabilities in the 
Far East and elsewhere in the world. 
The chapter will examine the war in Korea from the June invasion 
to the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur in April 1951, dividing this 
period of the crisis into two chronologically distinct decisional phases:  (1) 
Should UN forces halt their advance at the 38
th
 Parallel or unify Korea by 
force?  (2) Having decided that question, to then determine possible long-
term consequences.  This study will examine the question of crossing the 
38
th
 Parallel first.  This phase (25 June-1 October) represented a shift of US 
policy—from one of resisting the aggression in South Korea to one of 
rolling back the North Korean army, with the goal being the unification of 
an independent Korea.   
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MacArthur‘s successful challenge to communist military strategy 
and a string of UN military successes marked a particularly acute period of 
the crisis.   This second phase (1 October–27 November) witnessed the 
virtual elimination of the North Korean army and raised the question of 
whether UN forces should shed the burden of tactical constraints and 
exploit the opportunity to reunifying the Korean Peninsula.  The 
reunification of the peninsula carried immense risks, but the benefits were 
tempting.  For Washington, success might guarantee a bastion of 
democracy that would serve as a clear warning against future Korea-type 
ventures.  The current administration was uncertain, however, about how 
the communist leadership would perceive US actions in Korea.  This 
uncertainty hinged largely on the misperception of the communist client-
patron relationship—that Peiping and the Kremlin were hand in glove and 
that Chinese Communist plans were fully coordinated with the USSR.
609
  It 
was believed by the CIA that the Peiping government was unlikely to 
commit military forces to operations beyond China on its own initiative, 
but would almost certainly comply with a Soviet request for military action.  
Given the vast differences in culture and that communism had not been 
imposed on China from the outside, however, common ideology between 
the Soviet Union and Communist China was, as Walter Laqueur points out, 
‗naively overrated as a cohesive factor.‘610   
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While the CIA was better suited as a type of barometer for whether 
the communist leadership had intentions of provoking a general war and for 
placing this threat in a more manageable perspective, it was less 
comfortable with detailed information and assessing more specific threats 
during the war.  The chapter will show that the CIA‘s calm voice had 
stretched past its point of usefulness once hostilities escalated.  Its reports 
that had urged restraint and moderation months earlier were now partly 
responsible for miscalculations in the Far East.  In fact, by keeping the 
question of a threat of a global war on the front burner, the CIA ultimately 
failed to give credence to the mounting evidence on the ground that pointed 
to an escalation of hostilities.  This flawed view clouded the Agency‘s 
ability to better understand the intentions of communist leaders. 
The positions taken in this section of the case study challenge the 
conventional wisdom to a lesser degree than the previous chapter.  
Nonetheless, the study fills an important gap in the historiography.  This 
segment is analogous to the previous chapter in that it will demonstrate that 
the CIA‘s role in the decision-making process should not be packaged too 
neatly.  By looking beyond the issue of who was right or wrong, the 
complexity of what the CIA was reporting to policymakers comes into 
better focus.  The widely accepted view correctly asserts that the CIA fell 
short in its task of informing policymakers of the strategic and political 
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dangers after the June invasion of South Korea.
611
  In other words, the 
Agency‘s mindset about the war in Korea, beyond its broad intelligence 
assessments about the possibility of a global conflict, was flawed.  
Therefore, it is important to look at why the CIA fell short in its analytical 
role following the communist invasion of South Korea.   
 
 
Recent Views 
Although the most credible accounts of the CIA‘s early history offer 
explanations that provide real insight, there is still room for throwing 
further light on the complexities and inconsistencies of the crisis in Korea.  
For instance, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones‘ examination of the disconnect between 
the CIA and policymakers suggests that because Truman and his advisors 
were too preoccupied with other problems, like the defense of Formosa, 
and too impatient to read intelligence reports carefully, they were ‗deaf‘ to 
important signals from intelligence.
612
  His observation is not without 
merit, but only offers a partial explanation of the CIA‘s problems during 
the crisis.    
Richard K. Betts offers a more theoretical position, and though 
thought-provoking like Jeffreys-Jones, his position does not cover quite 
enough ground to resolve the policy-intelligence questions during the crisis.   
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By the narrower definition of intelligence, 
there have been few major failures.  In most 
cases of mistakes in predicting attacks or in 
assessing operations, the inadequacy of 
critical data or their submergence in a viscous 
bureaucracy were at best the proximate 
causes of failure.  The ultimate causes of 
error in most cases have been wishful 
thinking, cavalier disregard of professional 
analysts and, above all, the premises and 
preconceptions of policymakers.
613
 
   
The Central Intelligence Agency was responsible for providing 
intelligence on a number of important issues, including:  Would the Soviet 
Union attack?  Was Korea the staging ground for a broader global 
offensive?  These questions that had preoccupied US policy officials before 
the invasion were no longer enough to address the uncertainties of the war.  
However, the CIA‘s mental image of the communist threat in the Far East 
was not exceptionally flexible; and like policymakers in Washington, clung 
to the simplistic view that Peiping was taking orders from Moscow.  
Although intelligence analysts (and policymakers) held the view that 
Moscow and Peiping were motivated by a shared ideology inconsistent 
with US interests, the Agency‘s analysis of the Kremlin‘s risk-taking 
continued to be the linchpin for its estimates—principally, that any Soviet 
decision hinged on to what extent the USSR was willing to risk a global 
war.   
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This sort of inflexible mindset made it more difficult to reach clear, 
accurate conclusions, particularly about the magnitude of risk associated 
with extending the UN‘s offensive north of the 38th Parallel.  In simplest 
terms, the CIA failed in its assessment of the long-range implications of US 
actions in Korea.  Analysts concluded that since the Kremlin and Peiping 
had been unwilling to risk a general war previously, Moscow would 
certainly not risk broadening a civil war when the UN was militarily 
prepared to respond.  As a result, the CIA fell short in providing 
policymakers with the necessary accurate and timely information on which 
to base well-informed decisions.
614
   
Before examining the phases of the crisis, the change in the CIA‘s 
leadership must first be addressed.  The political pressures stemming from 
the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report in January 1949 had turned the 
intelligence agency into a ‗political football.‘615  A common perception in 
Washington was that Hillenkoetter no longer held Truman‘s confidence.616  
In fact, Harry Truman had begun looking for someone who could 
successfully replace Roscoe Hillenkoetter as the director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.  Smith did not replace Hillenkoetter until a year after 
his selection‒the same day UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel.  The 
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President nominated ―America‘s bulldog,‖ Lieutenant General Walter 
Bedell Smith, announcing in mid-August that he had found a capable and 
experienced replacement for Hillenkoetter.
617
  Well before the soldier-
diplomat took over at CIA headquarters, he was already considered to be a 
Washington insider who shared the President‘s foreign policy position.  
Citing poor health, however, ―Beetle‖ Smith (as his friends frequently 
called him) initially declined the nomination.
618
  Yet even in a weakened 
condition, Smith could be ‗petulant, ascetic and strong tempered.‘619  
Truman admired this bluntness and his capacity for hard work and loyalty.  
He would not take ―no‖ as an answer.   
 David M. Barrett points out that Smith was ‗far more self-confident 
and shrewd than Hillenkoetter in navigating the shark-infested waters of the 
executive branch.‘620  To be sure, ‗a reputation for chutzpah also helps.‘621  
Indeed, Smith was not short of nerve, and his blunt, take-charge manner 
boosted the prestige of the Central Intelligence Agency.
622
  Stansfield 
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Turner, former DCI and author of Secrecy and Democracy, argues that as a 
relatively apolitical DCI, Smith maintained a higher degree of credibility 
with the State Department and the Executive because his advice was more 
impartial to partisan politics and lacked a political agenda.
623
 
 No less important for the CIA, was the fact that Smith was a skilled 
organizational man.  During his tenure, he established three new branches 
of the CIA:  the Office for National Estimates (ONE) specifically dedicated 
to producing national estimates, the Office for Research and Reports 
(ORR), and in 1952, the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI).
624
  In addition, 
the newly established Board of Estimates (BOE) set the procedures for the 
estimative process that lasted over two decades.  ‗Though criticized for 
producing current intelligence and neglecting estimates,‘ Charles 
Ameringer argues, ‗the truth was that the ORE did a good job and filled a 
role that the State Department‘s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], 
as successor to the Research and Analysis branch of the OSS, was supposed 
to play but did not.  Nonetheless, the perception of the CIA‘s failure to 
predict the invasion in June 1950 caused Hillenkoetter‘s successor, General 
Walter Bedell Smith, to bring to an end the Office of Reports and Estimates 
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and replace it with the Office of National Estimates (ONE) and the Office 
of Research and Reports (ORR).‘625 
 
 
The 38
th
 Parallel:  A Shifting Line in the Sand 
 
We do not believe in aggressive or preventive 
war.  Such war is the weapon of dictators, not 
of free democratic countries like the United 
States.—President Harry S. Truman626 
 
Although the US President viewed any undesired consequences 
arising from his decision with trepidation, the decision to expand the war 
across the 38
th
 Parallel (to include the reunification of the Korea) was a 
pivotal event of the war, representing a gap between well-meant intentions 
and anticipated consequences.  Reflecting on this decision, Truman wrote:  
‗There was no doubt in my mind that we should not allow the action in 
Korea to extend into a general war.  All-out military action against China 
had to be avoided, if for no other reason than because it was a gigantic 
booby trap.‘627  What compounded matters, though, was that the United 
States‘ inability to understand the dynamics between the communist leaders 
failed to improve after the June invasion.  Washington failed to appreciate 
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that the Chinese Communist government, like the North Korean regime, 
had its own agendas, despite the Kremlin‘s attempt to control events.  
Kathryn Weathersby notes that, although the Soviet leadership maintained 
‗close supervision‘ over developments in Korea, intervention was a 
reluctant risk taken by both Stalin and Mao.  Stalin feared a punishing 
response from the American military, but his advisors reassured him that a 
rapid victory would prevent such an American response, ultimately 
believing their actions would not provoke an open confrontation.   
Like Stalin, Mao was reluctant to intervene and showed signs of 
cold feet when it came down to the final order.  In fact, it wasn‘t until 
Stalin could guarantee Soviet military assistance that Mao agreed to 
proceed in Korea.  In a manner not unlike Weathersby, Robert M. Clark 
attempts to address the nuances of Washington‘s misunderstanding of the 
Sino-Soviet relationship.
628
  Offering a neatly packaged argument, Clark 
asserts that Moscow opposed Chinese intervention because ‗of fear that it 
could lead to a general war involving the USSR.  The US mindset of Soviet 
decision-making supremacy‘ he adds, ‗was abetted by the failure of the 
CIA to consider the multidisciplinary factors that led to both invasions.  
Cultural, historical, and nationalistic factors in fact dominated North 
Korean and Chinese decision-making.  The CIA analyses took none of this 
into account.‘629 
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In the spring of 1950, Stalin‘s policy had taken an ‗abrupt turn.‘  By 
this point, Moscow had approved Kim‘s plan to reunify the Korean 
Peninsula by military means and to provide material support.  Weathersby 
points out that Moscow ultimately considered it ‗vital for the security of the 
Soviet Far East that Korea not be in hostile hands.‘630  Policymakers 
believed that the Soviet Union would not sanction the use of Soviet or 
Chinese Communist troops if faced with a UN victory.   
US leadership was also troubled by uncertainty about Communist 
China‘s intentions:  Would the advance of UN troops to the Yalu River, the 
border between Korea and Manchuria, provoke a Soviet or Chinese 
intervention?  Would China accept a line of demarcation between the UN 
command and Manchuria?
631
  Based on recently available Chinese sources, 
historian Jien Chen‘s work argues that although Mao Tse-tung may have 
possessed private reservations, he had intended to intervene in the Korean 
War all along.  The newly established regime, Chen states, faced enormous 
problems, including ‗achieving political consolidation, rebuilding a war-
shattered economy, and finishing reunification of the country.‘  
Furthermore, Mao‘s decision to enter the war was about more than 
protecting Chinese borders.  Because Peiping‘s decision to enter the war 
was ‗based on the belief that the outcome of the Korean crisis was closely 
related to the new China‘s vital domestic and international interests,‘ there 
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was little possibility that China‘s entrance could have been averted.632  As 
far as Chinese methods in Asia were concerned, the CIA had believed for 
some time that communist successes in China had greatly contributed to the 
confidence of the northern Korean regime and had ‗increased the fear in 
southern Korea that eventual Communist domination is inevitable.‘633 
Many Western diplomats considered the probability of Chinese 
intervention to be quite high.
634
  The State Department feared any operation 
north of the 38
th
 Parallel might ‗needlessly risk drawing Soviet or Chinese 
Communist forces into either general or local conflict with forces 
supporting the UN.‘635  However, the Secretary Acheson believed that the 
Chinese leadership could be reassured that US intentions in Korea were 
benign.  If the US sent the correct signals, then Communist China would 
remain calm—even in the face of the approaching UN army.636  It appears 
that Washington believed that US intentions were as clear to others as it 
was to them.  In fact, the State Department did little more than attempt to 
reassure Peiping that the UN was fighting ‗solely for the purpose of 
restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion.‘637  
Reflecting on his efforts to assure Communist China of US restraint, 
Acheson declared: 
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No possible shred of evidence could have 
existed in the minds of Chinese Communist 
authorities about the intentions of the forces 
of the United Nations.  Repeatedly and from 
the very beginning of the action it had been 
made clear that the sole mission of the United 
Nations was to repel the aggressors and to 
restore to the people of Korea their 
independence.
638
 
 
This attempt at diplomacy, of course, fell short in lessening Chinese 
anxieties.  In the end, this unguarded optimism was betrayed by ‗a 
curiously naïve faith in the currency of his own verbal assurances.‘639  
A June 28 intelligence memorandum was quick to point out that the 
USSR was not yet prepared to risk full-scale war with the Western Powers 
and it was expected, therefore, that the Soviet Union would seek to localize 
the Korean conflict.  According to the memo, the USSR would adopt a less 
provocative action to achieve its aims, most likely by ‗providing support to 
North Korea short of open participation by Soviet forces in an attempt to 
perpetuate the civil war and maintain North Korean positions south of the 
38
th
 Parallel.‘  In the eyes of the CIA, communist activity would probably 
be intensified, but that greater care would be taken to maintain the fiction 
that it is ‗indigenous.‘640  The Agency‘s earliest reports pertaining to the 
38
th
 Parallel were submitted during the final months of Hillenkoetter‘s 
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leadership.  On this issue, analysts offered some relatively perceptive 
assessments suggesting Stalin was in the difficult place of weighing Soviet 
strategic concerns against possible US actions.  These reports were 
significant because the United States already had forces committed in 
Korea.  On July 4, analysts cited several reasons why Communist China 
might not intervene if UN troops continued to advance north.  First, 
Chinese intervention would not necessarily prevent a defeat of North 
Korea.  Second, a communist victory in Korea would seriously threaten 
Soviet control over Mao‘s regime in the following ways: 
  
The presence of Chinese Communist troops 
in Korea would complicate if not jeopardize 
Soviet direction of Korean affairs; Chinese 
Communist prestige, as opposed to that of the 
USSR, would be enhanced; and Peiping 
might be tempted as a result of success in 
Korea to challenge Soviet leadership in 
Asia.
641
 
  
 On the subject of a more general threat, an intelligence 
memorandum issued on July 8 advised Washington that the Soviet 
Union would, at least in the short run: 
 
probably localize the Korean fighting, still 
refrain from creating similar incidents 
elsewhere, but in order to prolong US 
involvement in Korea, give increasing 
material aid to the north Koreans, perhaps 
employing Chinese Communist troops, either 
covertly or overtly.  The USSR would remain 
uncommitted in Korea and would develop the 
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propaganda themes of US aggression and 
imperialistic interference in domestic affairs 
of an Asiatic nation.
642
 
 
 As for Soviet involvement, Kathryn Weathersby points out the 
overriding factor that may have accounted for the sharp departure of Soviet 
policy toward Korea—Stalin was fearful of the PRC not allying itself with 
the Soviet Union.  The relationship that developed out of this fear, she 
argues, had a significant hand in shaping the Soviet leader‘s decision to 
support China: 
 
…If Stalin were to refuse to support Kim Il 
Sung‘s perfectly reasonable goal of 
reunifying his country, which was 
comparable to what Mao had just 
accomplished in China, then Stalin would 
again be open to the charge of hindering the 
cause of revolution in the East.  His position 
as the leader of the communist camp would 
be weakened while the authority and prestige 
of Mao, to whom Kim would obviously turn 
and who had a blood debt to support the 
Korean communists, would rise.
643
 
 
The CIA further downplayed the risks of crossing the 38
th
 Parallel in a 
July 6 report which catalogued disadvantages for the Kremlin if 
Communist China intervened.  Analysts reasoned that the USSR desired to 
maintain ‗an official aloofness‘ because of its fear of undertaking a global 
war until the outcome of the conflict in Korea became more apparent.  ‗The 
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Chinese Communist forces are fully capable,‘ analysts advised in the Daily 
Summary, ‗of launching military operations against Taiwan, Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Southeast Asia simultaneously,‘ but were not likely to undertake 
such aggressive action unless specifically directed to do so by the 
Kremlin.
644
  Of course, this conclusion hinged on an unknown variable—
direct support from the Kremlin. 
Submitted on the heels of this Daily Summary, the Agency again issued 
an assessment of communist risk tolerance for a general war.  At the point 
when the scales would tip in favor of the United States, the report warned, 
‗the key to the fateful Soviet decision will be the extent to which the USSR 
desires to risk instigating global war.‘  Given this line of reasoning, then, 
the CIA determined that the Chinese Communists would probably not take 
any action in Korea.  So long as North Korean forces continued to advance, 
the Soviet Union would prefer to confine the conflict.  Analysts cautioned, 
however, that a reversal might impel the Soviet Union to take greater risks 
of starting a global war ‗either by committing substantial Chinese 
Communist forces in Korea or by sanctioning aggressive actions by 
Satellite forces in other areas of the world.‘  They warned that the crucial 
moment would come when and if the battle turned in favor of US and 
South Korean forces.  ‗At that time, the USSR must decide whether to 
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permit a North Korean defeat or to take whatever steps are necessary to 
prolong the action.‘645 
The CIA went on to warn that a prolonged fight in Korea could 
encourage the Soviet Union to ‗take greater risks of starting global war by 
committing substantial Chinese Communist forces in Korea….‘646  This 
report also argued that the decisiveness of the US reaction in Korea would 
cause the Kremlin to move cautiously.  Analysts added, however, that the 
danger still existed that the Soviet Union might again ‗miscalculate the 
Western reaction, adding that Chinese Communist troop strength and 
dispositions would permit military aggression in a number of places with 
little or no warning; and that these troops were sufficient to provide 
substantial support to the North Korean army.‘647  While these reports did 
not forecast any specific actions, two important observations should be 
noted:  first, the information brought to Washington‘s attention concerning 
the possible consequences of extending the conflict; second, the fact that 
analysts underscored the USSR‘s potential willingness to assume more risk 
if a communist victory in Korea should be jeopardized, although this 
information was smattered with reassurances that all available evidence 
suggested that the Soviet Union was not ready for war. 
The CIA revisited this issue of Soviet risk-taking on July 14 by 
presenting specific reasons why Stalin might view Korea as a minimal 
security risk to Soviet power.  The reasons, analysts wrote, hinged on 
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several misperceptions that Stalin held about the conflict:  First, that he 
believed UN action would be slow and cumbersome.  Second, that he 
believed that the United States wouldn‘t intervene with its own forces; and 
third, fighting could be portrayed as instigated by the US.  Based on this 
analysis, the CIA reasoned that Stalin might actually believe he was risking 
little in Korea.
648
 
A Weekly Summary issued later in July stated that North Korea 
would have committed practically all of its available organized and trained 
troops to achieve a quick victory, regardless of the risk.  Most likely, stated 
the Weekly Summary, the Northern Command had been assured of 
reinforcements.  The report suggested that such reinforcements would 
consist of no fewer than 40,000-50,000 ―Koreans‖ available in Manchuria.  
However, there was no indication at present ‗as to whether the USSR will 
risk the political disadvantages involved in committing non-Korean 
reinforcements should such a step become necessary.‘649 
In one of its most forward-looking assessments of the crisis, the 
CIA fashioned a memorandum that suggested developments in Korea might 
be more complex than originally assumed.  The paper listed four alternative 
courses of action it believed were open to the Soviet Union.  (1) The USSR 
could localize the fighting in Korea, thereby permitting US forces to drive 
north of the 38
th
 Parallel.  This course would be the most cautious.  
However, the CIA considered this course unlikely because the advantages 
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would be ‗long-range‘ and ‗intangible‘ while the disadvantages would be 
immediate.  (2) The USSR would seek to prolong the conflict in Korea by 
giving increased material aid to the North Koreans by employing Chinese 
Communist troops either covertly or overtly.  The CIA considered this 
alternative moderately cautious for the Soviet Union.  The advantages to 
this course of action were threefold:  The decision would allow the USSR 
to portray the United States as the aggressor.  This would seriously limit 
US military capabilities elsewhere in the world; and, should the conditions 
at any time appear favorable for the USSR, Soviet leaders could shift to 
creating a series of conflicts similar to Korea.  (3) In addition to prolonging 
the Korean War, the USSR might attempt to overstretch US forces by 
initiating a series of incidents similar to that in Korea.  This alternative 
course of action could be achieved, the CIA reasoned, without directly 
involving Soviet forces.  However, analysts considered this a comparatively 
unlikely direction that the USSR would take.  (4) The USSR might consider 
Korea either as a prelude to an inevitable global war or as a justification for 
beginning a global war.  The CIA stressed that nothing about the situation 
in Korea indicated that the Soviet Union was planning any actions that 
might precipitate a global war.  The report concluded, therefore, that the 
USSR would have little reason to deliberately provoke a global war at that 
time.
650
 
Beyond listing these possible contingencies the report was helpful 
in providing reasons why particular options were unattractive to Soviet 
leaders and specifically stating why option (2) was the most likely course 
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of action for the USSR.  The analysis of possible Soviet responses to the 
conflict was significant because it suggested that Stalin was not blind to the 
consequences of probing.  According to the report then, Stalin was not 
recklessly steering a course toward war, but rather was a calculating 
opportunist, albeit a misinformed one.  Perhaps most importantly, this 
particular assessment went beyond the standard intelligence report which 
merely reasoned that since the Soviet Union had not yet done anything 
brash enough to risk global war, it would most likely avoid such 
provocations with the United States in the near future. 
Within the week, another report stressed the risks of advancing 
north of the 38
th
 Parallel.  This course of action might provoke a Chinese 
intervention, the CIA wrote.  Conversely, a voluntary US withdrawal from 
Korea would probably encourage, rather than discourage Soviet initiation 
of limited wars in other areas.  The USSR would ‗proceed with limited 
aggressions similar to the Korean incident if it [the Soviet Union] did not 
estimate the risk of global war to be substantial.‘651  This report shows that 
CIA analysts believed that although the threat of global war was the only 
thing keeping the USSR at bay in other areas of the world, the USSR could 
achieve limited objectives through low-level aggression. 
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As a whole, it appeared the Soviet Union was relatively unprepared 
for a major war in 1950.  There were grounds for concern, however, 
including the Soviet nuclear energy program with a stockpile of twenty-five 
atomic bombs.  In other fields of economic or quasi-military activity, the 
USSR had been accelerating its war readiness program, notably regarding 
petroleum processing, completion of a plant conversion program, aircraft 
production, airfield construction, and the stockpiling of reserves.  These 
preparations, viewed in the light of its war readiness, argued the CIA in a 
memorandum, ‗suggest strongly that the Soviet leaders would be justified 
in assuming a substantial risk of general war during the remainder of 1950, 
arising either out of the prosecution of the Korean incident or out of the 
initiation of new local operations.‘652 
Requesting another viewpoint, Truman asked the National Security 
Council to prepare a report on the future of US policy towards North 
Korea.  The NSC made clear that the UN commander should ‗undertake no 
ground operations north of the 38
th
 parallel in the event of the occupation of 
North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces but should reoccupy 
Korea up to the 38
th
 Parallel.‘653  Geoffrey Warner points out that the junior 
members of the National Security Council staff had reached a general 
consensus in July that ‗ground operations north of 38º subsequent to the 
withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea would probably lead 
to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union and/or Communist China in 
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hostilities which might well become generalized.‘654  However, the NSC 
remained slow in fully realizing the dangers of military action north of this 
line.  A September 1 draft of NSC 81 stated, ‗It also seems unlikely that 
Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly employed in major 
units in the fighting in Southern Korea, for it is believed that neither the 
Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to engage in general 
war at this time for this objective.‘655 
A report issued the same month by the CIA again addressed the 
probability of direct Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.  Its 
assessment was based on two general assumptions:  1) Limited covert 
Chinese assistance to the North Korean army, including provisions to 
individual soldiers, was assumed to be presently in progress.  2) The 
provision of overt assistance by the Chinese would require approval by the 
Soviet government and such approval would indicate that the USSR was 
prepared to accept an increased risk of precipitating general hostilities.  
Analysts acknowledged the increase in Chinese Communist build-up of 
military strength in Manchuria (with approximately four million, Soviet-
equipped men under arms), coupled with the known potential in that area, 
an intervention in the Korean conflict was ‗well within immediate Chinese 
Communist capabilities.‘  That being stated, analysts maintained that it 
appeared more probable that the Chinese participation in Korea would be 
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more indirect and limited to integrating ―Manchurian volunteers‖ of air 
units and ground troops.
656
 
The situation in Korea had taken a turn for the worse by 
midsummer.  At this point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was concerned that the 
conflict in Korea might escalate into a global war.
657
  In the face of 
overwhelming force, UN forces withdrew to the Pusan Perimeter in the 
southeast from 25 June to 31 July.  By August 5th, the UN army was 
pinned down, leaving ninety percent of the peninsula in the hands of the 
North Korean army.  Adding to the logistical difficulties of fighting during 
the rainy season, UN troops were slow to arrive at forward areas of the 
battlefield.  The nearest combat-ready troops were stationed in Japan; and 
these units, the Army argued, were ‗seriously under strength.‘658  However, 
a cordon of defenses was soon established (from 1 August- 14 September) 
in the west along the Naktong River, allowing time for three large 
contingents of US reinforcements to arrive in Korea that prevented the 
enemy from maintaining the initiative, despite very high casualties.
659
 
 In savage fighting from August 18 to 22, two Republic of Korea 
(ROK) divisions halted three North Korean divisions in their assault down 
the eastern corridor of Pusan.  But by the end of August, the continuous 
fighting around the Pusan Perimeter was nearing a breaking point.  The US 
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Army spokesperson reported that Chinese troops were massing near the 
Korean frontier.  Six days after these reports, Secretary Acheson 
maintained that everything possible was being done to convince the 
communist regime in China that there were no American designs on 
Formosa or any other Chinese territory.  However, the US administration 
failed to appreciate that Chinese leaders would interpret the United States‘ 
actions as anything but threatening. 
 As Acheson issued reassurances to the Peiping regime, General 
MacArthur reported to the United Nations that North Korea was recruiting 
forces in Manchuria.  For MacArthur, however, the UN‘s latest foothold in 
Korea revealed an opportunity for innovation in US policy.  The US 
General told William Averall Harriman on August 6 that he did not believe 
that the Chinese Communists had any present intention of intervening 
directly in Korea.
660
   William Stueck argues that MacArthur knew NSC-81 
left open the possibility of attacks by Communist China in the event UN 
forces intervened on a large scale in Korea, yet the commander viewed the 
buildup of Chinese troops across the Yalu with ‗a degree of equanimity.‘661   
 The intelligence reports that followed in September and October 
ultimately left policy officials without any clear indications about which 
way Chinese leaders were leaning.  The first assessment in September 
followed the long-held presumption that Soviet leaders could choose their 
own time for committing to any particular course of action.  Assuming, 
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then, that the USSR had the initiative, analysts presented a number of 
widely varying scenarios and options but went no further to predict which 
course of action the Communist leadership would take.
662
  ‗These latest 
moves,‘ wrote the CIA, ‗offer few definite clues regarding future 
Communist moves….‘663 
 Similarly, the CIA discounted numerous reports of Korean veterans 
from Manchuria being deployed in the conflict.  A Weekly Summary 
pointed out that, if deployed to a forward area, these forces would have 
been utilized during the initial days of the invasion when they could have 
proved more decisive.  In addition, the ―Korean‖ combat veterans would 
have been more useful than the green recruits being brought to the front 
line.  Thus, analysts concluded that it was likely that the North Koreans 
would depend on further replacements from either:  (1) recruitment of non-
veteran Korean troops; (2) untrained manpower sources from China or the 
Soviet Union; or (3) Chinese Communist or Soviet military units to be 
employed in the defense of the 38
th
 Parallel or to drive UN forces out of 
Korea.
664
  A Weekly Summary issued a month later conflicted with this 
assessment.  Here, analysts not only argued that the loss of North Korea 
was not likely to produce any ‗immediate‘ or ‗drastic‘ Soviet reaction but 
                                                 
662
 CIA 8-50, ―Review of the World Situation,‖ 16 August 1950.  CREST, 67-00059A, 
Box 5, Folder 9, NARA. 
663
 CIA, Weekly Summary, ―Far Eastern Struggle:  Soviet Moves,‖ 1 September 1950.  
CIA Electronic Reading Room. 
664
 CIA, Weekly Summary, ―North Korean Reserves,‖ 8 September 1950.  CIA Electronic 
Reading Room.  On September 9, 1950, NSC directive 81/1 authorized General 
MacArthur‘s advance north of the 38th Parallel.  
271 
 
that the possibility of intervention by the USSR or the Chinese Communists 
diminished the longer the conflict continued.
665
 
 In early September the CIA submitted a report that considered the 
probability of the Chinese Communist government using regular and local 
ground forces as well as its air force in support of the North Korean 
invasion.  The intelligence memorandum assumed that any overt Chinese 
assistance would require approval from the Soviet Union and Soviet 
acceptance of an increased risk of general hostilities.  Although there was 
no direct evidence that the Chinese Communists would intervene directly in 
North Korea, the CIA concluded, ‗It is evident that the Chinese 
Communists or the USSR must supply trained and equipped combat 
replacements if the North Korean invasion is to achieve complete control 
over South Korea before the end of the year.‘666  This report was not 
necessarily alarming, but it should have raised concerns in Washington. 
 At the same time, the memorandum pointed to mitigating factors 
pointing against a Chinese Communist intervention; and discounting the 
USSR‘s willingness to intentionally escalate the Korean conflict from an 
‗ostensibly internal dispute‘ to an international struggle.  Analysts argued 
that the decision to commit Chinese troops would ‗significantly affect the 
Soviet position in China as well as Korea.‘  Minor factors included:  (1) 
Chinese national and military pride might cause friction if Chinese troops 
were placed under Soviet or Korean command; and, (2) intervention would 
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probably eliminate all prospects for China‘s admission to the United 
Nations.
667
  Other reasons were cited, including the belief that as China 
emerged from a protracted civil war, its people would no longer possess the 
will for a protracted fight.  Furthermore, China needed to consolidate its 
economic and human resources before it could embark on foreign military 
ventures.  Perhaps most importantly, direct involvement in Korea would 
necessitate China‘s increasing dependence on Moscow. 
At least as important as any intelligence analysis was the success of 
General MacArthur‘s amphibious landing operation at Inchon.  Truman‘s 
renewed confidence in a successful outcome was strengthened on 
September 15, 1950 when MacArthur‘s UN forces repelled North Korea‘s 
advances.  Located approximately 150 miles behind the enemy battlefront 
on South Korea‘s northwest coast, Inchon signaled the rapid disintegration 
of the North Korean army.  By September 19, UN forces had broken the 
Pusan perimeter cordon and closed in on the overextended North Koreans 
in a pincer movement that drove the enemy forces back across the 38
th
 
Parallel; and by September 26, UN forces had recaptured Seoul.
668
  
MacArthur was eager to capitalize on this battlefield success and push 
northward.  Washington was also encouraged by the news from Inchon and 
assumed a quick victory would ensue.  However, as Paul Nitze later argued, 
this initial military success ‗temporarily blinded many to the limits of our 
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available military power.‘  This shortsightedness, he argued, did not sink in 
until the Chinese intervened.
669
 
Nearly three months after beginning its military venture into the 
war-by-proxy, argued the CIA, the Soviet Union retained the strategic 
initiative to some extent in Korea and to a much greater extent globally.  
Analysts suggested that, given the fact that the USSR had been ‗vigorously 
preparing its armed forces, its economy, and its political control system for 
the eventuality of a major war,‘ any measure of US optimism should be 
guarded.  So while the Soviet Union was not yet prepared for international 
military operations designed to defeat the US and its allies, it had, 
nevertheless, steadily gained ground in Asia.
670
  
On the same day as the Inchon landing the CIA issued a report titled 
―Soviet/Communist Activity‖ that made clear the difficulty in interpreting 
the probability of overt intervention by the neighboring communist 
regimes.  Analysts cited the numerous reports and speculation concerning 
both Chinese Communist intervention and political difficulties between the 
USSR and China over military policy.  Given the sum of cogent political 
and military considerations, the CIA believed that Chinese Communist 
forces were unlikely to directly commit ground forces in Korea.  This 
general tone of optimism pleased policymakers, like Dulles, that advocated 
the elimination of the strategic boundary in Korea as a means to 
circumscribe political restraints.  Those in the Dulles camp considered the 
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complete destruction of North Korean forces and political reunification 
under the auspices of UN authority the only way to secure a lasting victory: 
  
The 38
th
 Parallel, if perpetuated as a political 
line and as providing asylum to the aggressor, 
is bound to perpetuate friction and ever-
present danger of new war.  If we have the 
opportunity to obliterate the line as a political 
division, certainly we should do so…The 
North Korean Army should be destroyed, if 
we have the power to destroy it, even if this 
requires pursuit beyond the 38
th
 Parallel.  
That is the only way to remove the 
menace.
671
  
 
Almost a month after the invasion of South Korea, Truman still 
believed it was ‗plain beyond all doubt‘ that an international communist 
movement was prepared to use armed invasion to conquer independent 
nations.
672
  Short of a disastrous turn of events or overwhelming evidence 
of such a turn on the horizon, the State Department believed that to halt at 
the 38
th
 would not make political or military sense ‗unless the risk that it 
would provoke a major clash with the Soviet Union or Communist China 
were so great as to override all other considerations.‘673  Truman weighed 
the possible consequences of extending the war further, but in the end the 
green light was given to cross the 38
th
 Parallel.
674
  The obvious flaw in this 
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line of reasoning, however, was the possibility of Soviet or Chinese 
intervention.   
In Rethinking the Korean War, William Stueck argues that had 
policymakers known the magnitude of the Chinese presence in Korea ‗they 
might well have stopped UN ground forces during the second week in 
November.‘675  However, this position suggests that Washington lacked any 
information that might have indicated the adverse consequences of the 
UN‘s advance north of the 38th Parallel on September 30, 1950.  The 
reports cited above, although often ambiguous, suggest that Stueck‘s claim 
as not fully taken into account the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency 
had warned Washington of at least the potential risks. 
Despite a number of warnings issued by intelligence, Washington 
failed to fully appreciate the risks associated with United States provoking 
a military intervention by Communist China.  This was, in part, because 
many policymakers longed for victory over communism and continued to 
view the line as ‗an artificial construct that had no saliency for an American 
public which.‘676  In any event, the decision to cross the 38th Parallel was 
made without full knowledge of what the Chinese response would be.  So, 
on September 27, 1950 General Douglas MacArthur was authorized to 
cross into North Korean territory.  This expansion of UN objectives made 
clear the course of action in Korea: 
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The UN Commander should also be 
authorized to conduct continuous roll-back 
operations against North Korean forces well 
into the northern part of the peninsula if such 
operations are necessary to the dissolution of 
the North Korean armed resistance
677
 
 
William ―Wild Bill‖ Donovan, often considered the father of 
American intelligence, believed that the fighting in Korea was about 
keeping the communists off balance—not about actual liberation.678  
Regardless of motives, at the moment of decision, the rationale for rolling 
back North Korean troops had broad appeal to the minority of men 
responsible for Far East policy.  Weighing the risks of provocation and 
success, Paul H. Nitze notes: 
 
Those who argued in favor of crossing the 
38
th
 parallel had a strong case on their side.  
A reunified Korea was a logical and desirable 
objective.  To stop at the 38
th
 parallel would 
have been tantamount to a restoration of the 
status quo ante.  The North Korean regime 
would be left in place and the Soviets would 
no doubt help it to rearm.  The threat…would 
be revived, obliging the United States, in all 
probability, to keep sizable forces in the 
south indefinitely.
679
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The Question of Chinese Intervention 
 
America‘s people expect you to be on a 
communing level with God and Joe Stalin…. 
They expect you to be able to say that a war 
will start next Tuesday at 5:32 p.m.—Walter 
Bedell Smith
680
 
  
Given the high stakes, Washington needed detailed, timely and 
accurate assessments based on specific facts.  Yet, the following segment of 
the chapter will reveal that the intelligence reports issued after the summer 
of 1950 were in line with a reading of the global picture that suggested the 
USSR and China were unwilling to risk global war by stirring a hornets‘ 
nest in Korea.  This inability to understand the rapidly unfolding and 
complex events in Korea resulted in numerous misguided assessments.  By 
this point of the crisis, the CIA‘s inflexible mindset became a liability for 
policymakers.  This is not to suggest that analysts did not caution against 
military action that might be interpreted as a direct threat to China‘s 
sovereignty and security.
681
  (Indeed, it is now clear that the Chinese 
leadership considered the advance of UN forces as a direct threat).
682
  More 
often, though, policymakers continued to receive general assessments about 
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risk-taking and rebuttals of the evidence that pointed to an escalation of the 
war. 
 Moreover, once UN forces were north of the 38
th
 Parallel, the CIA 
was slow to shift focus from the possibility of Soviet military opportunism 
outside the Korean Peninsula to whether US policy should change to reflect 
the improved military conditions in Korea.  Analysts suspected that the 
threats received from communist leaders were nothing more than an 
attempt to intimidate the West and concluded that an open intervention in 
Korea was not in the interest of Communist China because of the threat of 
war with the United Nations. 
One of the CIA‘s most urgent assessments of Chinese intentions 
was issued weeks before UN forces marched north of the 38
th
 Parallel.  
Analysts warned that reports of increased military strength in Manchuria, 
coupled with ‗the known potential in that area,‘ made it clear that 
intervention was well within immediate Chinese Communist capabilities.  
In contrast to so many of the Agency‘s general assessments, the report 
contained specific information regarding the estimated military strength 
and capabilities of Chinese Communist forces along the Manchurian 
border: 
 
The major elements of Lin Piao‘s 4th Field 
Army—totaling perhaps 100,000 combat 
veterans—are now in Manchuria and are 
probably located along or adjacent to the 
Korean border, in position for rapid 
commitment in Korea.  Approximately 
210,000 Communist regulars under Nieh 
Jung-chen‘s command are presently deployed 
in the North China area.  Some of these 
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troops have been reported [en route] to 
Manchuria.  The Chinese Communists are 
believed to possess an air force totaling 200 
to 250 operational combat aircraft, some units 
of which are reportedly deployed in 
Manchuria.
683
 
   
In light of this information, analysts concluded that the recent 
Chinese Communist accusations regarding US ―aggression‖ and violation 
of the Manchurian border might be stage-setting for an imminent overt 
move.  The CIA added some confusion to the picture, however, reporting 
that such an overt action by the Chinese Communists would have 
‗momentous repercussions;‘ therefore, Chinese participation in the Korean 
conflict would probably be more ‗indirect, although significant.‘684  At the 
same time, the intelligence agency pointed out that the successful 
consolidation of UN forces at Inchon was rapidly changing the outlook in 
South Korea, arguing that the advance of UN forces brought North Korea 
and the USSR nearer to the time when they would implement ‗crucial 
political and military decisions regarding the ultimate fate of North 
Korea.‘685  Each government knew that with the available forces, the North 
Koreans would be unable to hold South Korea.   
Among the courses of action available to the USSR, the CIA 
advised, was the possibility of Chinese or Soviet troops being committed 
north of the 38
th
 Parallel to check a UN advance.  Analysts estimated 
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120,000-130,000 North Korean troops were engaged in southeastern Korea 
at the time of the Inchon landing.
686
  However, the CIA maintained that 
organized resistance in the South could not be sustained without military 
assistance from either Chinese or Soviet combat units since nearly all North 
Korean units had already been committed to the fighting.  Believing that 
the Soviet Union was willing to ‗write off North Korea militarily rather 
than risk the possibility of global war with UN powers,‘ analysts reasoned 
it was improbable that either Soviet or Chinese Communist organized units 
would be committed to action in Korea for the purpose of preventing UN 
ground forces crossing the 38
th
 Parallel.
687
 
The flurry of intelligence reports disseminated during October 
continued to argue the improbability of Chinese Communist intervention.
688
  
A Daily Summary issued on October 3 referenced a telegram routed from 
the British Foreign Office representative in Peiping.  The telegram reported 
that Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou Enlai, had warned the 
Indian Ambassador to Peiping, Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, that if UN 
armed forces crossed the 38
th
 Parallel China would ‗send troops across the 
frontier to participate in the defense of North Korea.‘689  Although this 
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telegram circulated through the State Department and went to the President, 
it was considered ‗no more than a relay of Communist propaganda‘—an 
idle threat that was unreliable for serious consideration.
690
  This sort of 
dismissal of repeated warnings from Chinese leaders cannot be pinned on 
intelligence analysts alone.  Still, it may safely be argued that the CIA 
played a role in reinforcing Washington‘s inability to recognize the risk at 
hand.  Like the State Department, intelligence analysts suspected that the 
information from Ambassador K.M. Panikkar was planted in an attempt to 
influence US and British policy, believing that most of the reports it 
received were Chinese Nationalist propaganda for Western consumption.  
The arrival of Bedell Smith as DCI brought a new sense of urgency 
to the CIA‘s analysis of the situation in Korea.  The former ambassador 
wasted no time in overhauling the Agency‘s estimating procedures and 
expanding its covert operation capability.
691
  (By 1949, President Truman 
had begun considering ways to expand the CIA‘s covert operational 
capabilities).
692
  As DCI, Smith addressed inefficiency and duplication by 
streamlining departmental procedures and removing much of the 
bureaucratic red tape that impeded the CIA‘s ability to collect intelligence 
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and conduct covert operations.
693
  The President made his approval of 
Smith‘s reforms known by presenting him with a letter in which he wrote, 
‗I have been reading the Intelligence Bulletin, and I am highly impressed 
with it.  I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one.‘694  Truman‘s letter 
also draws attention to the gap that is often so difficult to bridge in 
intelligence studies—from common assumption to unequivocal evidence 
that the President read the CIA‘s reports! 
 However, considering the paucity of the communications and 
technical intelligence and the inadequate clandestine operational abilities, 
analysts still had few information sources to draw upon.
695
  In fact, until the 
creation of the NSA, the intelligence community continued to primarily 
rely on traditional open sources such as Pravda, party propaganda, as well 
as Soviet defectors.  It must be remembered, though, that even today most 
raw intelligence is not acquired by cloak-and-dagger adventures, but rather 
from readily available sources, including: journalists, diplomats, 
government officers, governmental publications, private businesses and 
scholars.
696
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 Once in office, Bedell Smith not only had to deal with these 
matters, but was faced with the unopposed communist invasion of Tibet on 
October 7, 1950.
697
  Tibet‘s quick loss of sovereignty should have alerted 
observers and led them to see Chinese risk-taking in more alarming terms.  
To be sure, the Truman administration was concerned that this display of 
Chinese aggression could be a precursor to future plans in Korea.  
However, the US government‘s position on Tibet was made clear during 
World War II: 
    
The Government of the United States has 
borne in mind the fact that the Chinese 
Government has long claimed suzerainty over 
Tibet and that the Chinese constitution lists 
Tibet among areas constituting the territory 
of the Republic of China.  This Government 
has at no time raised a question regarding 
either of these claims.
698
 
  
 Truman had cause for concern.  The day following the invasion of 
Tibet, Mao Tse-tung secretly ordered Chinese ―volunteers‖ towards the 
battlefront in Korea.
699
  Washington was forced to reconcile its support for 
Chinese territorial declarations with current US policy.  A Daily Summary 
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sent to the President‘s desk on October 9 summarized a report from US 
Ambassador Murphy in Brussels in which the ambassador had been 
informed by a high official of the Belgian Foreign Office that it had no 
information ‗of a disturbing nature‘ regarding a military intervention, 
although it was believed that the threats issued by Premier Chou Enlai 
should be ‗closely examined‘ because Peiping was evidently prepared to 
make ‗equivocal statements to please the Russians without ―making 
definite commitment to act openly in Korea.‘700  This information rested 
well with the CIA‘s line of reasoning that an intervention was unlikely.701 
  On the same day of receiving this Daily Summary, Truman issued a 
directive to MacArthur stating that, even if Chinese intervention occurred, 
the General should continue operations, as long as, in his judgment, ‗action 
by forces under your control offers a reasonable chance of success.‘702  
Truman‘s administration appears to have remained naively optimistic that 
US determination could assure success.  According to Gabriella Heichal, 
President Truman had received the information that fitted with his image 
about the Chinese threat and was thus able to ignore the warnings.   This 
‗coping-avoidance‘ allowed him, Heichal argues, to deflect the initiative 
and avoid making difficult decisions himself.
703
 
A subsequent assessment of the critical situation in the Far East was 
issued on October 12.  ORE 58-50 reported that there was evidence of a 
buildup of Chinese troop strength across the Yalu River, albeit with no air 
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or naval forces to support a ground assault.  Analysts argued, however, that 
the most favorable time for intervention had already passed and argued 
against such an event on the grounds that troop movements into Manchuria 
alone did not necessarily indicate an imminent intervention, but rather a 
defensive posture against a possible UN incursion into Manchuria.  The 
report reasoned that the Chinese would fear the consequences of war with 
the US because ‗the regime‘s entire domestic program and economy would 
be jeopardized‘ by the strains of war.  Besides, ‗intervention would 
minimize the possibility of Chinese membership in the UN and of a seat on 
the Security Council.‘  Furthermore, open intervention would be costly for 
the Chinese military without the direct support of Soviet air and naval 
power.  In turn, this acceptance of increased military assistance ‗would 
make [Peiping] more dependent on Soviet help and increase Soviet control 
in Manchuria….‘  Finally, analysts wrote that continued covert aid would 
‗offer most of the advantages of overt intervention while avoiding its risks 
and disadvantages.‘704 
The continual dismissal of warnings from the Chinese leadership 
significantly shaped the CIA‘s reluctance to appreciate the increased risks 
in Korea.  Despite statements by Chou Enlai, troop movements to 
Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities and border violations, 
there were considered to be no convincing indications of an actual Chinese 
Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea.  Instead, 
analysts considered these reports as a possible means to ‗intimidate and 
divide‘ the United States and its allies over the issue of crossing the 38th 
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Parallel, and the threats made by Chinese Communist leaders were seen as 
a ‗last-ditch attempt‘ to intimidate the United States. Ultimately, the 
estimate concluded that open intervention in Korea was not in the interests 
of the Chinese Communists because of the resulting war with the UN: 
  
While full-scale Chinese Communist 
intervention in Korea must be regarded as a 
continuing possibility, a consideration of all 
known factors leads to the conclusion that 
barring a Soviet decision for global war, such 
action is not probable in 1950.  During this 
period, intervention will probably be 
confined to continued covert assistance to the 
North Koreans.
705
 
 
To complicate the picture further, General Douglas MacArthur 
maintained a degree of contempt for any civilian agency, believing that 
intelligence belonged in the hands of the military.  As a wartime combat 
leader, MacArthur continued to possess a great deal of political power as 
was evidenced by his ability to sideline CIA efforts in the Far East 
whenever possible, even though his military intelligence was inadequate for 
the job.  To make matters worse, the CIA was required to coordinate its 
intelligence operations with G-2 and a special operations entity—
Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK).
706
  
However, since the Second World War, MacArthur had resisted the CIA‘s 
                                                 
705
 Ibid.  The most acerbic warning came from Premier Chou Enlai‘s response to the UN‘s 
breach of the 38th Parallel on 1 October.  The CIA dismissed out of hand, warnings by 
Chou Enlai, troop movements to Manchuria, as well as reports of border violations.  See, 
ORE 58-50, ―Critical Situations in the Far East,‖ 12 October 1950.  CREST, 86B00269R, 
Box 3, Folder 4, NARA.  The same report also pointed out that Soviet armed forces were 
capable of overwhelming UN ground forces in Korea, virtually without warning. 
706
 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 273-274, 281.  
287 
 
presence in the region and was resentful of the CIA‘s budding operations in 
the Far East, as well as the Agency‘s increasing influence over the 
President.  For MacArthur, the problem about intelligence in the region 
arose from the CIA‘s handling of it and had nothing to do with his own 
predilection for control and authority.   
UN forces advanced across the 38
th
 Parallel into North Korea in 
early October.  Truman grew increasingly concerned about the possibility 
that the communist government in China might intervene to protect the 
North Korean regime.  ‗In addition, Mac Arthur had recently embarrassed 
the administration by calling publicly for the use in Korea of nationalist 
Chinese forces from Taiwan—something that the administration rejected 
for fear that it would antagonize the Chinese Communists.‘707  The 
President did not share MacArthur‘s optimistic battlefield assessment and 
feared that if the present military response of the UN was not confined civil 
war could quickly escalate into an unmanageable full-scale global war.   
Therefore, on October 14, Truman met with MacArthur at Wake 
Island to assess the military situation in the Far East.
708
  After more than an 
hour of discussion about the Korean situation Truman asked the general, 
‗What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?‘  The General 
replied, ‗Very little.‘709  MacArthur went on to assure the president that 
victory was imminent and that the US could even send a division to Europe 
in January 1951, clearly indicating that even at the highest levels, the US 
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command did not expect the war to last much longer.
710
  Reflecting on this 
position, the CIA‘s Korean Desk Officer at the time wrote that 
MacArthur‘s G-2 ‗continued in all official assessments down to the 
outbreak of the war to discount reports and rumors of an invasion.‘711   
The intelligence report most scrutinized by historians was included 
in an intelligence briefing prepared under the direction of Dean Rusk, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, for the Wake Island meeting.  
It is worth noting that this briefing was drafted at a time when the tide of 
war seemed to be going in the favor of UN forces.  The CIA, like General 
MacArthur, was instrumental in forming the consensus at Wake Island by 
downplaying the critical situation in the Far East.  Copies of its report, 
―Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,‖ were sent to 
the White House and to the participants at the Wake Island meeting.  The 
report offered conclusions regarding a possible Soviet decision to risk a 
global war with Korea.  Analysts advised that with the Soviet Union‘s 
aggressive posturing, the risk of a general war existed ‗now and hereafter at 
anytime when the Soviet rulers may elect to take action which threatens, 
wholly or in part, the vital interests of the Western Powers.‘712 
It was agreed upon that General MacArthur‘s directives should be 
changed and that he should be free to do what he could militarily.  At the 
same time, the State Department would seek ways to find out whether 
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negotiations with the Chinese Communists were possible.  MacArthur left 
the meeting with a rather inflexible military strategy and plans to roll back 
the North Korean army to the banks of the Yalu River.  No one should have 
been better qualified than MacArthur to make an accurate assessment of the 
current situation in Korea.  After all, the UN commander was most familiar 
with the logistic and strategic situation on the ground.  Yet, MacArthur 
downplayed the seriousness of the evidence pointing to Chinese activity 
that suggested preparations for a major offensive.  Reflecting on their 
meeting at Wake Island, Truman noted, ‗General MacArthur had assured 
me…that it [Chinese intervention] wouldn‘t happen.  Apparently, his 
information service was not what it should have been.‘713  
 
 
Advance to the Yalu 
 
The advance to the Yalu is a prime example 
of an American propensity to take the 
righteousness of its actions for granted and to 
ignore the objective reality which its behavior 
represents to others.—David S. McLellan714 
 
Shortly after returning from Wake Island, MacArthur pressed the 
UN forces well beyond the restraining line agreed upon earlier by US 
policymakers.  This line was ignored altogether on October 24 when his 
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field commanders were ordered to use any and all ground forces at their 
command to capture North Korea.   Ultimately, the military risk was 
permitted because, as David S. McLellan points out, ‗it was assumed that 
with the success of MacArthur‘s offensive it would only require a measure 
of self-restraint in the approaches to the Yalu to establish a buffer zone 
which would be accepted by the Red Chinese either tacitly or after some 
brief period of skirmishing.‘715 
The final weeks in October did not see any real changes to the 
CIA‘s assessments.  A Daily Summary issued on the 16th was in line with 
earlier assessments that China‘s intervention was unlikely even though 
analysts believed North Korea‘s troops lacked the strength and experience 
to continue to be effective on the battlefield.  In addition, the CIA 
referenced information obtained from the US Embassy in Hague.  The still 
classified source referenced four divisions of unidentified troops (presumed 
to be Chinese) that had crossed the Manchurian border into North Korea.  
Still, analysts concluded that Communist China would probably not openly 
intervene.
716
   
To be sure, the situation on the battlefield looked promising shortly 
after the Wake Island meeting.  On October 18, South Korean troops 
occupied the North Korean cities of Hamnung and Hungnam.  The 
following day, the Eighth Army took the capital city of North Korea, 
Pyongyang—a clear indication that the tide of battle had turned in favor of 
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the UN forces.  As the chances for success tipped more in favor of UN 
forces, the CIA became increasingly convinced that although the Chinese 
Communists had possessed the capability for direct military intervention 
for some time the optimal moment for them to attack had passed.
717
  This 
general conclusion persisted despite its own sources reporting 400,000 
Chinese Communist troops massing in the mountains along the border.
718
 
By October 25, UN forces were less than forty miles south of the 
Yalu River.  The following day a small number of Chinese troops (15,000-
20,000) were reported to be fighting in northern Korea.
719
  According to a 
still classified source in Hong Kong, however, the Peiping and Moscow 
governments regarded the war as ‗virtually ended‘ and were not planning a 
counteroffensive.
720
  The reason is unclear why the CIA chose to support 
this fragmentary evidence.  A Daily Summary issued at the end of October 
discounted information obtained from interrogated prisoners of war.  Ten 
Chinese Communist prisoners claimed that three divisions were in Korea.  
Still believing that China‘s direct intervention in Korea was unlikely, CIA 
analysts concluded that the information obtained from these POWs was 
probably planted in an attempt to frustrate the UN advance, reasoning that 
privates in the Chinese army would not ordinarily possess detailed 
battlefield information.
721
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The final Daily Summary in October dismissed a report from the US 
Eighth Army headquarters that two regiments of Chinese Communist 
troops might be engaged with US forces in North Korea.
722
  The CIA 
acknowledged that there were small numbers of Chinese troops operating 
in Korea, but still believed that the presence of the reported troops was not 
necessarily an indication that Communist China intended to intervene 
directly.
723
 
 The coming challenges of the crisis hinged on the significant events 
that occurred during what Secretary Dean Acheson described as the most 
critical period of the Korean War:  the three-weeks from October 26 to 
November 17.  By early November, the UN army was approaching the 
Yalu border and intensifying bombing of enemy communications routes.  
DCI Smith now believed that the Chinese Communists and the Soviets had 
accepted an increased risk of a general war.  (Prior to mid-October, Chinese 
support of the North Korean regime had consisted solely of logistical aid 
and moral support).
724
  The intelligence director prepared a memorandum 
for the President in which he warned that fresh, newly-equipped North 
Korean troops appeared in the Korean fighting, and had clearly established 
that Chinese troops were also opposing UN forces.  The CIA‘s field 
estimate was that between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese Communist ground 
troops, organized in task force units, were helping the North Koreans 
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prolong their resistance while the parent units remained in Manchuria.
725
  
The current pattern of events, argued CIA analysts, indicated that 
Communist China had decided, regardless of the increased risk to general 
war, to provide increased support and assistance to the North Korean army. 
Yet even as mounting evidence suggested an increasing appetite for 
risk by the Chinese Communists, the Central Intelligence Agency 
continued to issue an overstretched measure of reassurance.  Believing the 
time had passed when Chinese intervention would have turned the military 
tide in Korea, analysts wrote: 
 
In a sense, of course, the Chinese 
Communists already have ―intervened,‖ since 
forty to sixty thousand Chinese-trained troops 
of Korean origin have been fighting in the 
North Korean army and since Manchuria is a 
major supply source for North Korea.  The 
Soviet Korean venture, a laboratory test in 
the use of non-Soviet Communist forces to 
fight a local war of limited objectives has 
ended in failure.
726
 
 
At the time, the CIA was receiving reports from numerous 
independent sources indicating massive Chinese Communist troop 
movements.  A Daily Summary in early November contained a classified 
source that claimed twenty Chinese Communist armies were in Manchuria 
(approximately 400,000-600,000 troops).  Reports from US representatives 
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in London and Rangoon and from another classified source in Taiwan 
indicated ‗considerable troop movements‘ into Manchuria during October.   
In addition to cataloging the evidence available on Communist 
troop movements, the Daily Summary referred to the US Consul in Hong 
Kong, General Wilkinson.  Wilkinson claimed that the decision had been 
made for Communist China to ‗participate in the war‘ during an August 
conference of top Sino-Soviet leaders.  The US Consul also relayed that 
Chinese Premier Mao Tse-tung had made the formal decision on October 
24.
727
  On this issue, however, the CIA viewed these assessments by the 
diplomatic community as merely a representation of personal opinions, 
asserting that, on the basis of the available evidence, Chinese Communist 
participation in the Korean conflict would be limited to the defense of the 
Manchurian border and that open large-scale intervention was not likely.
728
 
On the following day, the CIA and General Douglas MacArthur 
offered similar assessments.  MacArthur provided an interim appraisal to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he argued that a full-scale Chinese 
intervention remained unlikely.
729
  Likewise, the CIA concluded that the 
indications of ‗increased Chinese Communist support and assistance‘ to 
North Korean forces merely pointed to a decision to establish a cordon 
sanitaire south of the Yalu River.  This assessment was qualified, however, 
by adding that the possibility could not be excluded that the Chinese 
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Communists, under Soviet direction, were committing themselves to a full-
scale intervention in Korea.
730
  
On November 7, the Peiping government revealed the existence of 
Chinese volunteers in Korea.
731
  Policy leaders received a National 
Intelligence Estimate peppered with inconsistencies the following day.  The 
NIE, titled ―Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,‖ reported that 
combined Chinese and North Korean ground forces on the peninsula could 
compel UN forces to withdraw to ‗defensive positions further south.‘  The 
report also estimated that Peiping probably could make available 350,000 
soldiers ‗for sustained ground operations in Korea…within thirty to sixty 
days.‘732   
A Weekly Summary issued several days later contained a greater 
degree of caution than previous reports.  ‗At any point in this 
development,‘ the Summary warned, ‗the danger is present that the 
situation may get out of control and lead to a general war.‘733  The report 
pointed out that the Chinese Communists had already accepted a ‗grave 
risk‘ of retaliation and general war by their limited intervention in Korea.  
According to analysts, this restricted involvement may have been an 
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indication that their objective was merely to halt the advance of UN forces 
and to maintain a Communist regime in Korea.
734
 
Just nine days before the Chinese intervention, the CIA continued to 
reassure policymakers that the Chinese Communist moves were ‗flexible‘ 
and ‗defensive‘ in nature and were designed for probing and limited 
purposes.
735
  The same day these ―defensive‖ maneuvers were reported, the 
China specialist at the State Department‘s Policy Planning Staff, John 
Paton Davies, issued a warning that challenged the intelligence agency‘s 
judgments.  Davies advised that the bulk of the evidence indicated that the 
Kremlin and Peiping were ‗committed to at least holding the northern 
fringe of Korea—and, that, against our present force they have the military 
capability of doing so.‘  Davies further suggested that the US should 
consider halting ‗major military operations and seek the establishment of a 
demilitarized zone south of the Yalu.‘736  Instead, the British and American 
governments continued to deliver diplomatic missives to assure the Chinese 
government that the UN would respect the Manchurian frontier and would 
demilitarize a buffer zone along the border.   
The reassurances appeared to have helped.  By November 21 the 
first US 17
th
 Regiment had reached the Yalu without any Chinese 
interference.  MacArthur‘s army, already looking forward to returning 
home by Christmas, arrived in two widely separated columns ‗in a manner 
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inviting a counterattack.‘737  Unsuspecting of the enemy-in-hiding, General 
MacArthur ordered General Walton Walker to attack along a broad front 
that exposed the flanks of the Eighth to the concealed Chinese army.
738
  On 
November 26, 1950, an army of approximately 100,000 Chinese troops, the 
38
th
, 39
th
 and 40
th
 armies secretly crossed into Korea by night to hide their 
movement from the air.
739
  Fitted with little more than grenades, rifles, 
machine guns and mortars, the communist forces arrived opposite the 
Eighth Army.  In one of the greatest defeats in US military history, UN 
troops were blunted by a massive counteroffensive launched by Chinese 
Communist forces.  Although the Chinese lacked the training of their UN 
counterparts, as well as trained tank and artillery units, they had the 
element of relative surprise.  UN forces were overwhelmed and retreated 
along all fronts across the Yalu area.  Within two days Chinese forces 
threatened to completely envelop the retreating UN army. 
Citing communist threats against Formosa, Japan and Western 
Europe, the President despondently wrote, ‗…It looks like World War III is 
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here.  I hope not—but we must meet whatever comes—and we will.‘740  
Also alarmed by the swarms of Chinese Communist soldiers, the CIA 
shared the President‘s concerns, but only after Communist China‘s 
intentions were completely obvious.  Reflecting a complete revision of its 
assessment of communist intentions, analysts warned that the Soviet 
leaders, in directing or sanctioning the Chinese Communist intervention, 
‗must have appreciated the increased risk of global war and have felt ready 
to accept such a development…They have resolved to pursue aggressively 
their world wide attack on the power position of the United States and its 
allies, regardless of the possibility that global war may result.‘741  
Intelligence analysts were reasonably certain that the USSR, ‗motivated by 
unwillingness…to accept the significant loss of International Communist 
prestige and important strategic territory involved in abandoning North 
Korea,‘ had felt ‗the urgent necessity of striking a blow at the ever-
expanding US policy of containment....‘742  (Containment, embodied in 
NSC 68, became an updated version of the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and its 
implementation owed a lot to the Korean War.  In fact, NSC 68 became the 
cornerstone for US foreign and military policy until Truman left office).
743
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Washington feared that a UN failure would embolden the newly 
formed Sino-Soviet alliance.
744
  The American Joint Intelligence 
Indications Committee echoed this concern during the final weeks of 1950.  
The Soviet armed forces, it wrote, ‗are in an advanced state of readiness for 
war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning.‘745  
Secretary Acheson noted his frustration over the United States‘ position in 
the Far East, writing that the Government missed its last chance to halt the 
march to disaster in Korea.  ‗All the President‘s advisers in this matter, 
civilian and military,‘ he wrote, ‗knew that something was badly wrong, 
though what it was, how to find out, and what to do about it they 
muffed.‘746  Were Acheson‘s frustrations overstated?  This is unlikely.  
Even President Truman later acknowledged:  ‗We knew that this was one 
of the places where the Soviet-controlled Communist world might 
attack.‘747  Richard Aldrich asserts that this blunder was due, at least in 
part, to policymakers being ‗strongly influenced‘ by the CIA‘s suggestions 
that there were no convincing indications of Chinese Communist 
intervention (although he points out that intelligence had improved in the 
course of the Korean conflict).
748
  Allen Dulles‘ memoir casts additional 
light on the estimates policymakers received from the CIA about the 
Chinese intervention:  
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…It was a toss-up, but they leaned to the side 
that under certain circumstances the Chinese 
probably would not intervene.  In fact, we 
just did not know what the Chinese 
Communists would do, and we did not know 
how far the Soviet Union would press them 
or agree to support them if they moved.
749
 
 
Dulles was clearly troubled by the inconsistencies that plagued the 
Agency‘s assessments during the war; nevertheless, he believed that the 
communists‘ failure of a war by proxy in Korea was due ‗in no small 
measure to the employment of intelligence assets…‘750 
 
 
Stalemate:  1951-1953 
It has been argued that part of the blame for not predicting Chinese 
intervention must rest on the poor relationship between General MacArthur 
and the Pentagon.
751
  Once his forces were engaged with the enemy, the 
often overconfident MacArthur insisted that the Kremlin must have backed 
Chinese motives.
752
  The never reticent UN commander quickly called for 
the UN to break from its policy of self-restraint and to consider extending 
the war into Manchuria and urged the Truman administration to meet the 
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Chinese counteroffensive with full force.  His appeal directly challenged 
Truman‘s order to limit the Korean conflict.  In fact, MacArthur‘s 
objective, known to few in Washington at the time, was to expand the war 
into China, overthrow the Peiping regime, and restore Chiang Kai-shek‘s 
government.  MacArthur‘s objectives ran counter to the President‘s 
concerns about the ‗jittery situation‘ with Communist China engaged in a 
direct military confrontation. 
Frustrated by his arrogance, President Truman used MacArthur‘s 
public attack on the CIA in the New York Times to politically isolate the 
general.  MacArthur had claimed that the CIA had reported to him that 
Communist China would not intervene directly in Korea.  The following 
day, Truman argued that the CIA had, at the very least, warned of the 
dangers of a Chinese attack in November 1950.
753
  The precise reasons 
behind Truman‘s actions remain unclear. Were his efforts an indication of 
disgust with MacArthur, a show of support for the Agency, or a mixture of 
both?  The evidence presented in this case study suggests that Truman‘s 
public refutation of MacArthur‘s criticism of the CIA was not so much a 
vote of confidence for the intelligence agency, but a sign of the president‘s 
frustration with the general‘s disproportionate weight in the decision-
making process.   
MacArthur was dismissed from command on April 10, 1951.  His 
removal signified a clear shift of US policy in Korea and re-established 
containment as ‗the reigning orthodoxy.‘754  Equally important, it defused 
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the explosive potential of MacArthur‘s more ambitious war aims and 
relieved Truman from the tension of the general‘s unpredictable behavior.  
This presented an opportunity for Truman to resume peace negotiations 
with Peiping and Moscow.  After MacArthur‘s dismissal, the most 
uncertain stages in the crisis had passed and the situation on the battlefield 
began to improve.  Known as ―Old Iron Tits,‖755 the new commander of all 
UN forces in Korea, General Matthew Bunker Ridgeway, stabilized the UN 
army‘s position along the 38th Parallel, and by early 1951 American forces 
were able to establish a defensive position just below the 38
th
 Parallel.  On 
July 2, 1951, North Korea and China agreed to discuss a cease-fire, 
although an armistice wasn‘t signed until July 27, 1953. 
  
 
Conclusions 
 The lessons of Korea had a profound effect on intelligence and the 
decision-making process significantly broadened the scope and the 
responsibilities of the CIA.  By the time of the signing of the armistice, the 
CIA had established itself as a formidable intelligence agency.  Ray S. 
Cline notes that only under the ‗impetus of the War in Korea in 1950‘ did 
the CIA begin to get the authority, the funds, and the staff to operate as a 
real central intelligence machine.
756
  Indeed, the CIA had grown to 
approximately six times its 1947 size and its covert operations budget had 
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increased twenty fold.
757
  Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones points out that the reward 
for intelligence failure was to be intelligence expansion.
758
  Certainly if one 
were to use numbers as any guide, then Jeffreys Jones is correct.  In 1949, 
the OPC had 302 employees, with a budget of $4,700,000.  By 1953, the 
number of employees had risen to 2,812 home-based with an additional 
3,142 overseas employees, as well as a budget increase to $82,000,000.
759
  
‗The political climate of the 1950s, as well as the Agency‘s expertise and 
good fortune,‘ argues Jeffreys-Jones, ‗contributed to the status-boosting 
judgmental process.‘  According to a heavily edited, informal memoir 
prepared by the ORE Korean Desk Officer (circa 1948-1950), the 
intelligence community was granted substantial increases in funds and 
personnel, ‗rather than suffering a loss of stature and prestige for any real 
or imagined shortcomings in performance‘: 
 
New offices, new functions, new procedures, 
new techniques were given spur by the war, 
were created in response to it, or were made 
possible by the new atmosphere in which an 
appreciation of the importance of intelligence 
to national security reached new highs.
760
 
 
Surprisingly, much of this ―good fortune‖ occurred during some of 
the Central Intelligence Agency‘s darkest days.  A US Senate Select 
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Committee reported that, by 1953, the Agency had achieved the basic 
structure and scale it retained for the next twenty-five years:  ‗The Korean 
War, United States foreign policy objectives, and the Agency‘s internal 
organizational arrangements had combined to produce an enormous 
impetus for growth.‘761  At the very least, this rapid expansion suggests 
that, even during some of its darkest days, the CIA was viewed an 
important source of information for policymakers. 
The previous chapter demonstrated that, while certainly not 
flawless, the Central Intelligence Agency was a guiding hand for an 
administration that needed reassurance about communist intentions.  The 
point that should not be overlooked here is that the CIA was most useful 
when it did not have to go beyond the general atmosphere of concern about 
Soviet intentions and objectives to risk a general war with the United States 
and/or Western Europe.  At no point during the crisis did the CIA overlook 
the ultimate Soviet threat of a general war in which Western Europe and 
most of Asia could be quickly overrun by the USSR.  In weighing the 
probability of whether Soviet leaders might consider it necessary to accept 
such a risk, the intelligence agency placed security threats within a 
manageable and realistic context that allowed Washington to focus on the 
developing crisis in Korea.   
Following the invasion of South Korea, however, this ―guiding 
hand‖ had stretched past its point of usefulness as analysts became 
increasingly incapable of providing Washington with assessments that 
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accurately reflected the complexity and risks of the crisis.  Limited by its 
belief that neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China was prepared to 
provoke a general war, CIA assessments had become largely inflexible.  
The CIA‘s understanding was challenged in a number of areas:  the 
continuing evidence of reinforcement of Chinese Communist forces in the 
region, the further build-up of their forces in Manchuria, and the nature of 
the Chinese Communist offensive in Korea.  We have even seen that, up to 
the last minute when Chinese troops were clearly in Korea, the CIA was 
still refuting the facts—even to the extent that, no matter what evidence 
analysts received, ‗they found reasons to discount it.‘762   
A particularly harsh internal review of ORE‘s performance 
highlights a number of compelling reasons for the failures of CIA 
assessments of the Far East:  1) a reliance on broad, general assumptions 2) 
a reliance on narrow, specialized knowledge that supported the belief that 
Communist China required the consent of Soviet Russia, and 3) a belief 
that the commitment of Chinese troops would mean a general war with the 
US.
763
   To be sure, analysts had been hamstrung early on by its inflexible 
mindset that reasoned that the Chinese Communists would not enter the 
war; and having followed that line of reasoning throughout the course of 
1950, the Agency continued to follow it in the face of mounting, conflicting 
evidence.  To be fair, we must remember that the CIA never suggested that 
Chinese Communist intervention was impossible.  In fact, analysts 
submitted numerous reports that suggested the Chinese Communists were 
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capable of a full-scale military intervention.  Still, the intelligence reports 
were often inconsistent and failed to take account of the rapidly changing 
situation.   
These flawed assessments were most likely because of the Agency‘s 
inflexible mindset—that the Soviet Union was unwilling to enlarge the 
scope of the conflict by committing Chinese forces for fear of substantially 
increasing the risk of a general war.  Consequently, the CIA‘s assessments 
of the specific risks in Korea were remarkably inconsistent with the 
available evidence.  In fact, analysts even discredited warnings issued by 
Chinese leaders through public and private channels.  The intelligence 
agency had been so focused on the question of Soviet intentions and 
capabilities that it believed the key to any Chinese decision hinged on to 
what extent the USSR desired to risk instigating a global war.   
Certainly on the question of the risks associated with expanding US 
war aims in Korea, the CIA‘s declassified intelligence reports have shown 
that its assessments were relatively inconsistent and ineffective at 
informing policymakers about security threats.  On the question of Chinese 
intervention, the CIA‘s analysis was even more so.  This is not to suggest, 
however, that determining the risks of a global war were not still an 
important factor in guiding US policy.  As the war progressed in Korea, 
though, the Truman administration was more confident that the Russians 
hoped to involve the United States as heavily as possible in Asia ‗so that 
they might gain a free hand in Europe.‘764   
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 Richard Betts asserts that in the best known cases of intelligence 
failure, ‗the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of 
raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished 
analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products 
of intelligence services.‘765  Certainly in the case of Korea, the crisis was 
further complicated because Washington was slow to realize that the most 
critical theater in the Cold War had changed.  The strategic priorities set by 
policy officials hastened the crisis in Korea and stressed the budding 
policy-intelligence relationship.  Furthermore, the political and military 
bumbling by the US leadership perpetuated a naively optimistic approach 
to the crisis.  Robert M. Clark contends in Intelligence Analysis—A Target-
Centric Approach that in 1950 that US intelligence made two major failures 
in prediction in six months—the North Korean and the Chinese attacks—
resulting from a combination of mindset and failure to do multidisciplinary 
analysis.  We‘ve already seen that the invasion of South Korea was not the 
―surprise‖ that is often suggested.  ORE‘s record with respect to warnings 
about the June invasion was reasonably satisfactory.  However, Clark is 
correct in arguing that since the political, military and intelligence thinking 
at the time was that the USSR was ‗the dominant communist state, 
exercising near-absolute authority over other Communist states, the 
resulting perception was that only the USSR could order an invasion by its 
client states, and such an act would be a prelude to a world war.‘766   
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By carefully examining precisely what the Central Intelligence 
Agency was telling senior policymakers, we have been better able to 
determine that the CIA‘s ability to assess specific threats during this time of 
the crisis, outside the fundamental risk of a third world war, could have 
been much better.  Moreover, its understanding of the Far East was not 
conducive to policy innovation and effectiveness in the region.  As a result, 
US policymakers were more likely to test the limits of the crisis.  Without 
an accurate analysis of the risks, colossal conceptual mistakes were made 
during both of the major phases of decision-making—the decision to cross 
the 38
th
 Parallel and the subsequent question of Chinese intervention. 
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Chapter VII 
Conclusions 
 
With a world up for grabs and with the Soviet 
Union taking what it could get, the CIA was 
charged with laying the U.S. claim.  The 
atmosphere was of a dawn like thunder.  The 
realization was clear that if it failed, the 
whole world might be lost.
767
 
 
 Reflecting on the CIA‘s performance at a news conference in 
October 1951, President Truman Harry stated, ―It [CIA] has worked very 
successfully.  We have an intelligence information service now that I think 
is not inferior to any in the world.‖768  As the Korean War drew to a close, 
Truman‘s successor, President Dwight Eisenhower, further championed the 
expansion of American intelligence by appointing Allen W. Dulles as the 
next director of central intelligence.  Even as the ink was drying on the 
Korean armistice, Dulles was ratcheting up operations against the Soviet 
Union.  Benefitting from a period of ‗progress amidst anxiety,‘769 Dulles 
inherited a robust, well-established intelligence agency that had emerged 
from growing-pains of the late 1940s and restructuring of the early 
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1950s.
770
    The CIA had expanded by six times in size from 1947 to 1953 
and was playing an increasingly important part in informing policy 
decisions.  Harry Howe Ransom touches on this early progress, noting that 
the CIA began to display ‗the features of an independent organization, a 
huge bureaucracy in its own right, with its own foreign policy, its own 
bureaucratic turf to protect, its own secret communications channels, its 
own airlines and secret armies, and vast sums of unvouched funds.‘771 
 
 
Research Questions Revisited 
 By providing a careful, detailed and critical analysis of the 
intelligence reports that reached the desks of key policymakers leading up 
to and during the Berlin crisis and the Korean War, this study has 
questioned the conventional wisdom of the CIA‘s early history.  The first 
case study examined the CIA‘s assessments within the context of policy 
decision-making from the months immediately following the Agency‘s 
creation in September 1947 to the lifting of the blockade in May 1949.  The 
other case study examined the crisis in the Far East from the escalation of 
hostilities in Korea to the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur in April 
1951.  Like the preceding case study, the CIA‘s assessments were placed 
within the context of US political decision-making but was divided into two 
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chronologically distinct phases.  Using this comparative case-study 
approach, this thesis has addressed a number of important questions:  How 
well did the CIA read Soviet intentions and how effectively did it read each 
crisis?  How accurate were analysts‘ warnings and assessments?  Yet, 
despite the clear answers to this set of questions, determining what 
influence its assessments had on policy decisions during times of crisis has 
been much more difficult to establish. 
 
  
A Tricky Business 
 Intelligence is a tricky business.  By its very nature, the crystal ball 
can never be anything more than an opaque reflection of human 
knowledge, experience and fallibility; and it has always contained an 
element of subjectivity and discretion.  In light of this reality, the preceding 
chapters have demonstrated that the Central Intelligence Agency had its 
share of difficulties in its formative years.  The bureaucratic infighting with 
the State Department and military intelligence compounded the confusion 
of objectives.  Furthermore, the intelligence agency was initially bogged 
down with daily reports, failing to adequately prioritize larger policy issues 
that could provide policy makers with suggestions for action.  In addition to 
dealing with these problems, the Office of Reports and Estimates and, later, 
the Office of National Estimates were handicapped by a deficit of 
HUMINT and SIGINT.  Yet, despite a general paucity of specific, detailed 
312 
 
information, the CIA‘s assessments were remarkably perceptive for the 
time. 
  However, where intelligence reports had been a strength in Berlin, 
it had been a weakness in Korea with the question of Sino-Soviet risk-
taking.  Throughout the Berlin crisis, analysts provided relevant, perceptive 
assessments regarding, not just broad Soviet objectives, but specific 
information about Soviet maneuvers in the eastern sectors of Germany.  
Analysts had a better hold of the issues in Germany than in the Far East, in 
part, because US policy was more clearly defined.  In other words, what 
worked in one crisis—the almost single focus on the threat of a general 
war—didn‘t work in the other.  It seems that the CIA‘s mindset was geared 
for one set of threats.   
 The CIA‘s analytical branch under the leadership of Hillenkoetter 
and Smith had a mixture of successes and failures, depending on a number 
of factors, including:  whether assessments were based on broad general 
security threats or on specific strategic issues, whether assessments focused 
on European issues, and whether the focus was on a principally Soviet 
threat.  The frequent assessments during both crises helped place Soviet 
actions in context by suggested that the USSR was neither planning for nor 
desired a direct military conflict.  In the case of the Berlin blockade and the 
early stages of the Korean War, intelligence analysts did a better job 
helping senior policymakers better understand alarming events in more 
realistic and less reactive terms. 
 Most importantly, CIA analysis of the Kremlin‘s aggressive 
posturing in Berlin was careful not to convey a sense of panic.  True, the 
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Agency‘s reports rarely revealed anything earth shattering, but in the case 
of Berlin, no news was good news.  Arthur M. Schlesinger Junior‘s 
suggestion that the Nobel Peace Prize should have gone to the atomic 
bomb, while almost certainly tongue-in-cheek, brings to mind how 
profoundly non-events shaped the early Cold War.
772
  This study has 
provided a number of examples along this line of reasoning, demonstrating 
that the Agency‘s most remarkable achievement was what didn‘t happen 
during these crises.
773
 
How these two Cold War crises might have played out without the 
CIA‘s influence are left to some measure of speculation.  The question of 
influence is a complex picture, and certainly more nuanced than perhaps 
supposed.  What we can be certain of, though, is that despite a general 
feeling of anxiety, Washington showed remarkable restraint during each 
crisis, in part, because of the CIA‘s assessments.  By adjusting perceptions 
of the Soviet threat and placing these threats within a pragmatic context, the 
Agency‘s reports may also have prevented an even greater military buildup 
in defense of a global war that was never to take place.  While we may 
never know, such a reactive buildup might have further unnerved the 
Kremlin enough to extend the limits of risk-taking. 
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The Crisis in Berlin 
 Western Europe was central to the Cold War; but it was Berlin that 
held the key to the uneasy peace.  Just one mistake or gunshot away from a 
hot war, the Soviet blockade gave rise to enduring tension that set the stage 
for the entire Cold War; not only because Germany remained the frontline 
of skullduggery and diplomatic trepidation, but because it also 
demonstrated, so soon during the postwar period, that provocative actions 
did not always equate to an armed conflict.  The crisis also established the 
Central Intelligence Agency as an integral component in the decision-
making process.  Despite the organizational problems and its newness, the 
CIA made assessments that were remarkably accurate and perceptive for 
the time.  Its assessments of Soviet behavior were increasingly important 
leading up to the Berlin blockade since events elsewhere had left 
Washington unsure about which Soviet actions or reactions might 
precipitate a war, thereby increasing the potential for many key figures to 
react strongly to Soviet risk-taking.  The CIA effectively placed Soviet 
actions in Berlin within a manageable context.  This was often achieved by 
establishing a clear understanding and distinction between Soviet intentions 
and capabilities—in either case showing that the Soviets were not ready for 
a direct military conflict. 
 Ultimately, the Central Intelligence Agency‘s cautious position of 
moderation was most effective at reassuring policy officials that Soviet 
overtures and risk-taking in Germany, while although provocative, was 
unlikely to lead to war.  Even as Soviet posturing became more 
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provocative, most US policymakers refused to take seriously the possibility 
of a blockade, despite mounting tension and the recent Soviet imposition of 
a temporary blockade of Western ground traffic to the Berlin.  In spring 
1948, when so much remained uncertain, General Clay and most US senior 
policy officials were unsure if they faced a political challenge to their 
presence in Berlin or the threat of war.  Only after carefully considering 
what intelligence analysts were telling policymakers does it become clearer 
that this uncertainty would have been more acute without the Agency‘s 
assessments.  In fact, when we reflect on the possible outcomes, especially 
given the confrontational posturing of the Soviet Union and the reactive 
approach of the US Military Governor in Germany, the significance of the 
CIA‘s ability to adjust perceptions of Soviet behavior during the crisis 
cannot be overstated.   
 The potential for mistakes and miscalculations during the early 
stages of the crisis further underscores the significance of the CIA‘s ability 
to issue assessments that could reassure Washington that the Russians had 
neither the intent nor capability for a direct military confrontation with the 
West.  On this issue, Truman and his circle of policymakers were advised 
that, although Soviet actions in Berlin had been far from conciliatory, it had 
not been as definitive or final as to signal a direct military conflict.  This 
proved to be an instrumental factor in moderating policy decisions.  By 
framing the potential triggers of the crisis in less alarming terms, the CIA 
could contextualize the threat and conclude that the sky was not falling.  
Analysts assumed that the Kremlin would remain antagonistic and 
opportunistic in Europe, particularly in East Germany, but cautioned that, 
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although the Kremlin was intent on exploiting Germany economically and 
politically, it did not desire an armed conflict. 
The study has also demonstrated that the CIA considered Western 
efforts in Berlin vital to US security interests. The intelligence reports 
urged policymakers that, in any negotiations, the Soviets would seek to 
prevent the establishment of a western German state and to frustrate the 
economic rehabilitation of Germany.  Analysts advised Washington to 
establish a firm, yet moderate position with the Soviets and outlined how 
the US could avoid a showdown while maintaining its position in Berlin.
 
 
 
 
The Crisis in Korea   
In comparison to the Berlin crisis, the CIA‘s record in the Far East 
is less straightforward.   The Korean War was a hot war in response to a 
direct confrontation, both larger in scale and more violent.  This study has 
also pointed out the relevance of Washington‘s lack of a clear and effective 
Far East policy.  With relatively little interest or influence on the Korean 
Peninsula, Washington had greater difficulty in placing the emerging crisis 
in a proper strategic context.  At least initially, the Truman administration 
feared that a Soviet success in Korea would translate into communist gains 
in Europe and other areas of the world.  This fear of a wider strategy for 
spreading hostility to other areas of the world became particularly acute 
during the early stages of the crisis because the leadership in Washington 
was unsure how far the USSR was willing to go.  The risk of further 
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miscalculations was thus significantly elevated.  Moreover, Truman‘s 
administration was neither willing nor prepared to support and defend a 
region with such a low security priority.  Once the war began in earnest, the 
political and military bumbling perpetuated a naively optimistic approach 
to the crisis, particularly when testing the limits of the political and military 
risks of crossing the 38
th
 Parallel.  As a result, colossal strategic mistakes 
were made.  
As in the crisis in Berlin, the CIA was remarkably perceptive on the 
larger issue of the risk of a global war.  These assessments were 
particularly important in the months leading up to the Korean War, given 
the potential for senior policymakers‘ concern over a global conflict to 
result in over reactive behavior.  Analysts issued reassuring, pragmatic 
assessments at a time when Washington was unsure of the magnitude or 
direction of the developing crisis.  Close analysis of the documentary 
evidence has also shown that the invasion of South Korea was not as great 
a ―surprise‖ as generally thought.  In fact, key policymakers were issued 
warnings about a probable invasion months before the outbreak of 
hostilities.   
As the violence escalated, analysts maintained their view that the 
Soviet Union had neither the ability nor the intent to provoke a major war 
with the United States.  Even after the June invasion, analysts correctly 
predicted that North Korea‘s attack was not indicative of a larger military 
conflict and that the Soviet Union did not desire any large-scale military 
action outside the Korean peninsula.  The study has shown that, quite often, 
these reports about the developing situation not only conveyed an 
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appropriate sense of urgency sufficient to have captured the attention of 
Washington, but also provided a corrective tool for decision-making by 
defining limits to the security threat.  
However, CIA assessments were relatively inconsistent in the 
period following the UN‘s offensive north of the 38th Parallel and, as a 
result, were of less value, particularly on the question of Chinese 
intervention.  The CIA understood that the stakes were high.  (American 
involvement in Korea resulted in the sacrifice of human life and economic 
cost:  Total US deaths during the conflict are estimated at 36,674.
774
  In 
terms of money, the war drained the economy of approximately 54 billion 
dollars.)
775
  But within the complex, rapidly shifting arena, intelligence 
analysts struggled to understand Soviet, Chinese and North Korean 
intentions in Korea.  This, in turn, led to analysts‘ failure to fully 
understand how American actions and the Sino-Soviet relationship would 
affect adversarial risk-taking.  On issues outside Soviet risk-taking and 
general war, the CIA‘s assessments of the communist threat proved 
somewhat inflexible.  Thus, what worked in one situation failed to work in 
the other.  The linchpin of the CIA‘s analysis was its belief that since 
Moscow and Beijing had been unwilling to risk a general war in Berlin and, 
again, in June-July 1950, it stood to reason that the communist leaders 
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would be unwilling to risk an open confrontation simply because UN forces 
deployed north of the 38
th
 Parallel.   
This preoccupation with the issue of whether or not there was a 
threat of global war, while valuable to policymakers during the crisis, 
appears to have blinded analysts to the mounting evidence that pointed to 
an escalation of hostilities.  Struggling to read China‘s appetite for high-
risk adventures, analysts even went so far as to dismiss diplomatic and 
battlefield intelligence that pointed to a Chinese Communist intervention.  
Moreover, the belief that the Soviet Union was the driving force behind any 
strategic decision in Korea illustrates how the CIA failed to understand the 
ideological considerations that led the communist leaders to undertake such 
risks in Korea. 
 
 
Implications  
This foreign policy stuff is a little frustrating. 
— Former US President, George W. Bush776  
 
 The concrete and barbed wire partitions created in Germany and 
Korea cast long shadows of distrust, apprehension and fear for the duration 
of the Cold War.  These two crises continue to leave an imprint on our 
understanding of US intelligence and foreign policy in the twenty-first 
century, even though the CIA‘s identity and role is continually undergoing 
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incremental change through reforms, public perception and policy trends.  
Not least because America continues to rely on many of its Cold War 
institutions to meet contemporary threats, this study, and others like it, not 
only contribute to the historical debate but contain modern-day relevance. 
 The increased public awareness to the CIA is unlikely to diminish in 
the coming years.  America‘s notorious intelligence agency continues to 
garner an enormous amount of interest.  A recent article in Foreign Affairs 
has, no doubt, continued to stoke the fires of debate.  In it, Paul R. Pillar 
suggests that the American public believes that the intelligence 
community‘s record ‗[to be] far worse than it actually is.‘  This assertion, 
we can safely assume, will be countered by a more critical appraisal.
777
  It 
is hoped that this detailed study, based on archival evidence, will play its 
part in forging a better understanding of the CIA‘s history. 
 So what, then, should follow in the field of intelligence history?  
There are still areas in which it is difficult to draw conclusions; principally 
on the degree of influence intelligence had on policy-making.  One would 
hope to see more answers about the CIA‘s nature and the quality of its 
influence during periods of crisis.  On this issue, future studies will need to 
track presidential decision-making as closely as this study has tracked CIA 
reports in order to go beyond drawing inferences and, when possible, to 
show direct connections.  Having pushed these two important case studies 
as far as I can in this direction, more case studies should be examined to 
draw an even stronger position.  The conclusions offered here would be 
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even more significant if this methodology could be extended to other 
examples of the Cold War. 
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Images
 
The sectors of Berlin during the Airlift 
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Gen. Walter Bedell Smith relieves R. Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter as Director 
of Intelligence in October 1950. 
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